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MS. and other Communications for the Editor should be addressed to G. E. MOORE, Litt.D., 86 Chesterton Road, Cambridge

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JULY, 1923.

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

EDITED BY

G. E. MOORE,

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF PROFESSOR PRINGLE-PATTISON, PROFESSOR C. D. BROAD, AND F. C. BARTLETT, M.A.

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
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MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

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PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—MENTAL PROCESS AND THE CONSCIOUS QUALITY.

BY J. LAIRD.

My object, in this discussion, is to consider some of the relations between consciousness and mentality, and more especially the relations between mental properties and what I call the conscious quality. It is impossible, I know, to expect general agreement on these topics; indeed it is very hard to make a single assertion on any point of principle which is not expressly denied in some competent quarter, and there is a peculiar, disquieting risk of mistaking cobwebby distinctions for solid barriers. On the other hand, the subject is important, and the risks are common to all enquirers.

Mental properties, we may agree, are those which are distinctive of minds, either in the broader sense of pertaining to minds or in the narrower sense of constituting a part of their being; and it is usual to believe that the relation of a mind to its states of consciousness is that of a thing to certain of its phases. This belief, of course, may be disputed. While some philosophers maintain that a mind is the very paradigm of thinghood, others assert with at least equal vigour that it is not a thing at all. At a certain level of discussion, however, it seems legitimate (and even necessary) to regard the mind as a continuing entity which in some important sense is the same thing throughout its changing career. If so, the mind abides, at least for a season, and conscious processes come and go. They are passing events in the mind, 'fulgurations,' or what you will. They glow, flicker, and vanish, giving place to other phases which vanish, likewise, in their turn.

From this point of view, then, we encounter the philosophical problem of the relation of a substance to its phases

and activities. Therefore, we may look out for difficulties. Some people 'bifurcate' the facts into a continuing, self-identical entity on the one hand, and the phases and activities which 'belong' to 'it,' on the other hand. Other people, starting from the premiss that a thing is just what it declares itself to be, and that a 'phase' of it may be *all* that it declares itself to be during the phase, conclude that a complete description of all the phases in their continuity would also be a complete biography of the thing. Translated into terms of the mind, these theories yield well-known views with equally well-known difficulties. The first gives us a 'pure ego' somehow related to the 'empirical me,' and it is supposed to be stricken to death when some Hume arises and declares that he cannot observe this ego when he looks for it. Considering that the substance of the bifurcating theory is always imperceptible and unimaginable—in literal strictness a noumenon that can only be thought—the surprising thing would be if the pure ego differed from any other substance in this particular. Even this, however, has been alleged. The self 'as a whole,' we are told—I suppose the same whole from the cradle to the coffin—enters visibly into all its experiences. The other party is less heroic. The mind, on this alternative view, is just the continuant which is the totality of its phases, and if you ask what 'its' means, you are referred, quite simply, to the continuity which is discoverable in fact when we say that Paul continues to be Paul. Paul can draw a conclusion if he is able to keep all the premises in *his* mind. *Paul's* hopes must have been dashed if *he* is disappointed. Peter's hopes, if any, are irrelevant to Paul's case.

It is generally agreed, however, on all the theories, that the conscious phases of the mind are only a part of its being. Why this should be agreed, I confess I cannot always see very clearly. If the mind 'as a whole' enters into every experience, then we ought to find it 'as a whole' every time. The 'pure ego,' again, might spring into existence at successive moments and embrace any empirical phase, or any set of empirical phases, however arbitrary their selection might seem from an empirical point of view. There is no way of deciding why there should be only one pure ego for Paul's empirical me, or why there should be more than one pure ego for all the empirical me's in the human race, or why any random selection of pure egos, on the one hand, and empirical processes, on the other hand, might not be, in fact, the true substantial union. The alternative view, it is true, seems to need something more than these phases. The per-

sonal continuity of Peter's conscious processes, we are told, compels us to admit the persistence of dispositions, tendencies, and traces in his case. He could not consciously remember unless something persisted in him which is not conscious. The greater part of his spiritual treasures, indeed, are present in potency, not in use. These are stronger arguments—much stronger ones—but they do not seem to be perfectly conclusive. It would be consistent, at least, to follow a suggestion of Berkeley's and maintain that Peter's mind 'exists not' in sleep and trances, although it palpably does exist when Peter is awake. It would also be consistent to maintain that Peter's brain is the only bearer of traces, tendencies, and dispositions which have to do with (and yet cannot be found in) the conscious Peter.

At the present stage of our knowledge, however, it is prudent, probably, to hold that the mind contains dispositions, tendencies, traces *et id genus omne*, as well as conscious phases, and so that mentality is indefinitely wider than consciousness. At any rate I do not intend to dispute the point—for the moment, at least—and I shall turn instead to the more moderate and most usual opinion that although the mind is much more than its conscious fulgurations, these conscious phases, none the less, are the only ones in which its peculiar essence distinctly appears. On this view, nothing could be a mind which was not sometimes, and indeed frequently, conscious; and those who would study the mind must probe its consciousness to begin with, and interpret the rest from the characters which they discover there. On the whole, this is the usual assumption, although certain philosophers aver that it is quite precisely wrong.

Plainly, if we take this (usual) line, we must be prepared to explain, at some point in our progress, what precisely we suppose this consciousness to be. No doubt, we need not begin with these explanations. To begin with, it may be enough to point to a few examples, to describe them roughly in phrases more or less equivalent, and then to forge ahead. To desire, to will, to reflect—these, we say, are conscious processes, and they may be otherwise described as experiences or as awarenesses or as *Erlebnisse*. To say this, is to gain something. It enables us to get under way, but there is little precision about it. If all 'experiences' are conscious 'experiences,' this particular synonym is correct, but it may not tell us very much. If not, it is not even correct; and the other alternative words are plainly incorrect. 'Awareness' is too narrow; for it is simply cognitive, and conscious processes, in most psychologies, are taken to include feeling

and conation as well as cognition. '*Erlebnis*,' on the other hand, is far too broad. All conscious processes, I dare say, are part of a life-history, but there is much in life which is not conscious. As an embryo, I am told, I have lived through a furry if unfeathered condition; at the present moment, I believe, I am living through a number of essential processes on the part of my spleen, and my duodenum, and my thyroid gland. But these *Erlebnisse* are not conscious processes. They are not even 'mental' on any reasonable interpretation of that word.

The method of pointing to examples, however unsatisfying, is certainly better than this, for there is always the chance of distilling a meaning out of a sufficient number of examples, carefully pondered. This being granted, it is best to be as comprehensive as possible, and a certain well-known statement seems promising. "What we are when we are awake," it is said, "as contrasted with what we are when we sink into a profound and perfectly dreamless sleep . . . that it is to be conscious." Quite so; but *what is that?* *What* is it that is present in waking and absent in sleep, and how do we know what it is?

Part of our meaning, when we distinguish sleep from waking, is to ascribe to the waking state a certain type of behaviour—what we might call a certain grasp of the situation and an appropriate response to it. This 'situation,' to be sure, may be invisible and impalpable. The situation which an absent-minded philosopher grasps may be some aspect of the problem of the One and the Many. He is not asleep simply because he is totally oblivious of meal times and of the state of the fire. For the most part, however, the situation to which any given man responds is at least as concrete as a banker's business. It has to do with the conduct of life whatever the biological and social requirements of a man's living may be, and it may not be impossible to give a general and tolerably adequate account of the distinctive features of this waking behaviour in mankind, or to draw the relevant distinctions between man's case and the animals'. A certain capacity for relevant selection; some degree of retention at least of the immediate past; some traces of orientation towards the future; an associative complexity in the response whereby stimuli to all appearance utterly diverse seem to move to action on account of what philosophers describe as a connection of content; perhaps, even, the more rigorous connectedness of this type which we call, at its best, logical sequence—these and their like are the properties we are accustomed to ascribe to waking re-

sponse, and it is possible, if we take the trouble, to make our account of them reasonably thorough and precise.

This, then, is part of what we mean when we distinguish waking or wide-awake behaviour from other conditions, but it is not the whole of what we mean, for we believe that waking life (at least in men and in some of the animals) is 'conscious,' and we therefore assign it what I call the conscious quality. The flavour of emotion as I feel it, the thrill of passage which is present in my conscious strivings, the peculiar *quale* of believing and doubting—this conscious quality, even if it eludes adequate expression, is indubitably real. In many ways, indeed, it is enormously the most important thing in human life. It is the conscious quality in happiness that makes happiness worth having, and the conscious quality in misery which makes misery so peculiarly a thing of dread. It is generally held that nothing can have intrinsic value if it lacks the conscious quality. And so on. I do not say that the conscious quality is the whole essence of what we call conscious process. On the contrary, I believe that we assign those other properties which I have mentioned to every conscious process, and the relation of those other properties to the conscious quality is precisely the question which I mean to discuss. When we distinguish consciousness from dreamless sleep or from anæsthesia, we refer, I think, to a type of behaviour which occurs, usually at all events, when the conscious quality is present. We refer to processes which are commonly characterised by both sets of properties, and we do not pursue the analysis further. Yet it is manifest that we dare not leave the analysis at this point if we wish to be thorough.

I propose, then, to distinguish between the mental properties which we describe when we speak, say, of a logical or of an associative response, on the one hand, and the conscious quality on the other hand. The first set of properties, as I have said, may be defined with considerable precision along the lines which I have roughly indicated. How, then, should we define the second?

I should doubt whether there is any definition except an ostensive one. At any rate I am not prepared to offer any other. This flavour of pleasure when I feel it, this thrill, this *quale*, which is of such exceptional moment, is something which it is easy to indicate and impossible (I think) to describe further. If so, the fact is neither unique nor disconcerting. The quality 'red,' for example (not the vibrations, but red), has simply to be indicated. An ostensive definition is the only possible one, and red is neither doubtful

nor unintelligible on this account. What is more, the consequential difficulties which seem to arise under this head need not be half so formidable as they are sometimes supposed to be. The conscious quality, we say, is found in pleasure and in pain, in doubting and in fearing, in love, and surprise, and confidence. What is it that can possibly be common to all these different states? I answer that the puzzle, if there is one, is certainly not unique. What is it that is common to red and to green—these extraordinarily different things which, we say, are both colours? As it seems to me, Mr. Johnson is right when he says that a highly distinctive kind of difference rather than identity is what we mean by 'colour,' and similarly, I think, judging, fearing, striving, and similar processes, in their conscious quality, are 'conscious' largely on account of the highly distinctive difference between them—a difference which makes them qualitatively comparable, while they are qualitatively incomparable with anything else.

I conclude, then, that the conscious quality can be defined ostensively and that the other mental properties with which I am dealing may be defined intensively. Assuming this, our next question is that of the relation of the two. Are they necessarily connected? Are they always together *de facto*? Are they only sometimes conjoined? It is impossible, however, to set about answering these questions unless we have come to an understanding concerning yet another problem. We have to consider the reliability of our evidence in the case. How do we know that any of these properties are certainly or probably present, and how do we know that any of them are certainly or probably absent? If we leave this problem to chance we need not expect to go far in the way of proving a conclusion.

This problem seems to raise no peculiar difficulties in the case of mental properties other than the conscious quality. Once we have defined what we mean, say, by a purposive or by a logical response we have simply to examine the facts to see whether they do or do not tally with our definitions. There are difficult borderland cases, to be sure. Romeo and Juliet are plainly purposive in their behaviour; filings and a magnet plainly are not; but the behaviour of the *paramcium* is open to question. Honeysuckle is not logical in its behaviour in any important sense of logic; Einstein is; but it may be disputed whether a dog or an elephant infers or not. What we need to do, then, is to examine the doubtful cases more carefully. The principle itself is not in doubt, and neither is the manner of its application.

It is otherwise with our evidence for the presence or the absence of the conscious quality. Here everything is disputed, and the point is fundamental. Let us consider it, then, on two sides—the side of presence and the side of absence.

On the side of presence we are presented with the most amazingly contradictory arguments. According to certain philosophers, "everybody knows what consciousness is because everybody is conscious". According to others, precisely the opposite is true. Simply because we are conscious, they say, we cannot be conscious of our consciousness. It seems to me that both parties are wrong. The conclusion of the former party may be true, but their argument is contemptible. One might as well say that every lump of sugar knows what sweetness is because every lump of sugar is sweet. The latter party seems to me equally mistaken, and I have tried to give my reasons for this opinion in *MIND*, No. 112. Briefly, then, there is no *must* in the matter. We, being conscious, may know what consciousness is, and again we may not. It is simply a question of fact whether we do or do not.

Assuming this, we should hold that our evidence for the presence of the conscious quality is derived from what Locke or Hume called 'reflection'—that is to say, from the 'reflex act' which, nowadays, is styled introspection or in other cases supplementary retrospection. There is a difficulty, indeed, in this supplementary retrospection, since the term implies, if the retrospection is really supplementary, that we remember what we did not observe. Memory of this kind, however, is not self-contradictory, and the thing seems to occur sometimes, although infrequently, in all other departments of memory. It would be strange, no doubt, if it *frequently* occurred in our memory of the conscious quality, and extremely seldom in all our other memories. But even this is possible.

In addition to these two sources of reflection there may perhaps be a third which might be called sub-reflexive acquaintance. The reasons for believing this are somewhat as follows: Explicit introspection, it may be said, and explicit retrospection of the conscious quality, are highly unusual and sophisticated processes. They may be cultivated, indeed, by professional psychologists and by the people who like to publish a literary confessional; but other people do not cultivate the faculty and these professional people cultivate it only when they remember. Yet most of us believe that most people are acquainted, tolerably adequately, with the

conscious quality of their mental processes, and that they generally have this acquaintance in considerable measure as they go along. If so, *their* acquaintance with the conscious quality cannot be explained by *their* explicit introspection or retrospection, and we must suppose that something vaguer (but quite stubborn and fundamental) serves their turn. Just as the sense of familiarity is distinct from explicit memory and yet entirely undeniable, so this sub-reflexive acquaintance may be distinct from reflexive, and yet indisputably a fact.

These arguments, I think, are weighty, and if we accept them we must hold that introspection, retrospection, and subreflexive acquaintance are the three sources which inform us of the presence of the conscious quality. We may also, of course, be able to extend this knowledge by inference, but these inferences (it would seem from our argument) must be based upon evidence derived from one or other of these three sources.

But what of the absence of this quality?

In general we have the right to say of any faculty that if it is capable of showing the presence of any object, it is also sufficient to give us *some* evidence concerning the absence of that object. If you see a thing, you have pretty good evidence that the thing is there. If it ought to be visible and you cannot see it when you look carefully, you have pretty good evidence that it is not there at all. There are differences, of course. An explicit memory, for instance, may be very good evidence that such and such an event actually occurred. The absence of any such memory may be a very poor reason for denying its occurrence. Yet absence, in this case, always gives *some* slight evidence, even when it is poor evidence, readily overborne. It would give *no* evidence only in the case in which the event in question did not come within the scope of the faculty at all—if you could not remember it supposing that it had occurred. Moreover, it is possible to explain why the evidence for absence is better in some cases than in others.

Assuming this general principle, then, we may proceed to consider our evidence for the absence of the conscious quality. Such evidence, it will be understood, must apply chiefly if not exclusively to ourselves, since the evidence for the presence of the quality, in introspection and the rest, seems to have this limitation.

Introspection comes first, and our principle plainly applies. If an introspective look enables us to detect the presence of the conscious quality, then plainly the seeming absence of

this quality, when we look, is *some* evidence that the quality, in fact, is not present. What we chiefly want to know, however, is the strength and degree of this evidence. Is it good evidence or very little? We have to enquire more carefully if we hope to answer this.

To illustrate once again. If some one asks me whether the telephone bell is ringing, and if I, after listening carefully, hear nothing, then I have very good evidence that the bell is not ringing, provided that I am not deaf, and that there are not too many doors and other obstructions to deaden the sound. This evidence, however, is good evidence precisely because telephone bells are so constructed as to be aggressively audible. In the case of other sounds, faint ones or vague ones, we should not consider the evidence particularly good, although it could not be utterly negligible. In a word, our conclusion ought to be that *either* there is no sound *or* that the sound is very faint, and we are entitled, I think, to draw a similar conclusion in the case of introspection. If we fail to detect the conscious quality when we look for it, we should conclude that it is either non-existent or else very faint and vague.

The second kind of evidence—supplementary retrospection—is less reliable than the first; for memory, as we know, plays us very strange tricks; and since retrospection of this kind is, *ex hypothesi*, memory of what was previously unobserved (at least explicitly), its dangers may therefore be increased. On the other hand, we have some criteria for the accuracy of memory. We have a much better chance of recalling that which was recent, or vivid, or interesting than of recalling events which were lacking in these respects; and this must surely mean that when we cannot recall an event, then either the event did not occur or else it was (probably) not recent, or vivid, or interesting. Apparent absence in retrospection, therefore, gives us *some* evidence concerning real absence, and we can, to a considerable extent, estimate the weight of the negative evidence as well as the weight of the positive.

Sub-reflexive acquaintance, if we accept its reality, must commonly be vague even if it is not necessarily faint, and, being vague, it is very naturally supposed to be dubious evidence either for or against. This interpretation, however, is itself somewhat doubtful, for it may be held that this sub-reflexive acquaintance, in its own fumbling way, includes the whole of the hazy, marginal region, and, consequently, that if anything is absent, even from it, that thing, in all probability, was absent altogether. A faculty which ought

to be clear, in other words, gives stronger evidence on the side of presence than on the side of absence. A faculty which is constitutionally muddled yields results precisely opposite in this particular.

How this may be, I do not know, and I do not see how to pursue the point. Accordingly, abandoning the question of evidence, I shall now return to the problem originally set. We have distinguished between the conscious quality, on the one hand (which can only be ostensively defined), and, on the other hand, certain properties, properly called mental (which may be defined intensively without any reference, or at any rate without any explicit reference, to the conscious quality). The problem is whether these two sets of properties are necessarily connected, and, if not, whether they are or are not always found together in fact.

Plainly, there are two sides to this argument. We have to ask whether the conscious quality necessarily implies (or is always found along with) these other mental properties. We have also to ask whether these other mental properties necessarily imply (or are always found along with) the conscious quality. My discussion, then, will follow this two-fold course.

If the first question were answered affirmatively, the grounds for this answer would have to be either analytic or synthetic, and each of these in its turn would be further subdivided according as a conceptual connexion or simply a factual conjunction was claimed. As I think, however, it would be peculiarly hard to establish a conceptual connexion between something that is only ostensively defined and something else which is intensively defined. This difficulty may be seen, I think, in analogous cases. Most of us would hold, I suppose, that red has a necessary connexion, of some sort, with spatial properties. A red which had neither position nor extension would be an utter nullity. We might also be persuaded that red (the hue, not the vibrations) could only be defined ostensively while extension might be defined intensively. Believing all this, however, we should find it very hard (I think) to maintain that the concept red necessarily implied the concept extension either analytically or synthetically. What we should hold, I think, would be rather that we have here a kind of union in the facts such that it is barely possible for us even to entertain the notion that something which was red might still have no spatial properties, and wholly impossible for us to believe that there could really be such a thing. So here. If we simply inspect the concept of the conscious quality, I do not see

how we could lay down the law about any of its conceptual connexions, either analytic or synthetic. The concept may be simple, and therefore have no analytical connexions, and it does not seem, of itself, to involve anything whatever synthetically. On the other hand, we do seem to regard the relations of the conscious quality to these other mental properties much as we regard the relation of red to what is spatial. A red thing which had neither position nor extension seems an absurdity; and a thing which had the conscious quality and yet had none of the properties which we define when we speak of the parts of a 'purposive,' 'logical,' or 'associational' series would seem an absurdity too.

Certainly, there is one apparent obstacle to this conclusion. When we attempt to define mental properties by such adjectives as purposive or inferential we are referring to processes which must be relatively prolonged in any life-history at all comparable to ours. The conscious quality, on the other hand, may have a very brief existence; and even when we have, say, a purposive train of ideas, each member of which has the conscious quality, these members usually have a different conscious quality from moment to moment. Indeed, this must be so if, as I have argued, we can trust our evidence for the quality both positively and negatively. In theory, then, at any rate, there may very well be processes which are too brief to be, let us say, inferences or purposes, and which in fact do not form part of any purpose or inference. In other words, there is no contradiction in supposing that 'floating' experiences and 'split-off' ones may flash with the conscious quality. What we have to say, then, is that anything which has the conscious quality has also those properties, whatever they may be, which are appropriate to the members of a series which is, say, logical or purposive; and this, I should imagine, we all believe to be true.

The second, converse, part of our problem is the question whether logical, associative, and similar processes necessarily, or always, possess the conscious quality. Here, plainly, we have the same difficulties as before if we attempt to prove a conceptual connexion in the case, and so we should probably try, as before, to see whether we can discern a binding unity in the facts. Let us consider, then, what the facts seem to tell us.

At the beginning of our argument we saw that the mind probably contains dispositions, tendencies (and the like), as well as what are commonly called conscious processes. Now

'conscious' processes may be assumed to have the conscious quality, and the evidence we have given strongly supports this assumption if any one should feel disposed to challenge it. On the other hand, this same evidence also shows, at least with very great probability, that many of our tendencies and dispositions do *not* have the conscious quality. To be sure, the processes that are commonly called sub-conscious (where the prefix has the same force as it has in sub-acid and similar phrases) should be supposed to have the conscious quality in a faint, marginal degree; and sub-reflexive acquaintance, as I have called it, may vouch for this. The great majority of the processes, however, which are called unconscious inferences, unconscious wishes, and the like seem *not* to have the conscious quality when we examine them carefully, and if I am right in my contention that this is at least some evidence against believing that they really do have the conscious quality, then (if we consider the range and variety of them) we shall be forced to conclude that it is very probable indeed that these processes, in some cases at least, do not have the conscious quality at all. They may be parts of a train of events which do (or may) show the conscious quality at *some* stage, but this quality is not shown at every stage, and it is probable that it does not exist, at least at some stages.

Accordingly, if we admit that these dispositions and tendencies exist and are mental (whether or not we are prepared to assign them all the power and influence which is claimed by advocates of the 'unconscious'), we are bound to conclude that some mental processes do not have the conscious quality. Given these assumptions, the conclusion follows, and it can be denied only if the assumptions are denied—that is, if it is denied either that any of these dispositions, tendencies, and their kind lack the conscious quality at any time, or else if it is denied that they are mental. The still more fundamental denial—namely, the denial that there are any such tendencies or dispositions—would also, of course, destroy the conclusion. This ultimate denial, however, as I have indicated, would seem quite extravagantly absurd without a mass of explanation which is outside the limits of this paper.

It is very often argued, I think, that because 'mental' tendencies and dispositions are tendencies *towards* something conscious, they must be presumed to *be* conscious all the time. The postulate of continuity, it may be said, enjoins this, and it would seem, from the usual arguments, that this contention is specifically applied to the conscious quality.

If so, one of two things must be held. Either our evidence for the absence of the conscious quality is absolutely worthless, or else there are many trains of events having the conscious quality in connexion with one and the same body, although these co-conscious trains are usually or always sealed from one another. I have tried to show that the first of these alternatives is improbable. The second, no doubt, may be consistently held, but it may be doubted whether the evidence for it is constraining, or even whether it inclines without constraining.

It is much more plausible to argue that these dispositions and the rest are not, properly speaking, 'mental.' They are tendencies, it may be maintained, which do (or may) result in consciousness, that is to say, certain of their actual or possible *effects* have the conscious quality. And that is all about it. We have no right to say that a cause must have the same properties as its effect, that a latent phase has the same properties as an active one, that a disposition has the same properties as that to which it disposes—in short, to draw any inferences whatsoever of this kind. We should therefore distinguish between conscious or subconscious tendencies, on the one hand (if there are any such), and, on the other hand, pre-conscious, post-conscious, and infra-conscious ones. The former have the conscious quality in some degree; the latter do not have it in any degree. In other words, these terms should be taken quite literally. Pre-war conditions are simply those before the war. They do not join battle. Post-war conditions are simply those after the war, neither more nor less. Infra-red rays are neither red nor coloured. Taken literally, then, these prefixes of *pre-* and *post-* and *infra-*, when applied to consciousness, need not indicate that the events to which they are applied possess the conscious quality in any degree, and this literal sense may be the only sense in which they can be used significantly. In themselves, these tendencies may be totally unknown, or again they may be merely physiological, and they may be 'mental' only in the sense that they have to do with the mind and not in the sense that they possess the character of mind.

Such an argument has certain most considerable advantages. In the first place, it is correct in what it asserts. To hold that a cause must be like its effect is a piece of exploded metaphysics which is harmful simply because so many people forget that the mine has really been sprung. In the second place, the argument calls attention to something which we certainly mean. When we speak of a wish, for example, we mean to indicate a certain recognisable

process which recognisably has the conscious quality. When we speak of a belief, again, we refer to something whose conscious flavour can be recognised. When we speak of a pain we mean to include its conscious *quale*. An unfelt pain—our toothache, for example, when we are too much excited to feel it—is plainly not a pain in any ordinary sense. There is *some* highly important difference between it and a pain that we feel; and there is at least *some* force in the usual belief that the excitement, for the time being, annuls the pain altogether. And so in the other cases. This contention, therefore, is true and important in these two ways at least.

None the less, it seems insufficient to prove its point. It would be sufficient only if the term 'mental' logically implied the possession of the conscious quality—that is to say, if this contention begged the question. Let us put the case schematically. A tendency $w_1 w_2 w_3 w_4 \dots w_n$ leads, let us say, to a wish W , and this wish W gives rise in its turn to an associative tendency $a_1 a_2 a_3 a_4 \dots a_n$. Let us also suppose that the phases of these tendencies, the w 's and the a 's, lack the conscious quality. (This is part of what we mean by calling them 'unconscious,' the rest of our meaning being that they also lack the characteristics, whatever these may be, which occur when something is grasped by the mind and held before it in awareness). Let us also suppose that W , the wish, has the conscious quality. In this form of statement, then, the arguments we have mentioned prove both that the w 's and a 's are not *wishes*, and that there is no logical necessity to suppose that they are like wishes in their intrinsic character. On the other hand, they *are* like wishes in their effects, for the whole point of the argument is that these w 's and a 's act as if they were capital W 's and capital A 's—that is to say, they lead to results broadly similar to those which we also find in processes all of whose terms have the conscious quality. Now, many of the ways in which we describe what is mental are precisely the ways in which we describe the general characteristics of a series of a certain type—logical, associative, purposive, or something of this species. We are accustomed, no doubt, to envisage such series in terms of what we call 'conscious' series, to think of inferences in which each several step is characterised by the conscious quality, and similarly in other instances. We also believe, as has been said, that anything which has the conscious quality has also those properties, whatever they may be, which are required of any term capable of being a member of such a series, but unless we

can prove that no other term could possibly have these properties we cannot prove the desired conclusion. There is no use in saying that our w's and our a's are lapsed W's and lapsed A's, that they once had the conscious quality and now have it no longer. If they do not have it *now*, then plainly they do not have it. In other words, they can do without it, and in still other words, some parts at least of a mental series can do without it too.

We must conclude, then, that 'mental' series may and do occur some of whose members, at least, are without the conscious quality. This follows unless we are prepared to break completely with the usual psychological accounts of dispositions, tendencies, and similar matters. Perhaps, even, it would follow on any assumptions, even remotely adequate ones, that we chose to make. On the other hand, it is at least pardonable to play with the idea that this conclusion, which seems so evident, may nevertheless be wrong. If the conclusion is true it seems to imply that the conscious quality is (comparatively at least) ineffective and accidental when it occurs. If it may be dispensed with for part of a process it seems probable that it might be dispensed with altogether, and we are told of a great many cases of 'mental' behaviour in which the conscious quality does not occur at all. This, no doubt, may be exaggeration. In most of the instances that we are able to cite, the conscious quality does occur at some point; but the reason may be that we notice these cases much more readily than others. Again, although the theory that our w's are really lapsed W's does not (as we have seen) explain away many of the special features of the case, it would provide us with an ample defence of the efficacy of the conscious quality, for it would imply that the conscious quality must have been present at some stage of the process for anything whatsoever to operate in a mental fashion at any other stage. This theory of lapsing, however, seems to have too much asked of it. These 'secondary automatisms' occur in certain typical cases, but these typical cases are quite special ones, and the 'secondary' cases would have to be 'primary' ones if they were able to honour all the drafts that are made upon them. Briefly, we cannot suppose that our minds to begin with are all W's, and then that we (sagely or carelessly) allow the W's to lapse into w's.

Any cogent argument for the efficacy of the conscious quality in mental affairs, therefore, must be able to show either that the conscious quality is absolutely essential to mental process or else that mental process is always

enormously the better for it. It is impossible to prove this, I think, from the concepts of mentality and of the conscious quality, and the facts, as currently interpreted, seem ultimately to give the theory comparatively little support. If, then, we still hanker after a proof of this efficacy—and many of us, I think, do so, not quite irrationally—we must be prepared to revise the usual interpretations, and to see whether we could not possibly defend the view that the mind consists *only* of those processes which possess the conscious quality in some degree—at least in the degree which I have chosen (perhaps arbitrarily) to call sub-conscious, and have supposed to come within the scope of our sub-reflexive acquaintance. If we do we shall probably fail, but the attempt may be worth making.

II.—AN APPEAL TO PSYCHOLOGISTS.

BY E. T. CAMPAGNAC.

PHILOSOPHERS, we are told, are like ordinary men in as much as they live in the same world ; but unlike because they look upon this world with a more penetrating gaze, because they ask more questions about it, and tarry for answers. Ordinary men wonder about things, but philosophers wonder about more things, and about the parts of things and the relations of things to other things. Ordinary men are philosophers undeveloped ; philosophers are ordinary men brought to high quality. It is pleasant for both the ordinary and the philosophic to be able to claim kindred. So we are told.

Yet kindred becomes hard and ever harder to claim and to credit, because while ordinary men are content with a rough and ready language—they have neither time nor skill to make or use any other—philosophers, whose birthright is leisure, and whose conversation is with other philosophers, being in the world, to be sure, but certainly not quite of it, have made and are ever making a special language fit for conveying their intimate inquiries into the nature of things and for recording such answers as they get.

Ordinary men do not understand this language. We are, of course, able to recognise that students and practitioners of a special, a technical subject must have a vocabulary as elaborate and as precise as their knowledge ; we do not expect to know or to employ for our own purposes the vocabularies of plumbers, electricians or chemists engaged in their appropriate tasks or speaking to their fellows, nor do these specialists desire to use their professional language for the purposes of general intercourse with the world of ordinary men : while they are occupied with their work, they are engrossed in it, and do not ask us to press them to our bosoms on the plea of a common humanity : they could not get on with their jobs if we held them, or they us, in a warm embrace. But philosophers will not let us go : they assure us that our business is their business ; they almost go so far as to declare that their business is our business. Yet the

moment they begin to tell us what our business—the common business of living in the world—really is, we are perplexed by the singularity of their language—singularity, indeed, it is, for they are not all agreed among themselves;—when they describe the world, which we share with them as inhabitants, we cannot recognise it; when they tell us how the world affects us, or what goes on in our minds, or set forth the relations which subsist between our own and other minds, our own and other bodies, we are at a loss. If they find our language clumsy and inaccurate, we find theirs beyond our comprehension.

And the difference between the language of philosophers and the language of ordinary men threatens a lamentable estrangement between them. For the doubt creeps in, whether after all we and they do live in the same world; or if that, at any rate, is granted, whether when we and they have fancied that we had looked at, or heard, or tasted, or in any other fashion experienced the same thing, there has not been an initial mistake. It cannot be, we are prone to say, that their experience is the same as ours, if the words in which they describe it are not our words at all, but words which we neither take upon our lips nor understand when they are uttered to us. Now philosophers must, in the process of their inquiry into the world of men, with whom they protest that they are allied, have made themselves acquainted with the language of ordinary men. They know, we must presume, what we ordinary men feel and mean however awkwardly and inartistically we express ourselves. Here, then, a challenge or a petition may be made to philosophers. Let them take some few of the uncouth forms in which simple folk body forth their rough feelings, their inchoate thoughts, and translate them into the philosophic language. The paraphrase, or ought we to say the metaphrase, would be read with eager eyes by ordinary men, who might thus get some initiation into the higher language, and what is more important, be convinced that it could lend itself to the expression—the finer expression—of what we had falteringly and feebly tried to say.

The passages which follow are attempts made in the language of the man in the street to deal with some matters with which philosophers are, I suspect, concerned:—

1. Development and arrest of development,
2. Dissembled emotions, or protective colouring,
3. Space, light and colour,
4. Looking out and looking in.

To set down these titles is to offer ordinary men some encouragement; and also let us hope to court the benevolent regard of philosophers—for have they not, these titles, a philosophic ring? Let the passages be taken as raw material for psychologists, who shall work them up, and dress them out, and introduce them again in a fit apparel. And yet, perhaps, even here a horrid mistake has been made! Will some one say that psychologists are not philosophers!

How hard it is to get the right word! What if psychologists are neither philosophers nor ordinary men? This is a dangerous speculation, and since alarm provokes alarm, I now begin to doubt the propriety of the titles which I have just given to my notes. I had better fall back upon my own language and use the original titles—with which they shall be, each one in turn, introduced.

1. A RIDDLE UNANSWERED.

He had made up his mind to do it that very evening. He was to ask her to be his wife. This was what we all cheerfully looked for, and what she, on her part, awaited. In very childhood they had, in the talk of all their friends, been paired; and if, now that they were grown man and woman, a proper delicacy sealed our lips, we were not the less conscious, each one of us, that the rest still entertained the expectation which we deemed it neither necessary nor polite to put into words. He, so we clearly saw, cherished in her his ideal; and she, we could not but perceive, took him for granted. She stood to him for all his dreams, his hopes, and, what could be held in a smaller compass, all his little knowledge of womanhood. She had grown used to the thought of him, and found him well enough; while her dutifulness and her practical sense had settled her determination to accept the proposal which he certainly and soon would offer.

And so though the evening ended with the great pact unmade, each of them was content to wait for a morrow which must be so like to-day that its mere delay could make no real difference.

But the morrow brought him the sudden, unsought opportunity of work abroad and of travel, and he seized it. There was the bustle of preparation, the hurried good-bye, and he was away upon his errand, upon his career. His mind was not changed; he made no doubt that she understood his unuttered claim as well as he, by a sure forecast of imagination, held her of course as yet unutterable response. But the words were not said; he went away with his ideal—

in his heart ; and she stayed at home with her man—in her pocket.

From that inviolate receptacle she would take him out, when she was in the mood, and make him play like a marionette what she considered good parts upon the decent boards of her trim theatre. She dressed him fitly for his rôles, and even added such decorations as a shrewd woman likes, borrowing at times from the honours which in fact he won for himself, for he soon began to make a name. Her theatre was her world, not a choice parcel screened and partitioned off, not a way of escape from the trammels of ordinary dull affairs, not a loophole for stray beams of celestial light—but her world ; and her world became her theatre. And he, why he, of course, who was at first put upon the stage, and then mechanically jerked about it, presently filled it, and was world and theatre both, and she looked on, with the consciousness of creative divinity, and the satisfaction of ownership. She beheld what she had made, and assured herself that it was very good. And what more could she have asked of fortune ? He was hers ; and she learned that he was accounted successful by his rivals, virtuous by the respectable, and solid by his bankers. She put him back in her pocket, and waited with composure and assurance.

His absence stretched out into years—five, seven, ten ; and then he returned to find her.

I told you he took his ideal with him on his journey in his boy's heart ; there it was planted like a seed in some vessel, large enough for its first purpose, but soon to be discovered too small. Or if we may for fancy's sake bid the vessel grow, we see it unable to keep pace with that swelling, irresistible form of life counterfeiting cold death within it. Soon it cracks, it breaks under the stress of that incontinent, insatiable vitality ; it crumbles and falls upon the large lap of the earth, earth to earth, but now life-giving, life-announcing earth to a new earth of potent hope. His ideal *breaks* his heart, and refashions it as part of a heart not his own ; his heart has set his head throbbing, and it too, that clever competent boy's head, cracks and becomes the fissured tenement of thoughts not imprisoned but visitant and vanishing, recurrent, but ever in new guises and in fresh company. His eyes have not lost their youthful keenness, but they have essayed the dark, and no longer recipients merely have come to be deep sources of light. Things he looks through and beyond ; he dreams dreams and holds converse with phantoms more vivid to him than the forms of men, talking the while to himself ; he is now a seer, and gazing into the spirit of

beauty, knows that her eyes, lit with intelligence and softened by goodness, gladden his own.

He came back to find her; but seeking his equal and his mate, he overlooked her; for she in those years had neither grown nor suffered other change; rather, by an arrest of development, she was now become a realist: and he, who in pious sacrilege had laid his hand upon the veil of reality, had been born again.

But what I want to know, and have never learnt, is whether she recognised him.

2. CLEVER OR NOT.

We who knew her well had long come to acquiesce in her cleverness, admitting what could not be denied, but silently all of us, and some of us even with a feeling, not perhaps of keen, but yet of genuine, regret. And anyhow we did not need to be reminded of this quality in her by other folk who, we were satisfied, knew her far less intimately than we; but they were insistent in their acclamation, and ready to give instances, of what they were proud to have detected. We might, we said to ourselves, have offered examples, other and better; other than they possessed, better than they could have comprehended; but we forbore and took the pose of attentive listeners, fixing our faces in smiles which should simulate intelligent pleasure and hide our weariness or vexation.

I say that some of us lamented her cleverness (which by the way had many names on the lips of her admirers; 'drollery' some would call it, and 'quaintness' others, and 'brilliance' not a few; and there were those who found her 'odd,' 'freakish,' 'elfish'—but 'clever' and 'cleverness' were in general use, when, with her for theme, grammar claimed adjective or noun). We lamented it, and I think I have already shown that we had reason in the sheer fatigue of being told what we already knew, by those whose knowledge was less accurate and drawn from a narrower range of observation than our own. But there were deeper reasons beneath this. For our informants were often at pains to recount 'clever' stories which they had not heard, to shoot at us 'clever' *mots* which they had not understood, and though, to be sure, they hit and hurt us, it was not with the sting of fresh wit which smites upon the mind as foam—spray driven up from the sea by a crisping breeze—smites upon the skin and makes it tingle; there was no salt left when they had handled their missiles; it was with dough that they

assailed us. Or again, and this was perhaps what put upon us the most trying strain, they hailed and treasured as clever any plain statement of hers made within their hearing, and told us with rapture that yesterday she had declared that 'rain is wet' or that 'suet pudding is solid eating'. It is not hard, of course, to see why they did all this ; to retail her 'cleverness' was to give proof of their own ; connoisseurs at least they might claim to be, if not artists ; and I doubt not some, in their silly heart of hearts, made claim to originality. If then we knew fatigue, you will grant that we knew also what annoyance was : and that—the irritation which they, her dull panegyrists, caused us, her much-tried friends—was the second ground of our regret.

These griefs we might have more lightly borne, had not another been added to them ; or no, for the image of burden laid on burden ill pictures our distress. Grounds of regret, I have spoken of ; but neither will that serve my purpose. The truth is that a suspicion hissed now and again in our minds that she was what they said she was and that she liked them to say it. Here was the poison, here the sting. We were strong to suffer or even eager to enjoy that contrariness which, like a back-turning ripple upon a tide, served to mask the swiftness and the volume of her kindness ; that perversity which veiled benevolence and saved it from the taint of patronage ; that childishness, which provoked our impatience and won our devotion : all these we ourselves gently or gaily welcomed as the natural, the undesigned expressions of her character ; but sometimes she would be merely and deliberately what they called 'clever,' and we were sorry and disconcerted.

Once when she had more freely than was her wont indulged this vein, I took it on me to protest. It was a late autumn afternoon ; the fire on my hearth was smartly crackling ; through the windows, still uncurtained, I could see heavy clouds labouring up from the West, as though returning from day's slow funeral. "Don't be clever," I said to her ; and she, "Clever ? I am not being clever, I am only sad." And presently, "Don't be clever," I repeated. "I am not clever," she returned, "I am only warming myself. Hark how those logs crackle ; you do not blame them and call them clever." And then, once more, "Don't—" I began, but she put her hand upon my lips and "Don't *you*," she said, "don't say it. Can't you see the wood is burning out its heart ; and look the light is gone from the sky. Draw the curtains and let us watch the sparks together ; they will not be 'clever' long."

Soon the fire fell into one mass of molten red, brilliant and

comforting, silent and fervid; and I fancied its colour was the colour of her hair, and its warmth a symbol of her glowing heart. "Clever or not," I whispered, "you are very dear."

3. PUCE.

I knew Savage well enough to go to his house and stay there even when he was away. I am not sure that I did not more certainly feel myself to be his guest in his absence than when he was at home. To be sure, I missed him, but only so as to take with a livelier pleasure the welcome which he had left for me.

His housekeeper, warned of my coming, showed no more surprise than I felt when with her hand still on the front door, which she was closing hospitably behind me, she said, "Mr. Savage is not in". There was no full stop in her utterance, only a pause which I rather clumsily broke with "I know; at any rate, I was not expecting to find him,"—and then she went on, "but he may come back; if so, he will be in by ten o'clock". Then I went upstairs to wait for his coming, if come he would.

I had not waited long, when I went to the door which opened before I could reach it. "I knew you were coming," I said. "No, I did not hear you—I was somehow aware of your approach." It was Savage himself, older, greyer, than I had thought him even a few months ago, but athletic as ever. "Damn these boards," he said and in the same breath, "Hullo, old man—I wanted to see you. . . . But," he went on after a moment's hesitation, "you did not hear me coming up, did you? Damn these boards." "Honestly, I did not hear you till you were in the room," I said. He had, and rejoiced in a marvellously light foot; for all his fifteen stone he moved with the noiseless tread of a cat or a tiger—and he was vexed at the creaking of the boards in his floor—a mixture, I think, of old timber and new, and none of it perfectly fitted. "They are bad boards," I said, "but if you will sit down instead of pacing the room, they will be quiet." "Wait a minute"—he was away and back again with some bread, some Stilton, and some port. Seated on either side of the fire we nibbled and sipped in silent happiness. Presently he rose from his chair, and again cursing the boards which continued to do injustice to his ankle—"the finest ankle in Europe," he is wont to exclaim—moved across the room and back again. "That is better," he said, "the room was not balanced and the light on that side was in my eyes." He had altered the shape of the room by putting out one electric bulb and lighting another.

The fire was glowing, radiant ; the two lights (heavily shaded with green silk) which he had left burning were perhaps a fourth of the distance from the chimney to the opposite end of the room, and behind us. As we turned to speak our eyes met the defiance of brasses glinting on the walls, the softer sheen of book-bindings and little fitful jets of light cast by glasses ranged on polished oak like tiny stars imaged in a black lake. The furniture was, most of it, oak ; a large oval gate-leg table in the middle, its ends more pointed, and I think prettier for that reason, than is usual ; a Jacobean cupboard opposite the fire, and facing the two windows two dressers, oak also. The chairs were Windsors, and very choice examples of a sound fashion. The smaller things were in mahogany. The use of oak in a house of what I had regarded as of the mahogany period happened at the time to be of some special interest to me. "It runs on," he said, "there really was no sudden transition from oak to mahogany ; you can find them together, and they are happy together ; but I agree, for a formal propriety, I ought to have mahogany only here ; but then there is mahogany and mahogany and oak and oak. Strange thing colour ! What do you think of this ? What colour is it ?"

He was opening a small suit-case which he had brought with him into the room, and one after another drew out six bowls. He released them from their wrappings of paper and wool and put them on the table. "I should say brown or black," I said. "Oh ! no," he replied, with confidence, "they are puce." "Whatever they are," I answered, "we cannot see them properly till we have dusted and polished them, and then the colour will depend on the line in which the light falls on them and on the angle from which we look." "On those things, yes," he agreed, "but on many more ; we shall see ; but, Good Heavens, what is all this ?" He had thrown the paper and wool which had protected the bowls on to the fire ; they flew burning up the chimney and now we were both delighted and alarmed by a shower of falling constellations ; they came thick and fast, and then stopped and then came again, breaking upon the hearth, leaping the fender, rolling upon the rug at our feet. We were indeed compelled for safety to give our attention, which they deserved for their beauty, to these fire-works, and delayed our study of the bowls, our inquiry into their true colours. But presently we were free to go on. "I shall not readily agree to puce," I continued ; "I always think of the penny stamps of five and twenty years ago ; they were puce and they were ugly. You remember my telling you of a man I knew at Oxford who

could not bring himself to use a penny stamp in those days and took the trouble to put two half-penny stamps on a letter instead. He never failed; it was a beautiful constancy." "I remember," Savage took me up, "I remember very well; you have often told me the story; but I am not sure that those penny stamps were puce, and if they were your friend was wrong. I think he afterwards became a Professor of English Literature; I should distrust his criticism." "But I have heard you repeat with approval the literary judgment of a man who had no ear for music! I think you are unfair to my old friend. Never mind; we can make an easy compromise; let us say that the old penny stamps, though of an evil colour, were not puce." "Very well," he consented; "but when did I praise the man who had no music in his soul?" "Often," I said, "though I do not know that I can cite definite occasions." "You are easily drawn," he returned.

Meanwhile his hands had not been idle: he had been rubbing bowl after bowl with clean dusters and napkins, and setting one and then another on the table from which he had removed cups, papers, odds and ends of things which had been resting on it. "Brown," I said, "purple, black, black with a streak of orange, violet or brown again, another and a different purple—no two are alike in colour, and not more than two of the same size and shape. But they are very beautiful." "You rarely find a set quite uniform in size and shape, and as for the colour, as you yourself said sometime ago, before the fireworks, that depends——! It does; it depends on so many things. But where is the cheese? and ought not we to finish this decanter?"

The moment was come for more food: the right food: a good Stilton, and this was a good Stilton, provides nourishment with something stimulant; the port, too, was good; and a good port offers something stimulant with nourishment; it at once composes and quickens the mind, adjusts it to fine deliberation and pleasantly teaches the serious meaning, the ultimate value, of things which in the hurry of ordinary hours we treat with too little respect. We drew towards the fire once more, but sat sideways so that our eyes could without effort reach the table in the centre of the room and withdraw from it easily: our wine glasses and the decanter were between us on a low wooden stool. We said nothing: we were face to face, but did not look one at the other; yet each of us, I am sure, knew quite well that from time to time while he was gazing into the fire, the other had turned his eyes to those bowls. As we savoured

the wine in the glasses, so we were savouring the colour of the bowls. Scent, taste, colour, which we are wont to keep apart and speak of as separate senses, in some moods of the mind come together not in confusion but so as to draw each one of them a distinction from the others, and to make a harmony of which each part, contributing to a new whole, is itself enriched and reveals its special quality the more perfectly, the more faultlessly for the alliance. And sense and the sensed thing become one, as the suggestive poverty of our language shows us. Is scent a sense or something perceived by a sense? And shall we not be clumsy if we speak of a sense of colour? 'Colour,' the one word alone, serves our double purpose of indicating a composite realisation, a blending of the inner with the outer world. So sound and significance are mated and should not be divorced. And texture, again, we are so fashioned as to recognise and enjoy; but who shall sunder texture from colour, or either from the 'feel' of things? If flowers gleam like stars in a field, stars may yield a scent as they bloom flower-like in the gardens of the sky.

The table, I have said, was oak, but old: years had given it lustre, a smoothness enhanced by a break, a chip, an indentation here and there. Four lights fell on it, from a height of, I suppose, seven feet from the ground. We, Savage and I, had to put up our hands well above our heads to reach them. So illumined the surface of the table achieved, with the depth and solidity of oak, the delicacy and distinction of mahogany.

The bowls had been informally clustered at the near end of the table: now Savage spaced them out, the six of them, at even distances. They were of that Bristol glass, made about a hundred and fifty years ago—yes, we must say again, a mahogany period; but this oak table under our eyes was claiming its right to carry these bowls; it was rivalling their colour, their colours indeed. What were they? Brown, purple, black, black streaked with orange, violet on brown, a new purple—the wood showed them all—all consonant—they sang together, and chimed with the colours of the bowls. Here was one more sense come to join the rest, to complete our concert in the silence of the night. The inspiration was given and received; we must complete that table—first we put our glasses, half filled with wine, upon the table—were we to say that port is 'puce'? The wine matched the bowls, the glasses shimmering picked out new hues in them—but we were not content. Dessert plates we reached from the dressers and arranged them, more glasses we set by every

plate; some silver was delicately laid down, a vase of fruit, cut glass on a silver pedestal, and then fresh decanters. We figured for ourselves a brown and burnished slave standing by the sideboard, and still were dissatisfied. How simple the remedy for our delicious distress. Why; we must have lights shining lower, to greet the ware with almost level beams and cast reflections upwards from the table to the lower parts of the bowls and glasses. We brought candles and candlesticks, four of them; and they played their part; they gave an embroidery to our music; they gave a new rhythm to our pattern; and still we were ill at ease for all our happiness. Something still failed us. Bowls; but yes; they were finger bowls and we had forgotten water. With water, a translucent silver sheet of it, stretched across them at a third of their height, they shone from within themselves. Each one held a moon in a frame of darkness; the light betrayed a divine felicity in that setting, which by giving definition fetched the infinite within our reach, within the reach of fingers which should dip into that water, shatter that moon only to suffer it to return to its tranquil brilliance.

The slave, still at his station, was not enough; ourselves we took no place at the table, but waited behind the chairs, willing servitors of imagination's dear unseen guests; we watched the ladies make their departure; we tarried again; at last, I presume, we felt that the men, invisible too, were gone. Then we returned to our chairs by the fire, which we piled afresh with wood and coal. We opened a new bottle of port, an 'intelligent wine' Savage called it. When the time came, he made (for he had the rare secret) a perfect cup of coffee. We smoked as we drank it. At four o'clock, when we parted, the winter night was making way for the drearier winter morning.

"I am sure it is puce," said he; and "as you will," was my complaisant answer.

4. FIGURES OF SPEECH.

Men are held and haunted all their lives by the figures of speech with which they became familiar in childhood. In youth, may be, they try to cast them off, to disown them; by middle age they have abandoned the attempt and use, as if they had the right of inventors, what in fact they have inherited; later, they find that the forms which they have employed to body forth their thoughts, are now become their thoughts embodied—the likeness is now the reality, the truth indistinguishable from the image which has so long stood for

it—the truth, or so much, so little, of the truth as they can see.

Figures of speech are phantoms of the soul—across the stage on which in youth we gaze, spectators yet, they move; they are figures in which our elders, those actors and actresses, present themselves to us, and in which, with finer intimacy, we guess, they discourse to each other. We learn their language, we copy their gestures, we hope soon to usurp their parts on the boards, and take their places for ourselves. Too long they stay, performers of good intent, but tedious; we must press over the footlights or storm the stage-door. We shall use that language better than they, and with a difference; on our lips it will be charged with a fuller significance; those gestures, so admirable and yet a little stiff, will be better when they are ours, more natural. The scene itself, when it is we, not they, who walk in it, will be livelier, more real. Why do they delay so long? Then, in a moment, our patience is rewarded or our impatience punished and ended, and we are there.

But if the old actors are gone, the stage is not empty—those figures remain, figures of speech, and into them we must press ourselves. The former tenants are vanished, but their tenements are there, for us to occupy. It is a transmigration of souls. It is in figures that we shall show ourselves for what we are; but the figures are not ours. We may pride ourselves upon our personality, but it is a mask which we wear, a part of the theatre's properties. Those predecessors have abandoned the stage to us, we think; but once upon it, we find that we are they—like them we look, this way, upon spectators who do not understand us, and that way upon disembodied spirits whom we do not understand; and for our turn play, with less distinction than we were ready to claim, the trite parts of people being born, now shivering with cold, now smiling in the sun, loving and hating, pricked by ambition, goaded by desire, not finding things sought, winning unsought things, growing very weary, and then—(so we judge the temper of the restless theatre, full of spectators who are sure that they can act better than we)—why then, to give the final proof of our lack of originality, just dying—and we too are removed. But those figures stay; stretched a little, or a little shrunken by our tenancy, but not essentially changed. They await and quickly receive our successors, those intrepid newcomers, who will take the shape of these figures, figures of speech, which we have had to quit.

It was by a figure of speech that Ferris had been taught in boyhood to keep the windows of his mind clean and clear,

or with a change of words to keep them open : his eyes too were to be bright and open. So he would see 'opportunity': he would perceive 'avenues' stretching out before him, inviting the explorer: an alert and well-directed curiosity would lead him to knowledge and knowledge to power, and power to places the main value of which was that they would reveal to him new avenues of vision, if his eyes were still open and bright, if his windows were still clean and clear. He was not unwilling to open his eyes and keep them open, or if ever he was drowsy his parents opened them for him again. The wonders of the world, they said, must not be missed; but missed they would be unless he was awake, wide awake: he must make his way in the world; but how could he make his way if he shut his eyes?

Ferris' parents were like other parents, not rich in metaphors, but assiduous in cultivating such as they had; they worked their metaphors intensively. Everything should be surveyed, they told him, with clear and open eyes; and everything was a window through which something else and something more might be seen, if only every window was brightly polished or thrown widely open. All the subjects of school instruction, Ferris learnt to believe, were windows. The doctrine sank deep into his mind. School-days passed; and he was entered in a business-house, beginning of course at the bottom; he looked through his work, it was a window: he rose to a position of greater responsibility and higher emolument; he looked through that. He was married, and looked through his wife, seeming to see her as little as if she too had been a window; children were born, and to him these also were windows; his experience was lengthening, his view extending. He became the head of his business, and so won a new point of vantage; he was elected to fill some public offices, and as he discharged his duties his clear eyes shone the brightlier. His parents had been successful teachers; the one lesson which they had wished him to learn he had learned. He never doubted the propriety, the necessity even, of straining his eyes to look through windows and along avenues; he was able to flatter himself that he could see very clearly and for a very long distance: but suddenly a question smote him, and it was this: what was to be seen at the end, and was there an end?

That penetrating gaze which he had learnt to direct into space, was it a gaze into empty space, into a translucent nothingness, a serene vacuity? The question troubled him. It would, he felt, have been a more satisfactory task to look round him, at things near him, things to be noted and named,

and touched perhaps, and loved for themselves. But if everything was a window, where, he asked himself, was the view. If he was forever to be looking, what, quite bluntly, was he to look at? For years, though this question came to him again and again, he was able to put it away as often as it came; but a change befel him and then he could not put the question away. There had been a time when being able to look far ahead had been in itself a joy and a pride to him; his pride and joy grew when he was aware that his vision was by use and practice getting a larger range. But progress stopped; then there was a decline in his powers, a failure in himself; far he could see, but not as far as formerly; the avenues shortened, the windows grew cloudy, his eyes had become dim. But not so dim as to be sightless; on the contrary, his narrower range was one in which he at least saw what he had only looked through in other days: his partners, his employees, became real people, filling, crowding indeed, a small but real world: his friends, his wife, his children, through none of these was he any more able to look, but instead he saw them, very near to him; and they too were real, filling, crowding his small but real household. They obstructed his view, but he was content to lose the view and have them; they robbed him of his ancient lights, but only because they were become an illumination. It was that, simply that; an illumination in which they were revealed to him. Able now to look at them he was shocked to perceive that he was the object of their dear solicitude. This gave him, with surprise, a warm delight of which he had been ignorant all his life. Half-way down the avenue through which he had spent his life looking and looking, the void had been peopled with friendly inhabitants; he was enchanted to make their acquaintance, but his new experience set him thinking. What if, after all, beyond the farthest line of space untenanted, there was a tenant; what if his failure had come a moment too soon, and another moment would have put a term to those avenues by affording a vision at once to reward his patient, life-long scrutiny and to quicken it to a finer perfection, a vision of something not less real than these real people, but more real, because, unlike them, infinite, universal?

He could not tell; and since the longer sight was now denied him, he gazed and gazed again at his wife, his children and his friends, peering with a loving curiosity into their eyes. Were their eyes windows for them; was he for them a window; were they looking not at him but through him? Again, he could not tell; he hoped, not; the problem

was insoluble; and their consoling, their warming nearness was a thing to treasure and treasure it he would.

But he was to suffer a further change. Once he had been able, with a lonely perspicacity, to see through his people; lately he had seen them with shorter sight, but better understanding; now his eyes failed him altogether, and he could see them no more. That gaze which had travelled so courageously and so far, and had then been restricted though still turned outwards from himself, was at last turned upon himself inward. Here was metaphor confounding metaphor; the window was no longer the clear medium for sight, but both sight and the thing seen, the end of the avenue was its beginning. Without movement, he had suddenly traversed a space which his eyes at their keenest had not conquered. Blind, he saw himself. It was a signal for departure; he had done with that figure of speech; he left it to be filled at once by some new actor. The few people who remembered him said he was a visionary; those, fewer, who had loved him, said that they did not know what he was.

III.—THE 'UNREALITY OF THE FINITE': A CRITICISM IN THE FORM OF QUESTIONS.

BY C. J. SHEBBEARE.

It is just thirty years since Mr. Bradley adjured the English theologians 'to be in earnest with metaphysics'. As a theologian who has laid this wise advice to heart, and has made the Hegelian categories for many years the central object of his studies, I may perhaps venture to mention some questions which it seems to me highly desirable that Mr. Bradley or some member of his school should answer.

The philosophical public has given to the school commonly called 'Hegelian'—the school of which Mr. Bradley, Mr. Bosanquet, and Lord Haldane are among the most conspicuous of modern English representatives—a striking measure of confidence. A recent evidence of the esteem in which this school is held is to be found in the obituary notice of Mr. Bosanquet's death in *The Times*. The same morning, and in the same column, *The Times* wrote of the death of a well-known lady who had been an M.F.H. during the war and whose name had been prominently and honourably before the world. Yet about seven-eighths of the column, and all the large print, were given to Mr. Bosanquet.

A large part of our population takes, as we know, no interest in philosophy at all. But of the remaining part it would not be too much to say that (though among the *writers* of philosophy the non-Hegelians are the more numerous) the great majority—at least of the cultivated section—of readers are just now on the side of the Hegelians against their critics. This fact, joined with the obscurity of much 'Hegelian' writing, seems to me to give rise to a very unfortunate conviction—the belief that philosophy is a highly technical subject, like the Calculus (but worse, because with philosophy you cannot be sure that it will yield its secret even to prolonged and painstaking study). Now the man who is to *write* philosophy must no doubt give his life to the work: but it is a bad lookout if the same apprenticeship is to be considered requisite for all who are to *read* it.

I venture to believe that 'Hegelianism,' valuable as its work has been, is associated nevertheless with a certain amount of confused thinking: that it is most difficult just where it is least correct: and that a few searching questions are what is needed to separate the grain from the chaff. I am aware that 'Hegelian' is a nickname. But I use it in no offensive sense;¹ but simply to designate those who hold the doctrine of the 'unreality of the finite'² and the connected doctrines that there are 'degrees of being,' and that ultimately the Subject and the Object of Knowledge are identical. If anyone says that to maintain the *reality* of the finite is to maintain the palpable absurdity of the 'self-subsistence of the dependent,' or the 'substantival character of the adjective,' I should of course reply that these identifications are part of what I dispute. I wish then to ask—and if I can to justify—some questions on the subject of the unreality of the finite.

This doctrine may be digested—quite provisionally—under five headings, so far as it concerns (A) Categories, (B) Propositions, (C) Inferences, (D) Things, and (E) the 'Self.'

It has been held (A) that no single category—'being,' 'quality,' 'quantity,' 'thing,' 'property'—has a stable meaning: that any taken by itself can be shown to be self-contradictory: that no category is qualified to grasp truth: that every idea depends for its meaning on the whole of its context in the widest sense: that to grasp truth we need to see the whole chain of the categories and to see them in their relation.

Kant, says Hegel, was right in recognising the *finitude* of the categories, and *therewith their incapacity to grasp truth* (*Diese Philosophie erkennt nun mit Recht die Verstandesbestimmungen für endlich und damit für unfähig das Wahre zu erfassen.*)³

¹ There is an offensive sense. The use of Hegelian catchwords became at one time a fashion. To compare serious thinkers with thoughtless imitators is an infamous method of controversy. But when a great man is known chiefly by a doctrine which has not won universal acceptance, usage justifies us in calling by his name those who maintain this doctrine. The believer in Gravitation has not hitherto been called a Newtonian. But we speak of Arians, Pelagians, Calvinists.

² Hegel, *Werke*, III. 163, Anm. 2, cf. p. 132.

³ *Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, first edition, § 32, p. 26. The context shows that the Kantian philosophy is referred to. It is a pity that this first edition of the *Encyclopædia* and also the *Greater Logic*—which together give the clearest account of the system—are so little known here. I have met with no translation of either.

Compare the well-known passage in the *Phenomenology* (Baillie's translation, p. 17), 'The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its own completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth; and that just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-becoming, self-development.'

Or take the still more famous comparison between 'truth' and the 'Bacchanalian revel where not a soul is sober; and because every member no sooner gets detached than it *co ipso* collapses straightway, the revel is just as much a state of transparent unbroken calm' (Baillie, p. 44).

But quotation is hardly necessary. The whole arrangement of the categories is based upon the principle that negative dialectic—to use the words of the late Dr. Caird¹—'shows that each limited idea comprises its own negation'.

With regard (B) to propositions, it is asserted that 'no separate proposition can be true': that what is seen out of its full context (and the *full* context is the Universe) is seen distorted: that you cannot, in a word, *tell* the truth, since it ceases to be the truth when told: that to tell it is to distort it.

'Philosophic truth,'² says Hegel, 'cannot be expressed in a single judgment. Spirit, life, Notion in general, is simply movement in itself, and this movement is killed in the judgment'.

In a similar passage in the *Greater Logic* (*Werke*, Vol. III., *Qualität*, Anm. 2, p. 84) we are told that the form of the Judgment is 'not qualified to express Speculative Truths'. 'Judgment is'—he says—'an identical relation between Subject and Predicate, and in the judgment we abstract from the fact that the Subject has other determinations than those of the Predicate: and likewise from the fact that the Predicate is wider than the Subject'.

Compare, again, Mr. Bradley's statement (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 361) that 'any categorical judgment must be false': and Mr. Bosanquet's dictum (*Individuality and Value*, p. 226) that 'facts as we call them . . . when we transcend their several limits of stability by bringing them into connexion with more of the real world' are 'none of

¹ Caird's little book on *Hegel*, p. 51.

² *Encyclopædia*, first edition, p. 84.

them sufficiently stubborn things to stand as finally coherent'.¹

With regard (C) to Inference, Mr. Bosanquet tells us that 'the proof of everything that is proved is ultimately the same, viz., that if it is to be denied nothing can be affirmed,' and that 'as it is impossible to deny everything a truth so guaranteed must be allowed to stand'.² Again, against the common view that some of our judgments—e.g., our aesthetic judgments—depend upon our possessing a special gift or faculty, he affirms that 'bad taste is bad logic'.³

Thus—in opposition to the common view that different branches of study have their own distinctive principles—it appears to be suggested (a) that proof always implies reference to the whole, and (b) that we can get 'from anywhere to anywhere'. 'If we view experience *bona fide*'—says Mr. Bosanquet⁴—'it does not matter from what point we start. It is like going up a hill: you need only to keep ascending and you must reach the top.' In Hegel's phrase, 'the stones will cry out'. Get the simple categories—such is the advice—which you cannot avoid in thinking of a stone, and these will lead you on by their own development to the conceptions under which you can adequately think the Whole.

We are told, again (D), that the conception of a 'thing' is inadequate to reality. 'Our things go to pieces, crumbled away into relations that can find no terms.'⁵ 'A finite thing has an essential relation to that which limits it, and thus it contains the principle of its destruction in itself.'⁶ It is therefore a self-contradictory existence, at once itself and its other, itself and not itself. 'The thing suffers a disruption into Matter and Form.' 'The thing, being this totality, is a contradiction.'⁷ 'All finite things involve an untruth. They have a notion and an existence, but their existence does not

¹ With these passages, cf. various Hegelian references to the 'Law of Contradiction'. See Wallace's translation of the *Logic in the Encyclopædia*, pp. 221, 223, 'Everything is opposite'; Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 33, 'To judge categorically, etc.', p. 227. See Caird, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

² *Ind. and Val.*, p. 49, cf. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 542, 'A thing is more real as its opposite is more inconceivable, etc.'

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7, cf. p. 51.

⁴ *Ind. and Val.*, p. 39.

⁵ *A. and R.*, p. 75.

⁶ Caird, *op. cit.* p. 134.

⁷ Hegel, *Encyclopædia*, Wallace's trans., p. 237, §§ 129-130. Cf.—on the application of the category of 'Substance' to God—Haldane's *Pathway to Reality*, p. 21. 'To define God as substance' is 'to define Him as something relative and not in the deepest sense real.'

meet the requirement of the notion. For this reason they must perish.¹

And as we are to deal with the 'Thing,' so again (E) we are to deal with the 'Self'. Mr. Bradley's two brilliant chapters² are well known. The Self—he concludes—is appearance not reality.

In very close connexion with these various expressions of the doctrine of the 'unreality of the finite' stands the 'Hegelian' conception of the relation of the Subject and the Object of knowledge. This matter may be illustrated by the following quotations—which, even if they do not express all of them an absolutely identical theory, at least all reveal a standpoint very far removed from that of the mass of mankind.

'Anything which can ultimately *be*,' says Mr. Bosanquet, 'must be of the nature of mind or experience.'³ 'The Absolute,' says Mr. Bradley,⁴ 'is one System and . . . its contents are nothing but sentient experience.' 'Being and reality are, in brief, one thing with sentience: they can neither be opposed to, nor even in the end distinguished from it.'⁵ 'If it (the Absolute) is more than any feeling or thought which we know, it must still remain more of the same nature.'⁶ 'In asserting that the real is nothing but experience, I may be understood to endorse a common error. I may be taken first to divide the percipient subject from the universe; and then, resting on that subject, as on a thing actual by itself, I may be supposed to urge that it cannot transcend its own states. . . . When I contend that reality must be sentient, my conclusion almost consists in the denial of this fundamental error.'⁷ 'The idea,' says Hegel,⁸ 'may also be conceived as the Reason, the Subject-Object, and the unity of the Ideal and the Real, of the Finite and the Infinite, of the Soul and the Body, as the possibility which contains in itself its own actuality, whose nature can only be conceived as existing.'

Before venturing to formulate questions which imply criticism of certain doctrines which Hegel and some of his modern followers seem to hold in common, I should like to mention certain matters with regard to which I happen to be in agree-

¹ Wallace, p. 52. Cf. pp. 148, 174, 361.

² *A and R.*, IX. and X.

³ *Ind. and Val.*, p. 135.

⁴ *A. and R.*, pp. 146-147.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

⁸ *Encyclopædia*, first edition, § 162, p. 112.

ment with them. I do this, not because I think that my opinions are particularly important, but merely in order that attention may not be diverted from the criticisms which I wish to raise, by a confusion of these with other criticisms with which I am not in sympathy.

I agree, then, with those who maintain the unity of the world against, *e.g.*, the New Realists of America for whom 'in the present state of our knowledge there is a presumption in favour of Pluralism.'¹ For, in the first place, the unity of the world is proved by the simple reflexion that *difference* is a *relation* and that *relation* is a bond of *unity*. Suppose two things—two facts, two elements (call them what you will)—cut off from one another by the widest conceivable gap of unlikeness or irrelevance. Still they are *different*, and therefore they are not cut off utterly from one another: they 'stand in a mutual relation' of difference. In this sense and to this degree we may say of *anything* that 'its own finite content indissolubly connects it with the total universe.'²

Secondly, I hold that the unity of the world (in a more interesting sense than that just mentioned) is implied in our trust in the predictions of Physical Science. There is, I think, an insuperable difficulty in stating the principle of the Uniformity of Nature in such a way that it shall be both *true* to facts and also sufficiently *definite* to form the basis of any prediction.³ This difficulty—joined with the fact that we rule out from the possibilities of Nature many *prima facie* conceivable incidents (such as those contained in mythologies or fairy-tales, which do not necessarily contradict either one another or observed facts), not because these are contrary to uniformity, but solely because if true they would make the Universe grotesque and absurd as a Whole—seems to me to prove that our trust in Physical Science is based ultimately upon the conviction that the world is a 'rational whole' in the sense that it realises a 'rational ideal'. Conformity with such an ideal would give to it a unity such as belongs to a work of art which in all its diversity of details is a single scheme or conception.

I agree again with Mr. Bosanquet when he says that the general trustworthiness of wide provinces of experience is surer than is the ultimate correctness of particular statements, *e.g.*, that the general trustworthiness of Physical Science is

¹ *The New Realism*, p. 472.

² *Appearance and Reality*, p. 525.

³ I have developed this argument in a discussion—shortly to be published—with Mr. Joseph McCabe on '*Agnosticism or Religion. Which is the more reasonable?*'

more sure than the Law of Gravitation, of Religion than the correctness of the belief in God.¹ Other agreements will come to light below.

But is it true that a warm sympathy with the Hegelian desire to assert the unity of the world, to keep men from resting in the fragmentary, from too much reliance on hard and fast antitheses, from the "partisanship" either of Matter or of Mind²—in general from the faults of the Abstract Understanding—really commits us to an acceptance of the doctrine of the 'unreality of the finite' in any of the forms in which we have seen it stated? Let us consider the difficulties that stand in the way of such acceptance.

Mr. Bradley confesses in his Appendix³ that he has 'used language which certainly contradicts itself, unless the reader perceives that there is more than one point of view': and says that he 'assumed that the reader would perceive this'. What seems to me to have happened—and that not with one writer but with a whole school—is that in a not quite effective attempt to express some highly important truths they have been led to deny certain truths of a humbler sort. The truths which they seek to express are in the highest degree interesting. They are—in the language of the journalist—'vital,' 'thrilling,' 'sensational'. The humbler truths which this school tends to deny are dull and dry, formal, abstract, logical. Still if they are truths, their denial must lead to confusion. When apparent contradiction arises Mr. Bradley (as we have just seen) leaves the reconciliation to the reader—trusting that the reader will distinguish the two points of view—and this state of affairs has now continued for a generation.⁴ Let us then take some of these humbler truths one by one.

(A) In contrary opposition to the Hegelian doctrine

¹ *Ind. and Val.*, p. 50.

² See Mr. Bosanquet's inaugural address as President of the Aristotelian Society.

³ P. 557.

⁴ No philosopher will cast a stone at those who in different contexts use language which if the change of context is ignored is contradictory. But the difference of context and its influence ought to be able to be plainly expressed. Hegel (*Encyclopædia*, first edition, § 39), writes: *Das reine Sein macht den Anfang*: and again (*Werke*, Vol. V., p. 325), he writes: *Die concrete Totalität, welche den Anfang macht*, etc. Both views get much discussion in the course of his work: but it would be hardly true to say that these apparently contradictory statements had been reconciled and explained in clear language.

that 'every category involves contradiction' stands the popular view that 'no category—no single term or conception—is by itself contradictory': that error is never in terms, but is first introduced when we link terms together in a proposition.¹ This popular view will be rejected of course by every Idealism which denies the reality of space: which conceives space as an essentially self-contradictory conception (on the ground, e.g., that Space is on its own showing a *quantum* and not a *quantum*; that it has size—since space is larger than this room—but no size in particular since any definite estimate of its size that we might make must necessarily be wrong.)

But does it follow, from the self-contradictoriness of *some* conceptions, that no conception has solid and stable meaning? And is the latter view tolerable? No one can hold more strongly than the disciples of Hegel the continuity of Philosophy. No one will affirm more strongly that there is something in common between the problem of Philosophy and the problem of the plain man. It is impossible—whether for two men or for two stages of the same man's consciousness—even to *differ* without some basis of agreement. We differ by giving a *different answer* to the *same question*. But if there is—between two stages of consciousness—some sameness of meaning, this surely can be expressed in some term whose meaning is the same at both. In passing from Arithmetic to Algebra we give a new meaning to the term 'Multiplication.' But this is possible only because we make use of certain conceptions which do *not* change.² If we said 'There is *no* term which keeps the same meaning throughout our intellectual progress' or 'We are seeking truth or reality at the end in an *entirely changed sense* from that in which we sought them at the beginning,' would this be consistent with any continuity at all?

To the author of a brilliant volume on the 'Meaning of Truth' the reply has been made that truth 'neither needs nor admits' such further definition as he seeks. When someone makes a simple statement which I understand, in understanding the statement I understand what it would *mean* that it should be true. Understanding the meaning of the simplest statement and understanding the meaning of truth are inseparable.

'But the plain man,' it is objected, 'if he is asked to define the meaning of truth defines it wrongly: he alleges that it always implies the correspondence of a mental state with a

¹ See e.g., *The Logic of Hegel*, Wallace's translation, pp. 51-68.

² E.g., 'unity,' 'division'. See Smith's *Algebra*, p. 14.

physical fact. Therefore you cannot maintain that the meaning of truth is understood by everybody.' This, however, is only one of the many cases where a man, asked for the first time to formulate his views, formulates them inadequately. He thinks of two or three cases where there *is* an agreement between mental state and physical fact, and jumps to the conclusion that truth is always thus. A single contradictory instance will show him that his hasty generalisation is wrong. He has simply mis-stated (as we all often do) his own meaning. This wrong definition is the meaning he *gives* and not the meaning he uses.

If then 'truth' has some unity of meaning throughout and for us all, does not this imply a similar stability in the connected categories of 'being' and 'reality'?

(B) The difficulty of maintaining that 'no categorical proposition can be true'—even of asserting that such a proposition is inadequate to express 'speculative truth'—seems obvious. How, without categorical propositions regarded as true, can we state the philosophy of the very philosophers who maintain this doctrine?

It is true that a narrow view of the Universe—or of any group of phenomena—which takes itself for a complete view, gives a sadly distorted picture. A purely contrapuntal criticism of music—a criticism which holds that to understand a great musical work we need only to formulate the rules of counterpoint which it exemplifies—is false criticism. But, if contrapuntal criticism knows its place, then, surely, all its statements may be absolutely true—may need no qualifying clauses—and may contain no error.

Again it may be plausibly¹ argued that the mind which concentrates itself sufficiently on any one proposition to be able to affirm it, thereby loses its balance and takes a distorted view of the Universe and of the proposition in question (just as excessive focussing of the eyes on a detail distorts one's view of the landscape and so of the detail itself). But even so, if we are confident that our statements—physical, ethical, economic, or whatever they may be—come somewhere near the truth (and if we cannot say as much as this why should we speak at all?) there are definite statements which we can confidently make: 'This statement is near the truth': 'This theory is nearer the truth than the opposing theory': and such like.

Thus, unless the Whole were an undifferentiated Unity—

¹ Not, I think, correctly.

the very opposite of all that Mr. Bradley and his school maintain—the Whole seems to involve the truth of a number of separate propositions. Certain trivial propositions—'Red has a place in the Universe,' 'Green has a place in the Universe'—and certain important propositions—'The completion of Metaphysics is to be found in the Absolute,' 'The completion of Religion is to be found in the Absolute,'¹—seem to be alike in this respect, that they need no further qualification. Take an agreed conviction. 'Truth cannot be fully apprehended without some insight into mathematics.' This is a *finite* statement: it contains much less than the whole. But what qualification does it need to make it true? And have we not here a truth which may lay claim to the rank of 'speculative'? It is in such statements that the Hegelian philosophy gets itself expressed.²

¹ *Appearances and Reality*, p. 454.

² The doctrine that no finite proposition is true is associated, both by Hegel (see above) and by Mr. Bradley (see *A. and R.*, p. 20, and cf. pp. 132, 165, 168, 170, 175, 361) with criticism of the proposition-form as such. In reading *A. and R.*, p. 20, the reader should ask himself whether we are right in treating "is" as equivalent to "equals". We know what we mean when we say "London is larger than Paris," and we do not mean "'London' = 'larger than Paris,'" so that these two expressions are equivalent terms. Cf. Hegel, *Werke*, III., p. 84, quoted above.

The importance Mr. Bradley attributes to the 'endless search for the relation between the relation and its terms' is well known (p. 178). Is the word 'search' justified? Green, *e.g.*, is different from red. When we recognise this difference the 'question arises'—such appears to be the argument—as to what is the 'relation' between this 'difference' and 'red' and so *ad infinitum*. But does any question arise? If we know what the difference between these colours means, surely we know all that could be known as to how the 'difference between green and red' stands to green. What further problem on this head provokes our curiosity? Is not the question that 'arises' merely verbal? We can doubtless go on raising verbal questions *ad infinitum* in the same sense that we can keep adding to the series 'I know that I know that I know.' To this sentence we can—so we say—prefix the words 'I know that' an infinite number of times. In fact of course we can do nothing of the sort. Sanity forbids us to do it a dozen times. Even the madman must come to an end at last. What then is the truth about such infinite series? Surely all we can say is that there is nothing in the words 'I know that' *in themselves*—i.e., considered in *one abstract light*, considered *apart* from the fact that breath is needed to pronounce them and ink to write them—to prevent their indefinite repetition. Such knowledge seems somewhat thin.

I do not know how much of what I have said on the 'endless search' I owe to some remarks of the late Prof. Cook-Wilson. But I believe that his views on these subjects have now partly been published.

Would it be a purely Philistine proceeding to suggest that Mr. Bradley's great chapter on 'Relation and Quality' is a case of 'proving too much'—that the contradictions he attempts there to bring to light must 'break

(C) The principle that 'bad taste is bad logic and bad logic is bad taste' (*Individuality and Value*, p. 7) comes into conflict with the common belief in a special æsthetic 'faculty'. To allege such a faculty is of course no *explanation* of æsthetic experience. Yet it is quite important to point out that without æsthetic feeling no æsthetic judgment can be formed. If æsthetic beauty or ugliness in no way *stirred* me, then—even if a course of purely unemotional logic *could* show me what I ought to admire—such cold knowledge would not be what we mean by æsthetic 'appreciation,' *i.e.*, there is something which apart from æsthetic feeling we cannot *know*.

But here we come to a difficult question. (1) Æsthetic judgments, like moral judgments, profess to deal with necessary truth, not with mere contingent fact. We may, on various grounds, treat all æsthetic judgments as illusion. But if we accept any as true, we accept them also as necessary. To say 'Mozart's *Magic Flute* is *de facto* beautiful, but this very same concatenation of sounds might have been ugly' is frankly nonsensical. To say 'The world may come to lose its taste for Shakespeare' has intelligible meaning: but to say 'Hamlet is, as a fact, a good poem but the connexion between æsthetic beauty and this particular collection of words is purely contingent' has no meaning whatever. To allow an 'objective standard' of facts is to allow a 'necessary standard'.

But (2) necessity involves logical connexion. That which 'must' be means that which cannot without contradiction—'without open or hidden contradiction' let us say—be *thought* otherwise. For what makes the difference between 'It is so' and 'It *must* be so' except that the latter phrase implies a connexion which cannot consistently be thought away? What would *prove* a connexion to be necessary? Surely only the proof that it cannot be denied without contradiction. If I say 'There is no contradiction involved in denying it,' this is inconsistent with saying 'It is a necessary connexion'.

There is still to be remembered (3) the difference between

out' again in his own Absolute? The Absolute (p. 454) is the 'completion of metaphysics' and the 'completion of religion'. If we know that the Absolute deals in any sense with those two 'appearances,' this surely makes them 'terms' standing in a 'relation'. If in the Absolute they are not different enough to 'stand in relation' one to the other, it is hard to see what community there is between 'metaphysics' as we commonly conceive it and 'metaphysics' as it is in the Absolute. If 'metaphysics' is so transformed that it can't be distinguished from religion, why call it metaphysics? If it can be distinguished, then does it not 'stand in relation'—the relation of difference—with religion, and do not all Mr. Bradley's difficulties break out again?

the cases where (as it has been expressed) we can 'see into' the necessity of a truth, as happens, *e.g.*, in geometrical demonstration, which proceeds by unquestionable steps from self-evident principles: and the more usual cases where we believe in the necessity (and predict on the strength of it) without seeing clearly at every step. If we complain that our æsthetic judgments have not the same clear certainty as we get in geometry, it would be hard to express clearly what would satisfy us. What sort of a faculty are we conceiving? With the same kind of intellectual clearness as that with which we see the truth of an axiom there must be united an emotional element, if the judgment is to be perfectly clear and at the same time genuinely æsthetic. Here important problems arise.¹ But the question which concerns us now is whether those who hold that 'bad taste is bad logic' have sufficiently recognised the distinction between the contradiction that is *open* and the contradiction that is *hidden*. Doubtless, if we knew all, we should see that each false æsthetic judgment involved a contradiction. This follows from the admission that our æsthetic judgments claim necessity. But if it is suggested that *we can show* these contradictions—that at our present stage of knowledge we have a logical support for our æsthetic judgments—this is a very different proposition and yet this is what Mr. Bosanquet appears to mean.

Suppose then that someone maintained the sort of æsthetic judgment that no cultivated man could accept—*e.g.*, that all the 'repeats' in classical music are waste of time and have no æsthetic value—how would Mr. Bosanquet or his school convict him of contradiction? How would they even set about this logical task? Would they not, sooner or later, have to rely on direct deliverances of their antagonist's own æsthetic nature?

¹ *E.g.*, of which am I the more *sure*, of my moral or of my geometrical judgments? I am sure in the latter case in a different way. With regard to the 'two straight lines which cannot enclose a space' I have a type of insight which I lack in the other case. Yet it might well be argued that a man would be more shaken after a day spent in the company of a group of mathematicians (with a philosophical axe to grind) who denied the validity of this axiom than after a similar encounter with financial sophists who should try to persuade him that treacherous practices were innocent. Against the latter disputants one's 'whole nature' would be in revolt. Still, in the case of the mathematicians I should remain confident that (if they were serious) they were not really denying what I affirm. I should remain sure that the enclosure of a space by two straight lines as I understand the expression is impossible because unmeaning; whereas it is not in this sense directly unmeaning that our moral judgments, even the most fundamental, may be all wrong. But cf. Mr. Bosanquet, *Ind. and Val.*, p. 51.

'The proof of everything that is proved,' says Mr. Bosanquet, 'is ultimately one and the same, namely that if it is to be denied nothing can be affirmed.'¹ The obvious rejoinder seems to be to take two or three simple propositions which we consider to be in various ways proved: *e.g.* (1) that equilateral triangles are equiangular, (2) that the Romans once occupied Britain, (3) that the earth goes round the sun: and then to ask 'What place does each of these take in the proof of the others? If No. 2 is to be denied does this forbid us to affirm No. 1'? and so forth. A very competent critic has expressed the view that Mr. Bosanquet 'would not deny that one could be certain of one of such propositions without being certain of another'; that Mr. Bosanquet's meaning in this passage is that '*ultimately* the truth of the one hangs together with the other, so that if the one were not true, neither would the other be.' This expression of opinion supports the contention that this whole situation needs clarifying: that the real meaning of the philosophy of this distinguished school needs to be brought to light by persistent questioning. If (when we are in appearance being told that there is no such thing, even in mathematics, as a proof which is independent of outside knowledge) what is *meant* is an affirmation that the Universe is the embodiment of a single rational principle, why should not the meaning be expressed more plainly, and without the apparent denial of a humble but obvious truth?

(D) With regard to the conception of the 'thing,' all the most effective criticism directed against it appears to be in truth an attack² rather upon 'matter' than upon 'substance,' upon the notion of a 'material thing' rather than upon the thing in the sense in which it is the *correlatum* of the attribute.³ For those who admit that matter is 'appearance not reality' the question still outstanding is that of the manner in which, if at all, the category of substance may be applied to (E) the 'Self.' If Time falls (beneath the same kind of criticism as we have applied to Space—that Time is a *quantum* and yet *not* a *quantum*)—then Change falls with it. But if Substance is no longer regarded as 'the *correlatum* of change,' its more fundamental meaning as the 'correlatum of attributes' may still remain to it. If we are to allow any kind of reality

¹ *Ind. and Val.*, p. 49.

² See *A. and R.*, p. 364, note.

³ *Cf. op. cit.*, pp. 73 (*is* and *was*), 77, 79, 104, 118, etc., and Haldane's *Pathway to Reality*, I, 195 and question D at conclusion of this article. The doctrine of the 'substantial self' has, no doubt, given rise to much confusion. It is wrong to argue, from my conscious experience of yesterday and to-day, that through the dreamless night there necessarily existed a 'self'—a *conscious being* that *wasn't* *conscious*.

whatever to what we call our 'past self' or our 'future self' it seems to follow that—since the character of a substance depends on its attributes—our history, our personal existence, if we are to think it by help of the category of substance at all, must be conceived rather as a connected series of substances than as a single substance. Quite apart, even, from a denial of the reality of time, the conception of the self as a single substance is something of a makeshift. I have not the same attributes as were possessed by the 'I' of ten minutes ago.

Can we then abandon the conception of Substance altogether, or confine it to the Absolute? When Mr. Bradley¹ says that plurality of Reals is not possible the question arises how we are to treat, *e.g.*, *difference of opinion*. There is a tendency in philosophers of this school to dwell on the low *value* of erroneous opinion. But this surely is to evade the issue. My disagreement with Mr. Bradley may be a very trivial circumstance. But still as a fact I *do* disagree with Mr. Bradley (and if Time is not real then we cannot even hope to relegate this unhappy difference to an outworn past). If, then, Mr. Bradley thinks one thing, and his critic thinks another (or again if he knows something, or feels something, which his critic does not know or feel) how can this fact—which cannot be altogether denied and removed from the contents of the Universe—be in any measure recognised except by the peculiar conception of two substances, namely Mr. Bradley to whom one set of attributes belongs and his antagonist who owns another? Mr. Bradley's brilliant writings have been before the world for many years. No one doubts that *Appearance and Reality* is a book with a great future. But has it really made plain even to the philosophic world, what is to be done with facts like difference of experience and of opinion? 'The business of Metaphysics is to understand.' If we *understand* what is the position in the 'Real which is substantially one' of attributes such as 'agreeing with Mr. Bradley,' 'disagreeing with him,' ought we not to be able to express ourselves on the subject clearly and shortly? Can these be both of them attributes of the same Substance, except on a theory which would divide that substance into parts, and then might we not as well speak of a plurality of substances?

One more question remains. Is it true that there is nothing which in any sense is beyond experience? Is there nothing in the object which cannot ultimately be identified with the subject?

¹P. xix. Mr. Bradley speaks of the Real as 'one substantially'.

I suggest that we are in danger here¹ of using the word 'beyond' in an equivocal manner. Certainly nothing is beyond knowledge in the sense of being essentially unknowable. Whatever is or could be, must fall under some conception—if it *is* it must have some definite type of being—and with conceptions thought is conversant. But does it follow, because thought can *know* everything, that there is nothing here beyond the mere fact of knowing? Surely on the contrary knowledge implies a truth to be known; knowledge is knowledge of something prior to itself. It is here that the dry and abstract truths of geometry are so very useful. Though terribly dull they are limpidly clear, and obviously independent. The man who first discovered the axioms merely *discovered* them; he did not invent them nor create them. Even if God knew them from all eternity, His knowledge presupposes them true. They could not be known without being true: but they could be true without being known. They reveal, not how we *do* think, but how we *ought* to think. The norm then is prior to the reality.

But if part of the object of knowledge consists in truths of this sort which are obviously prior to and independent of the mind (of any mind, even the divine mind if it is considered simply *as* a knowing and experiencing mind, as popular theology conceives it), then it is surely impossible to treat the knowing mind at its very fullest expansion—even if we allow it to include all will and all sensation—as identical with the Truth known. Has modern philosophy really taken to heart the lesson that it ought to have learned from the break-down of Conceptualism? Has it seriously grasped the lesson taught by the position in the Universe which Plato assigns to the 'Forms,' the Ideas? There are those who have recognised that the world may be bound together by a bond which is spiritual but not conscious: that the relations which form this bond are not dependent for their existence on being recognised by conscious minds: that the axioms, *e.g.*, would have been true and mutually related even if no one had discovered them. But a more common type of opinion is that which argues (in the spirit of Conceptualism) that relations are mental facts and so that the unity of the world directly implies a self-conscious experience at its centre. Does not such an argument bring us dangerously near to the Subjective Idealism which those who use it would repudiate?

The questions then which I wish to ask are six in number.

¹ Cf. *A. and R.*, p. 175, 'How is it possible to transcend,' etc.

(A) Can philosophy be in any sense continuous with common knowledge, if in philosophy no single conception retains the meaning in which common knowledge employs it? Can the philosopher even correct the errors of the common mind if he uses such fundamental conceptions as 'truth,' 'being,' 'reality,' in a wholly changed sense?

(B) Can those who tell us that 'no finite'—or 'no categorical'—'statements are true' state their own philosophy without resorting to such statements? If they merely allege that 'These statements are provisionally serviceable in the search for truth,' is not this sentence itself a finite—and a categorical—statement?

(C) How will the philosopher set out, in any given case, to show that 'bad taste is bad logic': *e.g.*, to show *contradiction* in the statement that to omit the 'repeats' in Mozart's sonatas is an improvement to the music?

(D) Are the arguments used against the category of 'substance' ever valid, except in the cases where 'substance' is so used as to be implicated in contradictions which arise from the nature of Space, Matter, and Time?

(E) Can we deny the reality of difference of opinion? Can we on the other hand affirm it, without making use of the conception of two or more 'minds' with different 'attributes'—*e.g.*, one 'Liberal,' another 'Conservative,' and so forth?

(F) Are there not truths which are obviously prior to knowledge? (The axioms are a clear case whatever we take them to affirm: *e.g.*, if they merely state how a rational mind starting with certain presuppositions must proceed. Unless the mind simply *invents* them—if there is anything here that has been *discovered*—the priority of the truth to the knowledge is implied.) If so, is it not wrong to treat even an all-inclusive knowledge as either identical with, or creative of, the truth it knows?

It is on such questions that our teachers make statements which are *prima facie* contradictory. Mr. Bradley is the first philosopher of his time and Hegel doubtless among the greatest men whom the world has ever produced. But Mr. Bradley, as we have seen, openly leaves his *prima facie* contradictions for the solution of his readers, and Hegel in truth has done the same. And this has continued in the one case for a generation and in the other for a century. Is not a respectful and listening world worthy of a different treatment?

IV.—INTERCOURSE AND INTERACTION.

BY H. WILDON CARR.

IN a sympathetic and yet penetrating critical notice of my *Theory of Monads* in the April number of *MIND*, Mr. C. A. Richardson seems to challenge my consistency in holding that there is intercourse between minds while denying that there is interaction between monads. He charges me with using the word interaction in a restricted meaning which is wholly unwarranted, namely, one which would make it always imply spatial relations. Were the question involved one which merely concerned the right use of terms I should not defend my use but endeavour to avoid ambiguity in the future. It seems to me, however, that in this case the terms used are indifferent and that probably many of my readers besides Mr. Richardson have failed to understand my conception of the nature of monadic intercourse.

What I affirm is this. It may or may not be true that mind and body interact, it is at least conceivable that they do. It cannot be true that mind and mind interact, it is not even conceivable if we accept the theory of the monads, because if the mind is a monad interaction is a contradiction. Intercourse between minds is not a theory, such as in my view interaction between minds would be, it is a fact the nature of which has to be interpreted. Intercourse between minds would I suppose be rejected as illusion by a consistent solipsist, but it is the practical working belief without which we should not know how to conduct our lives. It seems to me a pure confusion of thought and not a misuse of words to interpret intercourse as interaction. The conditions of intercourse are different from the conditions of interaction, and the effects of intercourse are different from the effects of interaction.

An illustration from history may make the distinction clear. The doctrine of sufficient grace or divine efficacy which Pascal defended in the *Lettres Provinciales* is an interaction theory. According to this doctrine, God, the infinite mind, not only reveals or makes known his nature and his will to finite minds in his commandments, but he directly acts on

the elect enabling them by his efficacious grace to do his will and aspire to communion with him. When grace is withheld the power of the just to fulfil God's commandments fails, and such, according to one side in the famous Jansenist controversy, was Peter's condition when he denied his Lord. On the other hand, the doctrine which Leibniz propounded to Arnauld in the *Discours de Métaphysique* is the definitive denial of interaction. According to it, the infinite perfection of God depends on omniscience alone. God when he created Adam did so with perfect foreknowledge of his nature and of the actions which would result from that nature, but he created Adam's nature as a clockmaker constructs a clock which is intended to go by itself, a nature whose spring of action is entirely within itself. Adam's nature, because intelligent, comprehends capacity for intercourse but its activity consists in perception and its finitude in the confusion and obscurity of its perceptions. Here then we have two fundamentally distinct conceptions of mental nature, both affirming intercourse, but one asserting, the other denying, interaction between the divine or infinite and the human or finite mind.

Let us now look at the implications of the term interaction. When physicists use it they mean the relation between things which are subject to Newton's third law of motion. It depends therefore in physics on the Newtonian absolute space and universal time. No one would explain intercourse between minds on this basis or indeed on this analogy, even if, with some realist philosophers, they hold that minds are spatial and temporal. They would not, because obviously the kind of action and reaction, the constancy of which was formulated by Newton in his third law, simply does not express the relation which exists between minds when one is said to understand another's meaning.

When psychologists use the term interaction they refer always to a theory of the nature of the relation of mind and body. The term has for them a perfectly definite connotation. It expresses the view of those who hold that psychical states—sensation, perception, emotion, volition—are both conditions and conditionates of physiological states—neural transmission, muscular contraction and relaxation, glandular secretion and discharge. It is clear that whether interaction is or is not a true theory of the relation between mind and body it has not the slightest analogy to the relation of intercourse between mind and mind.

If now we consider ordinary intercourse, such as when one asks a question of another and receives an intelligible answer, it is clear that if such intercourse depends on interaction it

cannot be direct interaction between mind and mind because the two bodies intervene. The only obvious interaction is between the two physiologically organised bodies and the interaction of the two minds would necessarily fall into three completely separable and separate sets of events, *viz.* an interaction between the mind of the interrogating person and his body, an interaction between the body of the interrogating person and the body of the interrogated, and an interaction between the body of the interrogated and his mind. Such serial interaction may be a condition of intercourse but clearly it is not itself intercourse, nor as a condition is it in any way interpretative of intercourse, for intercourse means that there is mutual understanding of meaning. Clearly my mind does not inform my body, my body thereupon inform another body, and that other body inform its mind.

According to many investigators there is a direct relation between minds which is experimentally proved to exist; they have named it telepathy. The evidence for the existence of this phenomenon seems to me somewhat too easily and eagerly accepted by most members of psychical research societies, but on the other hand there are many critically minded philosophers who are convinced by it. If such a relation does exist in fact, and if its nature be what it purports to be, then there is a direct relation between minds which is one of interaction pure and simple and nothing else. It is mainly because I hold that intercourse is not interaction and that telepathy if it be a fact is interaction and not intercourse, that the theory of telepathy and the attraction that it possesses for some philosophers seem to me to rest on a complete misconception of the nature of intercourse. In other words, if minds can be conceived to interact in the way which telepathy supposes, then I am at a loss to understand why there is, and how indeed there can be, the ordinary fact we name intercourse. It must be an illusion and an inexplicable one. Telepathy is the theory that one mind can make another mind perceive the perceptions, think the thoughts, feel the emotions, which it is itself experiencing, by direct mind-mind action. A well-known instance, which will serve as an illustration, was when a famous author and public man sent an account to *The Times* supported by affidavits, of an experience he had had and which he interpreted as the direct action of a dog's mind on his mind where there was no possible physical medium of communication between the two bodies, at least none by the recognised physiological paths. The difficulty to me in this and in all cases of the same kind is not the *bona fides* of the facts but the rationality of their

interpretation. If one mind can direct or control the ideas of another mind or impart its own ideas to it by acting directly upon it then our bodies instead of being, as I hold them to be, the means by which non-interacting minds can have intercourse must be a hindrance to the direct interaction of minds, an obstacle to be overcome. It seems to me that believers in telepathy start with the preconception that the body is such an obstacle. I hold that it is the means and the only means of intercourse.

I will now as briefly as I can give my reasons for holding: (1) that minds do not interact; (2) that intercourse is mutual understanding which is purely ideal and brought about by the activity of each mind in self-expression; (3) that the means of intercourse is the body, and that the condition of intercourse is rhythmical unison in the duration and extension, that is in the range of activity, of the two bodily organisms. In other words only where there is a unity of the rhythm of duration, such as we find for example in human minds, is there the condition of monadic intercourse.

1. To give with any completeness my reasons for holding that minds do not interact it would be necessary to develop my whole theory of the essential nature of the monad. I will choose the shorter way of challenging anyone to produce from his own psychical experience—sensational, emotional, or cognitive—a case in which anything he feels or knows or desires is not due to his own mind's activity but to the activity of another mind. I cannot discover one in my own. I cannot by tasting pine-apple or port wine make another mind receive the sensation I am having, nor have I ever had need to attribute a strange sensation of my own to the activity of another mind. Indeed in regard to sensation is it not universally admitted that experience is incommunicable? Is it not the same with regard to emotions? Many popular expressions seem to indicate that such psychical states as love, fear, anger, are directly communicated from mind to mind, not by individual contemplation of lovable, terrible or outrageous deeds, but by a purely mental influence, across a soul atmosphere as it were, as when, for instance, we speak of panic seizing a mob. The slightest reflective analysis will show, I think, that this is only a way of speaking. If I make my neighbour angry, the emotion is due to his own mind's reaction to my injurious words or gestures, my mind does not directly impart his anger to him. In panic also it is the outward expression which renders the inward experience contagious. Is it different then in regard to cognition? Surely this goes without saying. Every teacher knows that

instruction is never either passively acquired or mechanically imparted, it supposes continuously the original and originating activity of the mind receiving instruction. Even if the mind be, as Locke supposed, a *tabula rasa*, passively receiving impressions, it is only cognitive in so far as it interprets the impressions and is to that extent active. Suppose, however, it is not a present experience at all which is in question but a memory. Memories, let us allow, are purely mental facts, existing only in the mind. In this case may there not be interaction between mind and mind? Suppose I have forgotten what someone reminds me of, making me remember also, is not this interaction? Clearly not, for there is no kind of interchange. The memory evoked is the past experience of the mind in which it is evoked, and the activity which evokes it is the activity of the mind in which it is evoked. There is neither exchange nor interaction. Negative instances however cannot be decisive. My reason for holding that minds do not interact is that I find that what I mean by a mind is a self-acting, non-interacting thing, and if I abstract from this self-acting character nothing distinctive remains. When I say for example that a horse has a mind and a steam-engine has not, I mean that in the horse there is an impenetrable principle of self-originating activity and in the steam-engine there is not. A mind for me is a thing-in-itself and whatever acts of itself and not for another is a mind. Interaction between minds is barred for me therefore by my concept of mind, but at the same time I allow that my concept of mind would not be self-consistent if it conflicted with facts of experience or even if it required terms to be used in their non-natural meaning. To pursue this further would lead to the general theory of the monads.

2. Intercourse is based on a purely ideal relation between minds which involves no identity of content and no interchange of energy. The activity of each mind is throughout an activity of self-expression, self-centred, self-originated, self-integrating, self-expanding, self-developing. It is an activity of recognising, understanding, interpreting, responding, and the mutual responsive cognition, emotion and sensation become the basis of mutual action and co-operation. If anyone insists that any relation between two things which has as its effect the modifying of those things, even though interchange is ruled out, is a form of interaction, I can only reply that this is to use the term interaction in a wider meaning than is warranted by ordinary usage, and it would make it exceedingly difficult to find any ordinary term to indicate the distinction between the doctrine of Pascal and that of Leibniz which I instanced at the beginning.

Ordinary knowledge is a purely ideal relation between the knower and the object known. When I see an impressionist picture and it appears to me an unintelligible chaos in colour, tone, and line, and then stepping backward I see it change to the representation of a landscape with natural order and unlimited suggestiveness, no one supposes that any part of the activity which produces this modification of my experience is other than the activity of my own mind. No one supposes that by knowing the picture I alter it. If I did or if I the knower were altered in my nature by knowing it, receiving something or imparting something of myself, the relation would not be purely cognitive. Suppose the object is the painter painting a picture, then there is an activity in the object or the object is an activity, but the activities are never interchanged, knowledge is the same purely ideal relation. In intercourse between minds the cognitive relation is throughout of this ideal character. The nature of each mind is uninterfered with, but in intercourse the cognitive relation is richer and more complex than the simple relation between a mind and its object, because a two-fold activity is directed towards mutual understanding. What I want to insist on is the significance of the fact that no power possessed by the inquisitors who made Galileo retract his words could make him change his belief.

3. Intercourse is not a relation which holds universally between monads. One cannot say of monads, for example, that while they do not interact they have the capacity of entering into communication. On the contrary intercourse between monads is a very rare phenomenon occurring under highly specialised conditions, and to interpret it we have to determine the conditions under which it can occur and the means by which it is effected. To illustrate my meaning I will ask the reader to accept provisionally my monadic theory and take my standpoint that the reals which constitute the universe are all self-enclosed like our minds. Not only then is my mind a monad, but my body, if in its unity it has an in-itself existence, is also a monad, and every cell of my body—if I am right in believing that each component cell has its own individual outlook on the universe and its own self-centred activity—is a monad, and clearly there is no reason to stop at the cell; the microscope reveals to me ranges within ranges of activity without ever bringing me within sight of a limit. My mind therefore is dependent for its activity, or at least for the efficiency of its activity, on the body and its constituent monads, yet there is no intercourse between mind and body, or between mind and the cells of the body, in the sense in

which there is intercourse between one human being and another. Intercourse is a peculiar relation which we actually know only as subsisting between human beings, and which to a limited extent we suppose to subsist between creatures which more or less approximate to the human in their organisation. How then is such intercourse effected if there is no interaction?

I suppose everyone will agree to the answer, that as between human beings the means of intercourse is language, using the term in its widest meaning and not restricting it to written or spoken words. But what is language? This is the really crucial problem. It is generally thought to depend on the agreement, arrived at by communicating minds, to use a material object as a conventional sign to convey a meaning, and the ideal of a perfect language is a system of unmistakable signs conveying unambiguous meanings. Such a view assumes as already in existence independent minds, generically related, with naturally acquired cognitions. I will not repeat here the arguments by which, in my *Theory of Monads*, I have claimed to prove that this account of language is untrue in fact and theoretically self-contradictory. The real fact about language is as paradoxical as the miracle which is said to have happened on the day of Pentecost when the apostle spoke in his own language and the hearers heard each in theirs. Intercourse depends on minds being attuned. The convention consists in inward adaptation and not in outward recognition. The condition of intercourse is not that two minds should be situated within a common universe, in some inexplicable way revealing itself to each and its identity to both, but that two minds each actively co-ordinating its own universe should have a common system of reference. In the language of relativity the identity underlying intercourse is an invariant equation.

If then intercourse is an ideal relation, self-mediated by each communicant, implying an independent process in each, by what means is it effected? The answer in my view lies in comprehending the true nature of the relation of mind and body. On this problem there is a great dividing line between systems of philosophy. According to some it is the body and the material constitution of the body, which is the fundamental reality—it is the body which owns the mind; according to others, it is the mind which owns the body, and whatever purpose the body serves, it is, so far as mind in its pure reality is concerned, an encumbrance from which it might be detached and set free. Neither seems true to me, and either would make ideal relations between two minds an unfathomable

mystery. In my view the body is to the mind its means of self-expression. An activity without means to express itself cannot be presented to thought in an image or idea, and this is what mind without body would be.

In my *Theory of Monads* I have described the mind-body relation as a solidarity. The two constituents are completely distinct. The mind is an ideal order, the body a material order. There is an intelligible meaning in which my mind was in existence before I was born and will continue in existence after I am dead, an intelligible sense in which mind is essentially eternal, body essentially temporal. None the less my mind's capacity for expression and for efficient action is entirely dependent on my body. On this point I must simply refer to the arguments of my book and not attempt to repeat them. What is relevant to the present problem is that the mind expresses itself in the body and gives form to that self-expression in actions. Herein is the condition of intercourse, for self-expression of itself provides the material of language. It offers the *prima facie* distinction between purposeful action and pure mechanical movement. It enables meaning to be conveyed, like the foot-print which Crusoe discovered on the shore. When two minds give expression each to its own activity in its actions, an ideal understanding by each of the other's purpose is rendered possible. The form of my actions may inform the mind of another if my expression of my activity directs another to the expression of his. Such possibility is clearly dependent, however, upon similarity in the form and organisation and range of each activity. As a matter of fact there is only intercourse between minds which are co-ordinating their universe in practically identical systems of reference, between minds who are using the same clock and the same foot-rule.

These are my reasons for holding that neither in theory nor as matter of fact is intercourse between minds an interaction of monads.

V.—SOME THEORIES OF LAUGHTER.

BY J. C. GREGORY.

HUMAN anger may result in many different actions: an angry man may strike the person who has angered him, he may send his children to bed, cut off his son with a shilling, spread scandal, plot for his enemy's ruin, alter his political opinions, or write a satire. Animal anger, speaking generally, is a single course of tooth-and-nail attack on the offender: as "a passion to enable the animal to overcome obstacles hindering his great work of self-preservation,"¹ as its "sudden courage,"² it impels to physical violence. The varied behaviour of the man and the single action of the animal are different methods of one fundamental impulse to attack. This primary, common, fundamental impulse is written, in essentially the same way, on the actions of every human being in the moment of anger, whether it results instantly in a blow or in a slower method of deferred revenge. Anger throws the body sharply into an attitude for attack: the clenched fist and tightened breath, figuring a whole by a part, represent its characteristic bodily expression. The "expression" of any emotion is the bodily behaviour common to all its manifestations, as the striking attitude characterises the moment of anger, to whatever actions it may lead. The primary attitude and actions of attack constituting the fundamental "expression" of anger may reduce to a dwindled remnant if the angered person restrains himself or if he vents his anger in one of the many human substitutes for physical violence. "The Expression of the Emotions" is frequently suppressed in human beings by such restraint or diversion of action from its original manifestation. But a certain definite bodily behaviour, though often in a reduced form, is attached to the occurrence of each human emotion. In anger, which can be taken as a type of other emotions, a diffused aggressive pose persists as a characteristic expression of this emotion to connect the many

¹ Mandeville, *Dialogue between Horatio, Cleomenes, and Fulvia*.

² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chap. 6.

methods by which human beings attack one another with the original method of bodily violence.

Anger prepares the angered subject for struggle throughout the resources of his being, and the external manifestation is accompanied by an internal mobilisation of power. When the fist clenches and the body centres its pose on a blow the internal economy responds and co-operates by supplying energy for its delivery. It also endeavours to meet the strain of the delivering. Adrenin from the adrenal glands floods the blood with sugar, assists the blood towards the organs that will endure the stress, makes the blood more rapidly coagulable, and is ready for the quick quenching of muscular fatigue.¹ The sugar supplying energy, the blood hurrying it to the straining organs, which add vigour to aggression, the increase in coagulability and the preparation to reduce fatigue, which reduce the exhausting effects of aggression by stopping the flow of blood from wounds and diminishing weariness, as obviously support and manifest the aggressiveness of anger as the outwardly visible pose of the body. The "expression" of anger, the aggressive pose which characterises the emotion, is diffused throughout the organism and is evident both to external scrutiny and internal exploration.

A spectator on a distant planet, able to perceive human actions as a microscopist perceives the actions of amoebae and as unacquainted as he with the thoughts or feelings of his subjects, might not realise that a vicious blow by one man and a libel suit brought by another were results of the same emotion of anger. If he observed the moment of insult in both instances he might deduce, from the common bodily expression peculiar to anger, that both men acted under the same emotion. If he could observe the liberation of adrenin as well as angry gesture he would be still more convinced of the fundamental identity between the two reactions. Now emotions may alter their natures, they may develop into other emotions different, more or less, from their originals as well as result in different actions. The characteristic expression, persisting from the original emotion through all its variations of nature or tendency, may then afford a valuable clue. Though we do not share the planetary observer's disability of being too removed from human life on earth to be intimate with it, we can share the advantage for study he would derive from the useful clues to mental life provided by the "Expression of the Emotions". These clues refer to the connections between emotions and to the nature of the

¹ Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage*, pp. 184-185.

emotions themselves. In studying the characteristic human emotions which express themselves in laughter, this laughter, this fundamental mode of expression common to them all, is a useful aid to their investigation and exposition.

A flight of meteors appears to stream from a single radiant point. It is only seeming because the perspective arranges for the eye to see parallel paths as divergent paths, as parallel railway lines seem to approach one another in the distance. In the evolution of life there are centres of divergence which are as well as seem. Bergson¹ remarks that the order of living things is spread out like a sheaf and not extended in single file. As a shell bursts in many directions or as stars shower from an exploding rocket, so the realm of life is distributively spread from a single vital impulse. Within this complex of divergent lines from a single point of growth the plan of the whole is repeated in its parts. This repetition is perhaps more certain and less speculative than Bergson's doctrine of a single, primal and explosive vital impulse which spreads, sheaf-wise, along divergent lines of evolution. This repetition, if it be repetition, of divergence from a centre of growth is apparent in the derivation of differently specialised types from generalised animals or plants. Often, in the course of evolution, a species with many capacities has a posterity of differently specialising species, each of which develops one capacity, or group of capacities, of the original and establishes a separate line of advance.² The generalised organism with many capacities is a centre of growth and the specialists are divergents from it. The occasions of smiling or laughter and the emotions, or feelings, associated with them have, in a similar way, developed out of an original centre which is still visible in the "mechanical motion, which we are naturally thrown into"³ when we laugh or smile.

Two companion prints of pictures, once popular, were common household furniture half a century ago. In one, "The Frown," a row of school-children bend tensely to their task; in the other, "The Smile," the same children in the same row sit cheerfully and at ease. Many writers have described the "mechanical motion" of laughter with very varying degrees of fulness or insight. Hobbes merely remarks "that distortion of the countenance" which is obvious and shared by expressions of many emotions—unless we stress

¹ *Creative Evolution*.

² Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution*, p. 18.

³ Mandeville, *Dialogue between Horatio, Cleomenes, and Fulvia*.

his defining phrase "which we call laughter".¹ Leigh Hunt, more explicitly, says "The breath recedes, only to reissue with double force; and the happy convulsion which it undergoes in the process is laughter".² As description becomes more adequate and more directed by careful inquiry the relaxation which is spread through "The Smile" and defined more sharply by contrast with the tenseness in "The Frown" is discovered in laughter and observed to be its characteristic feature. Milton's "Laughter holding both his sides"³ presents, by a symbol in a vivid line, a terse, envigoured, palpable summary of the more prosaic discoveries made by painstaking analysis. This sense of relaxation pervades the reports made by careful observers on the physical processes in laughter and smiling. Erasmus Darwin traced the infant's smile to the relaxation of the sphincter muscle of its mouth when fatigued by sucking⁴ and Freud discovers the beginnings of laughter in the smile of the "satiated nursling".⁵ Charles Darwin observed that infants pass on from smiling to incipient laughter without any abrupt line between violent laughter and its first stage in a faint smile. He also referred the sound of laughter to deep inspiration plus short interrupted contractions of the chest, and contrasted the laughing tittering sounds by men and some monkeys with their prolonged screams of terror⁶—thus circumspcctly reediting the description given by Leigh Hunt. The element of "interruption" which appears in Charles Darwin's description of laughter is as significant as "relaxation" and it appears again in Sully who regards the smile and the laugh as two stages in a process of INTERRUPTING the respiratory movements.⁷ Bacon, though, after the manner of his time, he referred the prime physiological cause to "the dilatation of the spirits," noted also "the dilatation of the mouth and lips, continued expulsion of the breath and voice, and shaking of the breast and sides".⁸ The "mechanical motion" of laughter is essentially a relaxation through interruption and always contains a titter, to which it often completely descends, which repeats again and again, in rapid alternation, the interruption and consequent relaxation of which it is compounded. We breathe in for effort and breathe out for relief; when we laugh we do both, because an interruption relaxes our effort, and continue

¹ *Elements of Philosophy*, iv., ch. 9.

² *Wit and Humour*, Illust. Essay.

³ *L'Allegro*.

⁴ *Zoonomia*.

⁵ *Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious*, Brill's Trans.

⁶ *Expression of the Emotions*, Chaps. 4 and 8.

⁷ *Essay on Laughter*.

⁸ *Nat. Hist.*, viii., § 721.

to repeat, in a titter or its magnification, the effortful breathing in and the relaxful breathing out. Because laughter arises from relaxation through interruption "its impulse seeks to effect no change in the relation of the organism to the outer world, but terminates in the bodily changes".¹

Since laughter has no intentions, since it relaxes and, when hearty, completely collapses all effort, it raises the blood pressure, hastens the circulation, enlivens respiration and thus promotes EUPHORIA without purposely mobilising the resources of the organism, as anger does. Anger prepares the body for specific action; laughter incidentally, perhaps, through the pleasure it manifests, prepares it for future emergencies. Laughter greatly promotes welfare of body and mind; but this secondary function, though it may have become very or most important, is not the direct clue to its origin nor to its connexion with the various emotions or feelings that have been, and are, associated with it.

The germ of amusement is satirically lodged in the laughter of triumph or scorn, but triumphant or scornful laughter is very different from pure laughter at the ludicrous. The earlier theories of laughter, by centering on its implication of superiority or eminency in the laugher, are a reminder of its steady growth into pure appreciation of the comical from malevolent relief at the fall of a foe or contempt for those whose enmity or power is esteemed as impotent or futile. In glee over deformity, as when Olympus laughed loudly at the hobbling Hephæstus, a sense of the ludicrous is displacing, though still mingled with, the feeling of triumph or scorn. The detachment of the amusing from its satirical connexion with superiority or contempt is the final humanisation of laughter and the final achievement of humour.

Laughter, Plato seems to have thought, inclines to immoderacy² and the ridiculous to buffoonery.³ Socrates specifies among the sources of laughter the weak and impotent who are thereby ridiculous and the misfortunes of friends which excite joy through envy.⁴ He perceived the nature of laughter and its nobler function when he remarked to Protagoras that "a jest may sometimes pleasantly interrupt earnest,"⁵ but Plato's eye is too fixed on the ungracious element in laughter. Bain thought that "a sudden stroke of superiority" is one of the most certain "causes of the outburst of laughter"⁶ and continued the traditional un-

¹ McDougall, *A New Theory of Laughter*, *Psyche*, ii., 4 (N.S.), p. 303.

² *Rep.*, 388.

³ *Rep.*, 606.

⁴ *Phileb.*, 49.

⁵ *Phileb.*, 30 (Jowett's Trans.).

⁶ *Mental Science*, Chap. 7.

gracious character which Hobbes had described as a "sudden glory arising from sudden conceptions of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others"¹ and which Descartes had singled out as the hate that, in the absence of wonder, is necessary for joy to excite laughter.²

Aristotle, remarked Coleridge, defined the laughable "as consisting of, or depending on, what is out of its proper time and place, yet without danger or pain".³ If we can abstract danger, he says, speaking of Hamlet and adopting Aristotle's description, from anything out of the common order, uncommonness will remain as a sense of the ludicrous.⁴ Such definitions indicate the transformation of a sense of sudden relief from danger into a pure sense of the comical which represents the evolution of the feelings or emotions associated with a common expression in laughter. This transformation is apparent in a survey of the occasions of laughter and of the estimates of its nature. In the triumphant laugh of the warrior who fells his foe there is a sudden relief as his straining body drops out of struggle. In the laugh of scorn there is contempt of a futile menace—an emotion compounded of a call by danger and a remission of unrequired effort. The panting of the triumphant warrior who has suddenly relaxed with elation becomes the less strenuous laugh, with its central core of titter, which represents the heavy alternation of inspiration and expiration, of the scorner who relaxes from a suggestion of danger before his prepared effort passes into action. The panting of elated success becomes the simulated panting of effort that has been called but not chosen—the pant after effort becomes the laugh that has avoided it. As laughter connects with the more depressed variants of scorn, such as a mildly pleasing sense of superiority, and with a purer sense of the merely ludicrous, it remains conditioned by dangerlessness. A reminiscence of the original of laughter remains in the Coleridge-Aristotelian emphasis on the innocuousness of the laughably incongruous. This definition marks the transition from estimating laughter as a triumph to estimating it as a sense of amusement: a transition of thought with a parallel in the historical development of laughter. When Schopenhauer has transferred the centre of emphasis to a sudden perception of incongruity, for him an incongruity between concepts and real objects,⁵ laughter

¹ *Elements of Philosophy*, iv., ch. 9.

² *The Passions of the Soul*, Art. 125.

³ *Lects. of 1818, Wit and Humour*.

⁴ *Lects. and Notes of 1818* (4).

⁵ *The World as Will and Idea*.

still is, and is perceived to be, dependent on a situation that contains no seriousness. Laughter occurs, according to Strong, even in its purest response to mere ludicrousness, when an apparently serious statement stiffens attention and promptly relaxes it by exposing its own pretensions.¹ Laughter originated in a conquered danger and the release from strain that determined its origin determines all its variations.

Since men triumph over one another laughter was socially begotten and retains a social nature. Its social origin, remarks Carveth Read, is apparent in its infectiousness, in its connexion with triumph and cruelty, in the prevalence of the practical joke and in its preoccupation with the drunken, the indecorous and the obscene. He suggests for it a rival origin to triumph and scorn in the broad humour and indulgence after successful hunting and in the abandonment of harvest and vintage festivals.² The "connexion with triumph and cruelty" seems to be the most intimate connexion of original laughter. A "mechanical motion" characteristic of triumph in battle, as it becomes associated with a developing series of feelings and emotions, since its original stimulus was a social situation, continues to react to social significances. Bergson's familiar restriction of the excitation to laughter to a human being behaving like a machine confines the laughable to social situations. McDougall's theory that "laughter is primarily and fundamentally the antidote of sympathetic pain"³ implies the same confining. All theories that depend laughter upon superiority recognise its social origin and lineage—if only by implication. Smiling and laughing are spontaneously added to conventional methods of greeting because they are naturally appropriate to social situations. Two human beings cannot meet neutrally: there is always a socially-begotten tension and when they meet as friends who require no protection from one another they relax into the natural expression of a social situation that has threatened an emergency and withdrawn its threat. The laughter of greeting is as innocent of amusement as it is of triumph, cruelty or hate, and this double innocence intimates the varied feelings that connect with a single bodily emotional expression expressing relaxation through interrupted effort. The laughter of greeting spreads throughout social intercourse to tempt the theorist into defining laughing as "a vent of any sudden joy".⁴ It is a vent for sudden joys, though not for

¹ *The Origin of Consciousness*, p. 21.

² *The Origin of Man and of his Superstitions*, p. 60.

³ *A New Theory of Laughter*, *Psyche*, ii., 4 (N.S.), p. 299.

⁴ Steele, *Guardian*, xxix., p. 25.

all joys, because relief results in joy and produces laughter. Pleasure connects with laughter because both proceed from relief and the delights of social intercourse continually prompt an established bodily mechanism that is sensitive to social stimulation.

The laugh rose in a social situation ; it spread and developed because society provided it with a multiplier. Hartley noted that the "first occasion" of laughter in the child is "a surprise, which brings on a momentary fear first, and then a momentary joy in consequence of the removal of that fear". This "original of laughter in children," he adds, "is MULTIPLIED by imitation".¹ The multiplicative effect exerted on laughter by its social origin and milieu extended its scope and increased its occasions in both number and variety. The exultant laugh became fixed as a habitual reaction when many triumphed together. Laughter became a fixed and spontaneous method of scorn, that rejoiced the scorners and wounded the scorned, when men saw one another laugh scornfully and scorned in company. The revelry of the feast, with its sympathetic contagion, impressed and confirmed the habit of laughter. Social intercourse constantly stirred the habit and laughter became an established mechanism, so easily touched off and so characteristic an emotional expression that Eastman regards it as the expression of a distinct and specific instinct.² The fixation of the laughing habit simultaneously secured a method of mental advance and exposed society to a danger. "Persons," said Hartley, "who give themselves much to mirth, wit, and humour, must greatly disqualify their understandings for the search after truth."³ Plato, many centuries before him, had marked and feared a tendency to immoderacy in laughter. Sydney Smith, himself a wit, perceived the probable tendency of wit and humour to corrupt understanding and heart.⁴ Thomas Fuller, who tempered wit with religion, commended "jesting" where it was no "master-quality" and only "attended on other perfections".⁵ These four out of many compose a representative jury that convicts laughter of often troubling mankind like a plague. But laughter is benign as well as injurious. If laughter had not been socially spread and socially fixed as a universal habit, wit, comicality and humour would never have collected round it. A world without humour would be a world without men and a world without

¹ Priestley, *Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind*, p. 271.

² Eastman, *The Sense of Humour*.

³ Priestley, *Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind*, p. 274.

⁴ *Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy*, p. 149.

⁵ *Holy and Profane State*, iii., ch. 2.

laughter would be a world without children. The ills that laughter inflicts can be endured for the sake of the grace it bestows. The amusement that laughter has finally released from its ungracious heritage of triumph, cruelty, and scorn marks a line of mental advance. The social multiplication of occasions for laughter has made this advance possible.

The single emotion of anger is served by a variety of expressions; the single expression of laughter serves a variety of emotions or feelings. The original vindictiveness clings persistently to the series of feelings as they develop, but it gradually reduces to a subdued ungraciousness which finally disappears in pure amusement; and, on the highest level of humour, antipathy is merged by amusement into sympathy and even into tenderness. Theories of laughter and of the comic and reviews of their objects are a commentary on this process of development and perhaps, though roughly, indicate by their own sequence the sequence in the history of the laughable. The object of laughter, wrote Bacon, "is deformity, absurdity, shrewd turns, and the like".¹ The "deformity" at the head of Bacon's list, the protest of Fuller against jests made, "like mummy," "of dead men's flesh," against the cruelty of beating "a cripple with his own crutches," against losing a "friend for a jest,"² and the satirical age of Swift, Dryden, and Pope, mark the continuance of "Homeric laughter" that contained a sting and often a sword. Deformity is no longer a legitimate object of mirth and, in the highly civilised, no longer provokes it. Hobbes carefully distinguished the "passion with no name" that has laughter "as its sign" from "wit": men laugh, he says, at mischances and indecencies where there is no wit or jest at all. "Infirmities" figure in his list and jests that discover, with elegant wit, the absurdities of others. He discloses clearly a brutality lingering about the laugh though he thinks it can discard offence: "Laughter, without offence, must be at the absurdities and infirmities abstracted from persons". His theory of laughter, however, remains a theory of "eminency".³ When amusement displaces the nameless passion as the patron of laughter Coleridge can say, truly enough, "To resolve laughter into an expression of contempt is contrary to fact, and laughable enough".⁴ As laughter becomes more predominantly the sign of mere amusement it tends to conceal its original and still frequent unkindness and its refusal to resolve into contempt or triumph tends to falsify its genealogy. But even as

¹ *Nat. Hist.*, viii., § 721.

² *Holy and Profane State*, iii., ch. 2.

³ *Elements of Philosophy*, iv., ch. 9.

⁴ *Table Talk*, Aug. 25, 1833.

thought is directed steadily to the incongruously comical or to the amusing revelation of identity in wit it is still aware of a persistence of the ungracious in laughter. Wit, which has appropriated to itself a share in laughing amusement, is specially loath to surrender the tradition of brutality. Sydney Smith, whose own witticisms were so often well-pointed and well-feathered darts, perceived an implication of superiority in the discovery by wit of surprising relations between ideas,¹ thought that "... the object of laughter is always inferior to us ..." ² and denied the compatibility of tenderness or respect with the humorous.³ Wit indeed, as Freud has explained,⁴ often attempts to restore the triumphant laugh by indulging in attack. The centering of modern theories on the element of amusement culminates naturally, in one direction, on McDougall's description of laughter as an instinctive reaction and of amusement as its specific emotional accompaniment.⁵ As discussion centres on the nature of the purely amusing, thought responds to the historical process of rejecting the ungracious from laughter by depending its conceptions on its purely amusing element. Boris Sidis, however, still thinks that a chief source of laughter is the realisation of strength in contrast with another's weakness.⁶ The perpetual haunting of laughter by its ungracious and even vindictive beginnings, as a family is haunted by its ancestral ghost, appears in the early laughter of children. On the principle that the child suggests, without recapitulating, the history of the race, the element of superiority noted by Kimmins in children's sense of humour⁷ is a reminder of the genesis and history of the laugh.

As the origin of the laugh connects with the lingering of ungraciousness so it connects with laughter as a social discipline. Society's insistence on conformity to its traditions by its members is often exaggerated to-day. Trotter, for example, divides too sharply between the origin of love of novelty in the individual mind and the origin of dislike of change in pressure from the herd,⁸ and language is not only "an artificial means of establishing unanimity and transferring thought from one mind to another."⁹ But the group does

¹ *Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy*, p. 128.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 136.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 138.

⁴ *Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious* (Brill's Trans.), *The Tendencies of Wit*.

⁵ *A New Theory of Laughter*, *Psyche*, ii., 4 (N.S.), p. 303.

⁶ Kimmins, *The Springs of Laughter*, *Child Study Soc.*, Oct. 13, 1921.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (1919), p. 32.

⁹ Smith, *Little Essays Drawn from the Writings of George Santayana*, p. 34.

prescribe for the individual and expect him to follow the prescription. Prescription and acceptance are often unwitting and the individual often spontaneously adopts the habits of his neighbours, as "one person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning from him".¹ Punishment often descends equally automatically upon the offender against custom: the contrast between his action as it is and his action as, in the estimation of society, it should be brings ridicule upon him as if he had touched the trigger of a trap. "In polished society," writes Sydney Smith, "the dread of being ridiculous models every word and gesture into propriety. . . . In Bedlam," he adds, "eccentricity runs riot because there is no fear of the ridiculous."² The spontaneous ridicule of society is supported by sarcasm, systematically expressed in satire and contemptuously directed in scorn. Ridicule, as is evident in its heightened form of scorn, is a reminiscence of the triumph when warriors victoriously rejoiced together. Laughter began in an act of discipline, in the defeat of a foe, and it still has a disciplinary use, though this is neither its final end nor its highest. The original triumph of laughter, patent still in contempt and scorn, lingers on in its ministry of social discipline as it lingers in the constant assumption of superiority when men laugh at the comical or at ready wit.

Laughter no more developed purely by its own internal momentum than any other thing develops independently of its connexions with circumstances outside it. The nature of highly civilised laughter is largely determined by the whole character of the civilised mind. If laughter "hath its source from the intellect" and "is proper to man"³ it will vary with the changing estimates of that intellect. Max Beerbohm, who echoes Bacon in "The physical sensations of laughter . . . are reached by a process whose starting-point is in the mind,"⁴ probably recognises that as the man's laugh is so is the man himself. But the pleasure, or satisfaction, inherent in laughter probably helped to transform virulent antipathy into sympathy. Since the relief in laughter is always a pleasure it is natural for laughter to diminish hatred as perspiration diminishes heat.⁵ Contempt perhaps marks very clearly a transition point in the history of laughter. "Contempt verges

¹ Plato, *Charm.*, p. 169 (Jowett's Trans.).

² *Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy*, p. 144.

³ Bacon, *Nat. Hist.*, viii., § 721.

⁴ *And Even Now, Laughter.*

⁵ Sydney Smith, *Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy*, p. 143.

on anger, and the humorous is at an end"¹ by a reversal of the passage from anger through contempt into the amusing. When "Incongruities, which excite laughter, generally produce a feeling of contempt for the person at whom we laugh,"² there is a milder reversal of the passage from antipathy to its opposite. It is a far cry from the satisfaction of the elated and laughing conqueror, who is prompted to a contemptuous mercy, to the highest levels of civilised humour, and the whole story of the human mind and heart is concerned; but the inherent pleasure of the laughable situation must have, at the least, provided the opportunity for the rich development of the sense of amusement.

Dr. Barrow compared the difficulty of settling "a clear and certain notion" of wit to making "a portrait of Proteus," and his own definition was described by Sydney Smith as "very witty and nothing else".³ The "portrait of Proteus" has not yet been completely made, and modern definitions, doubtless through their earnestness of search, usually lack Barrow's wit. They have, however, a measure of insight to compensate for their degree of failure. If the progress of knowledge is ever comparable to the gradual disclosure of an object under a scrutiny, it is so with knowledge of the laughable. If by the laughable we mean laughter itself and its varied, often apparently discordant, retinue of feelings, the long array of theories, descriptions and estimates may be described as steps of scrutiny. Remembering that the sudden relaxation of interrupted and triumphant effort, visible in the physical act of laughter, has been a centre of growth that has distributed the fundamental element in the laugh through many and varied situations, these theories, descriptions and estimates may be regarded as many partially successful scrutinies of the essential nature of laughter, of its varieties and of the connections between these varieties. It is no doubt prudent to repeat "partially successful".

McDougall⁴ draws laughter into the circle of instincts and, within that circle, separates it into the protective group. It protects us against excess of sympathy. Society is partly united by sympathy with major distresses and this sympathy, wearing by use into over-sensitiveness, tends, by responding to minor pains, to spread depression too widely. Laughter prevents this excess of sensitiveness in sympathetic response and relieves society of a burden. Byron, he adds, had anti-

¹ Sydney Smith, *Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy*, p. 143.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 115-116.

⁴ *A New Theory of Laughter, Psyche*, ii., 4 (N.S.), p. 303

cipated him; Hazlitt also referred the rise of amusement to a false claim upon sympathy.¹ "False claim" recognises the fundamental element of relaxation through interruption, of a response to a call for effort becoming unnecessary. Freud's economy of feeling in humour suggests another anticipation of McDougall, as his economy of inhibition in wit and economy of thought in the comic² suggests that Byron, Hazlitt, and McDougall have narrowed the limits of laughter. All theories of laughter, whether they circumscribe its occasions or achieve only a bare outline of its nature, as obviously fail to identify the laughable as æsthetic theories fail to identify the beautiful. They are but glimpses, and often the more obviously true they are, the more obviously they are only glimpses. The fundamental plan underlying laughter is visible in a combination of these glimpses, but laughter in all its varieties mocks all attempts at definition. Sixty houses built on the same plan may each have different furnishings and different occupants. The architect's plan is no guide to an intending visitor who is anxious about his reception or his comfort; no more are theories of laughter a guide to the laughable. They are often true, they are often informative, they are often useful; but they no more completely describe laughter than the architect's plan describes the menage and spirit of a household. They discover the clues contained in the act of laughter, but they do little more than trace them through its almost infinite varieties.

Since laughter originated in a relaxed effort it is a spill-way for surplus energy, as Herbert Spencer insisted.³ It often openly exposes its fundamental relief: "I heard the sound of little feet pattering outside of the door," wrote Washington Irving, "and . . . a choir of small voices chanted forth an old Christmas carol . . . I opened the door suddenly and beheld one of the most beautiful little fairy groups that a painter could imagine. . . . They were singing at every chamber door; but my sudden appearance frightened them into mute bashfulness. . . . They remained for a moment . . . until, as if by one impulse, they scampered away, and as they turned the angle of the gallery, I heard them laughing in triumph at their escape."⁴ The incongruous, repeatedly noted as the lurking place of the comical, is characteristic of a dangerous situation suddenly become dangerless and provides an opportunity for the sense of amusement. Amuse-

¹ *Lects. on Eng. Comic Writers*, Lect. 1.

² *Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious*, p. 384 (Brill's Trans.).

³ *The Physiology of Laughter*, *Macmillan's Mag.*, Mar., 1860.

⁴ *Sketch Book*, Christmas Day.

ment and relief often blend almost indistinguishably, as they may have done in Irving's carol-singers, to emphasise their common connexion with an incongruous situation. There is a shock in the original situations of laughter and there is a psychical shock in the comical that continues this basic element throughout the varieties of the laughable. Suddenness constantly appears in inventories of laughter. The first occasion of the child's laughter, remarks Hartley, "seems to be a surprise" and the act of laughing itself is "a nascent cry, stopped of a SUDDEN".¹ Laughter is a "Sudden glory," thought Hobbes, and men laugh at a SUDDEN conception of some ability.² "Surprise," said Sydney Smith, "is as essential to humour as it is to wit."³ Johnson thought that the "pleasures of the mind," which presumably include the laughable, "imply something sudden and unexpected."⁴ "One great branch of what we call wit," wrote Reid, "which, when innocent, gives pleasure to every good-natured man, consists in discovering unexpected agreements in things. The author of Hudibras could discern a property common to the morning and a boiled lobster—that both turned from black to red."⁵ Modern writers still harp upon this suddenness: the SUDDEN diversion of comprehension is for Laird the origin of the witticism,⁶ humour requires novelty, repeats Montague,⁷ and for Freud, as Holt reminds us, humour is letting the cat out of the bag.⁸

The sudden withdrawal of an exigency, the arrest that is neither "a flight from reality" nor a movement to it, continues to determine the sense of amusement. Incongruity is only an occasion for laughter when it is innocuous; "a more chaste and wise attention" succeeds the "loud and vivacious" enjoyment of the comic when in a public assembly "new topics are started, graver and higher";⁹ care is as much an enemy to laughter as it is to life.

The importance of disinterestedness probably explains the lesser degree of laughter in wit than in the more purely comic. A witticism secures something: the efficiency of wit connects many various estimates of its nature. The service of wit to hostility, emphasised by Freud, is prominent to-day. A joke described by Holt was an aggression on Christian

¹ Priestley, *Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind*, p. 272.

² *Elements of Philosophy*, iv., ch. 9.

³ *Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy*, p. 137.

⁴ *Life of Cowley*.

⁵ *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, v., 3.

⁶ *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1918-1919, *Synthesis and Discovery in Knowledge*.

⁷ *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1920-1921, *Variation, Heredity, and Conscientiousness*.

⁸ *The Freudian Wish*, p. 17.

⁹ Emerson, *Eloquence*.

Science. The pet cat in a Christian Science family had kittens. Unfortunately they were born blind and fortunately they were born in a Christian Science family. A healer gave them absent treatment and in ten days their eyes were opened.¹ The more traditional doctrine of wit was more impressed with the witticism's success in discovery than in hostility. Coleridge conformed to this tradition by defining wit as "presenting thoughts or images in an unusual connexion with each other, for the purpose of exciting pleasure by the surprise."² A witticism, so conceived, may contain a real and important discovery: "Experience is a good schoolmaster, but the school-fees are somewhat heavy". Coleridge recognises a scientific wit that perceives real connexion,³ and the comparison of experience to a schoolmaster contains too poignant a truth for its reception with hearty laughter. The tendency of wit to reduce its ludicrous elements throws a light on some of the essential conditions and characters of amusement. Wit offers opportunities for amusement but is not itself essentially amusing. It mingles incongruities into its successes and laughter can arise through its relief by achievement. Sydney Smith, however, noted that, though amusement can connect with its surprise, wit tends, by an alliance with seriousness, to dissociate itself from laughter. The relation discovered by wit, he remarks, must arouse no feeling of beauty nor other high emotion than surprise and there must be no impression of utility. Since wit is constantly exposed to these influxes of seriousness it exposes the fundamental disinterestedness in laughter by withdrawing from it. Rochefoucault's "hypocrisy is a homage which vice renders to virtue," adds Sydney Smith, is a witty image but attention to mere wit is swallowed up in justice and value.⁴ Such wit too successfully hits off a situation to be deeply penetrated by amusement and indicates that laughter requires a break in activity, a relaxation of tension, an unrequired achievement, for its free course. A joke, according to Angell,⁵ provokes disorganising tendencies in our co-ordination. The relaxation through interruption that characterises the occasions of laughter is a disorganisation of effort; effective wit is too successfully organised to ally itself very intimately with the amusing. The very success of wit, in some measure, does provide amusement with an appropriate situation, since it halts the mind sharply on an

¹ *The Freudian Wish*, p. 21.

² Lects. of 1818, *Wit and Humour*.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy*, pp. 123-126.

⁵ *Psychology* (1905), Chap. 18.

achievement; and the shock of success, comparable to the final stroke of victory that initiates the triumphant laugh, is favourable to amusement. But when wit lays hold of reality with both hands, as in Rochefoucault's epigram, it is too wise for mirth. Witticisms tend to the trivial and in indulging this tendency become more laughable. The variable connexions of wit with laughter, its constant association with amusement, its constant subjection of the laughable by seriousness and its constant approach to the laughable by descent into triviality, assist in defining the fundamental ground-plan of laughter.

George Meredith¹ has well summarised the achievement of laughter in the comic spirit and the dangers its history still exposes it to. "Comic perception" has so shed the ungracious from laughter that capacity for it can be estimated "by being able to detect the ridicule of them you love, without loving them less: and more by being able to see yourself somewhat ridiculous in dear eyes, and accepting the correction their image of you proposes." It is attained with difficulty, for it requires "a society of cultivated men and women," an equality of the sexes, communities without semi-barbaric giddiness and periods free from feverish emotion. He observes, it will be noted, the social conditioning of the comic spirit. He notes also how it tends to the alliance with acrimony or the attempt to subdue that points to the triumph in the inception of laughter, to the contempt running, in various degrees of depression, through many varieties of laughter and partially justifying theories of "eminency" or contempt or triumph. The wit of Hoyden "is warlike," often it is "entirely pugilistic" and may sound like "the smack of harlequin's wand upon clown". For comedy, very often, "Morality is a duenna to be circumvented".

He notes how the comic tends to degrade: "The public taste is with idle laughers, and still inclines to follow them". He notes how the relaxation of laughter, which is always its core, is fatal, if, instead of remaining a mere interruption of seriousness, it supplants it. He sees eye to eye with Landor and quotes his "Genuine humour and true wit require a sound and capacious mind, which is always a grave one". Laughter constantly stoops to "fun in Bagdad".

He notes also the disciplinary rôle of the comic: folly is her "natural prey" and she chases "with the springing delight of hawk over heron, hound after fox . . . never fretting, never tiring." Though "contempt is a sentiment that cannot

¹ *An Essay on Comedy, The New Quarterly Mag., April, 1877.*

be entertained by comic intelligence," discipline inclines to ungraciousness and "the English public are most in sympathy with this primitive Aristophanic comedy, wherein the comic is capped by the grotesque, irony tips the wit and satire is a naked sword".

The original situations of laughter are steeped in incongruity: a call upon effort and a sudden cry-off compose an incongruousness. He notes that incongruities draw the laughter of the comic spirit: whenever men "wax out of proportion," when they are pretentious or hypocritical or "fantastically delicate" or when they are "at variance with their professions," they draw the "silvery laughter" of the "Comic Spirit".

The pure, unacrimonious comic laughter is somewhat cold: it has shed ungraciousness without acquiring kindliness. It is cold if "Its common aspect is one of unsolicitous observation, as if surveying a full field and having leisure to dart on its chosen morsels, without any fluttering eagerness". But he recognises as well as the "impersonal" and "unrivalled politeness" of comedy, the "embrace of contrasts beyond the scope of the Comic poet". The laugh of humour is refreshing and "the loftiest moods of humour" fuse a more tragic sentiment with comic narrative. Humour, still more remote from the ungracious origins and habits of laughter than the purely perceptive comic, comforts sensibilities and tucks them up.

If Meredith is read in the light of the history of laughter, in the light of its habits and in the light of its theorists, he will be seen and accepted as a summary of the passage of the laugh from the warrior's triumph to the tenderness of humour.

VI.—DISCUSSION.

PROF. STOUT AND DR. ALEXANDER ON SENSE PERCEPTION.

THE central principle of Dr. Stout's realism is the material nature of sensa; for apart from this "we should not even have the thought of a (material) world so as to be able to raise the question whether it exists or not".¹ This is an invaluable initial standpoint; but when at the same time the identity between sensa and perceived physical existents is denied,² it appears to me either that our realism must become a mere noumenalism, or that all the attributes which are assigned to the perceived physical world are grounded on pure assumption.

Before discussing this aspect of the problem, I should like to clarify our terminology a little further. The term "sensus" seems to carry with it those subjectivist implications which Dr. Stout justly discerns in "sensation" and "sense-datum".³ I shall employ therefore "sensed contents," as committing us to nothing further than the patent fact that these contents are apprehended essentially by means of our sense organs. All further questions—the character of the complete conscious process—the nature of this content beyond the bare fact that it is "sensed"—are left entirely open, and can now be approached with no subjectivist presuppositions whatever. If anything, indeed, the contrary becomes true. For that content is "sensed" in this way is obvious to the most superficial observation, and thus we retain, for what it is worth here, the "realistic" attitude of ordinary experience.⁴

(1) Prof. Stout's duality between sensed contents and physical features, then, necessitates two classes or modes of material entities which are mutually exclusive; for one is sensed but never perceived, the other perceived but never sensed. "For each individual the material world has two parts . . . his own (sensed contents) and physical existence. The (sensed content cannot) be identical with *all or any* of the external factors . . . neither the *real* nor the *apparent* shape of the external object is identical with the size or

¹ MIND, vol. xxxi., p. 389.

² "I deny that sensa are identical with perceived features of physical existence," *ibid.*, p. 386.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ This suggestion accords with Dr. Alexander's distinction between "the *-ing* and the *-ed*," which came to my notice after I had adopted it. *Space, Time and Deity*, I, p. 23.

shape of the visual apparition immediately experienced".¹ The existence of the sensed sub-division, further, is determined by the organic processes of each individual.²

Despite this duality, however, and despite the intermittent existence of one of these types, they are still essentially homogeneous. But the analogy whereby Prof. Stout supports their continuity is altogether unsound. "The contents of sense experience and physical facts must belong to the same order of being. The several presentation continua of each of us are continued into and are of a piece with a wider continuum which comprehends them as the physical universe comprehends your body and mine".³ If now this "wider continuum" is not absolutely consubstantial with the physical universe, their original duality still persists and the argument is not advanced at all. But if, on the other hand, the two are consubstantial then Prof. Stout's analogy cannot hold. For the existence of all the factors of the physical universe is "continuous" in the sense that they are all transformable into one another—water into its elements and *vice versa*—without any loss; similarly with the forms of energy; there is here therefore no absolute cessation of existence. But in the case of sensed contents there must be, *ex hypothesi*, an absolute cessation; for the dentist cannot "experience his patient's toothache. He can experience only his own".⁴ There are thus an existential independence and separateness in sensed contents which are absent in physical existents; each main group forms an impervious compartment,⁵ and this precludes both any wider presentation continuum in the true sense of that term, and any "continuous whole" which comprehends sensed contents together with physical existents in "the same order of being". It may be suggested that the sensed content becomes somehow transformed, whenever the percipient ceases to be aware of it, into a physical entity; but since this physical entity itself *continuously* exists, this view implies that it sometimes exists only in one form, and sometimes in two forms simultaneously, which seems to me inconceivable, quite apart from the *modus operandi* of the transformation itself.⁶

When considered, again, as purely presentational, any true presentation continuum which is "wider" than that of any human experient must still appear—because presentational—to one single consciousness, just as the included continua do; a condition plainly akin to Berkeley's Divine Mind. But on the other hand the existence of this wider continuum depends solely on that of the individual

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 387, 394, 404. My italics emphasise the extreme contrast, which is at first sight as absolute as that between Locke's "ideas" and "substance," or between Kant's "representations" and "transcendental objects".

² Sensed contents "have no existence apart from the percipient's organism," p. 387.

³ P. 389.

⁴ P. 391.

⁵ P. 392. "He can hardly say that his sensing of sensa is literally identical with my sensing of sensa".

⁶ Cf. Dr. Alexander, *ante*, p. 8—"my permanent trouble".

experiences—"depends directly and *ultimately only* on the way in which the sense organ is affected";¹ any such wider Mind therefore is obviously impossible. There can be nothing more than a discontinuous and intermittent aggregate of presentations, distinguished from Hume's only in being internally continuous instead of atomic. But this internal continuity itself, though certainly real, is of a peculiar character. It is an attribute not inherent in sensed contents themselves, but conferred upon them by the sensing mind, thus closely resembling Kant's synthetic unity of apperception; which implies that it is mental therefore rather than material, despite the materiality of the content and its homogeneity with physical reality; for although "experience yields evidence of the identity of extension as seen, and extension as touched" (*i.e.*, as perceived), "it does not in the least show that visual and tactual (sensed contents) are included within the same continuous extension".² Their continuity, therefore, can be only that which results from their common presentation to, or their being sensed by, one mind; and this, together with their intermittent existence, makes it extremely difficult to accept their homogeneity with material reality.

(2) The materiality of sensed contents, however, is the indispensable basis of Prof. Stout's realism. But if, for argument's sake, this principle is accepted, difficulties equally serious attend the manner in which our immediate experience of them is related to our knowledge of the external world.

Prof. Stout's treatment of this point, in my opinion, loses sight of the fundamental issue. For he analyses the *nature* of knowledge, whereas our problem concerns, at bottom, the *origin* of knowledge—the mode of its primary development—the character of that earliest stage of experience which precedes knowledge itself and from which all knowledge evolves. This distinction is fully recognised, of course, by Prof. Stout;³ but the precognitive level is then either ignored, or inadequately analysed, according to the actual meaning of his description of the situation.

All that is said therefore with regard to knowledge⁴ is perfectly true. Knowledge is always self-transcendent—in principle to an infinite degree. But this important truth is, just here, totally irrelevant. For it holds of knowledge *once it has arisen*; it cannot explain therefore how knowledge first arises—the real crux of the present problem. It is no adequate solution to apply this principle of transcendence even to primary sense knowledge, and to hold "that in primary sense knowledge more is immediately known than is immediately experienced". For if "primary sense knowledge" is here identical with "immediate experience," the distinction just referred to is obviously ignored; while if the distinction itself is maintained, then no account is offered of the manner in which

¹ P. 404. *Italics mine.*

² P. 403.

³ Pp. 390, 391, on "immediate experience," "the experience in which knowledge has its source".

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

the two modes are related and the way in which one develops from the other. It is true that Prof. Stout calls his statement an assumption; but when taken with the due literal meaning of "knowledge" it is no more an assumption than the truth that the base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal; the one follows from the essential nature of knowledge as the other from the nature of an isosceles triangle, although in both cases the "nature" has to be analytically explicated. But though this assertion is actually true of primary sense knowledge, it still leaves open the further question how this knowledge is related to sense experience—"sensing"—which in itself is not knowledge, but is nevertheless the indispensable preliminary to all knowledge. "Primary" here is (so far) ambiguous, implying both a logical and a temporal priority—both an indispensable factor in every *separate* instance of knowledge, and the original phase in which *all* experience begins. Our problem concerns the temporal priority predominantly, though the logical priority, being the outcome of this, is also of great importance.

My contention finds confirmation even in Dr. Alexander's express contradiction of it. For he holds emphatically that "all experience is knowledge"; but his immediate qualification of this assertion at once disproves its universality. "All experience," he continues, "claims to be *true knowledge*".¹ But knowledge, essentially, is true knowledge—is certainty, as Locke held it to be. *All* experience therefore can be knowledge only if it is, with no exceptions whatever, true knowledge—if its "claim" is always substantiated by later criticism; and not only does this never occur in actuality but the process involved, as Dr. Alexander himself recognises, is itself much too complex to characterise the earliest phases of experience. "If knowledge is identified with true knowledge," he continues (as I contend is necessary), "we introduce a new element of value . . . truth is a *product* of art"; and thus "the experience which is knowledge is at a *higher remove* than that called experience by acquaintance".² It must be maintained then, against Prof. Stout in one direction as against Dr. Alexander in the other, that even "primary sense knowledge" (if really knowledge) is always the result of a development—is "a product of art";³ and Prof. Stout's principle that "more is immediately known than is immediately experienced," whether it be an assumption or not, leaves the nature of this development not only unexplained but unanalysed.

For the problem is, if "the whole complex content of sense-experience and each of its parts are primarily apprehended as continued into a whole which transcends and includes them," how do we become conscious of (a) this wider whole itself and (b) its connexion with—"continuance into"—sensed content? Obviously (a) and (b) must include constituents fundamentally different from sensed content, because inapprehensible by sense-awareness; for if this is not the case there is no problem of any kind—we apprehend

¹ *Ante.*, p. 2; my italics.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 4; my italics.

³ *Cf.* further below, p. 349.

the wider whole by the simple prolongation of sensing; and then either sensed contents must always (in principle) be physically real, as Dr. Alexander maintains: or they can never be known to be real at all—as Prof. Stout admits.¹ Of course if his assumption takes a form altogether different—if he *assumes* that awareness of sensed contents is *always* accompanied and supplemented by a knowledge of the existence and character of unsensed though perceived reality—then obviously, as I said at the outset, this begs the whole question at issue and further discussion becomes impossible.

This seems indeed to be Prof. Stout's final position. For his analysis of the way in which we "determine definitely and positively the *nature* of the external object"² leaves the preliminary question how, in "knowing sense apparitions," we also know of the *existence* of this external object, entirely out of consideration. We can explain "the antithesis between sense experience as dependent on the body, and as dependent on things external"³ simply enough, if we take these external things for granted; and we can equally well fall back on "causal relations and relations of magnitude" if we *assume* that water fills the bath whether we are there or not.⁴

(3) And any such assumption, after all, seems superfluous; it is rendered unnecessary by the basal principle of Prof. Stout's realism—the materiality of sensed contents. For these are neither Lockean "ideas" of material substance, nor Kantian "representations" of noumenal reality. Their changes and variations, their distinctions, relations and unity therefore must also be material; otherwise we posit mental relations, etc., between material entities. Finally, these distinctions, etc., are *known* distinctions;⁵ and this, in the first place, establishes the fact that knowledge, as such, is the result of a development from sense-awareness;⁶ for it can hardly be held that material relations are known from the beginning of experience.⁷ Secondly, sensed distinctions, etc., are both sensed, and *known*.⁸ But they are essentially material. What then forbids the further expansion of our realism so that physical existence proper may equally be sensed and known? If, indeed, some extreme contrasts subsisted between sensed material entities and physical existents, such as, *e.g.*, that between matter and æther, or molar and molecular masses, or ordinary motion and atomic vibrations, such a limited realism might be our only alternative. But for Prof. Stout the contrary is the rule: he insists repeatedly on homogeneity, correspondence, continuity, and an identical order of being.⁹ Once more then, since the material distinctions between sensed material contents are themselves sensed and known, why should sense awareness become suddenly incapable of apprehending further physical

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 389, "if not themselves features. . . ."

² P. 395; my italics.

³ P. 396.

⁴ P. 397.

⁵ P. 394; "he knows corresponding distinctions"

⁶ *Cf.* above, p. 348.

⁷ *Cf.* above, p. 348, on Dr. Alexander's position here.

⁸ P. 394.

⁹ P. 389.

distinctions and existents which are absolutely homogeneous and continuous with these ?

The final result of such a dualism, exactly as in the case of Critical Realism, is a mere noumenalism ;¹ this follows first from the nature of relations, secondly from the character of knowledge. Prof. Stout posits, as we have seen, continuous existence, homogeneity of nature, an identical order of being and a unified wholeness, between sensed but unperceived material contents and perceived but unsensed physical existents.² But continuity, homogeneity, unity and identity are relations ; and relations cannot be asserted, except dogmatically and illogically, between relations unless these (in principle)³ can be present to one and the same mode of conscious process, whatever specific form this may assume. The attributes, therefore, of physical reality (again in principle) must either *all* be sensed, or *all* be perceived, before they can logically be included under the one category "physically real" ; although this obviously does not prevent all or some of them being both sensed *and* perceived. If, then, sensed content (as for Prof. Stout) is material, the incommensurability of sensing and perception is of itself sufficient to debar us from calling perceived physical existence "material" or "physical" in the same reference and with the same fundamental meaning ;⁴ while the contrast between the organic dependence and intermittent being of the one and the independent persistence of the other enormously intensifies this primal difficulty.

(4) Nor can this be overcome simply by asserting or assuming either (with Dr. Alexander) the universality of knowledge in experience, or (with Prof. Stout) the self-transcendence of primary sense knowledge. Here I venture to think that both writers fail to present the true character of knowledge, as such ; and this raises another point of terminology which seems to me extremely important. It is incorrect to speak of "knowing" a physical object or thing, such as a table or chair ;⁵ we sense, or perceive, this, but we never "know" it ; though we may know *about* it. Knowledge, that is, is always of facts, truths, principles ; its content is expressible only in explicit judgments, which is impossible with the direct content of sensing and perceiving.⁶ This is not a hypercriticism of mere theory ; it rather determines our interpretation of all experience

¹ I am glad to find this view of Critical Realism confirmed by Dr. Bosanquet : "it is futile to maintain that (the object of thought) is not a *Ding-an-sich*" ; *Meeting of Extremes*, p. 146. Cf. *The Monist*, vol. xxxii., p. 395.

² P. 389.

³ As in the case of molecules and other scientific imperceptibles, or the imaginary entities of mathematics.

⁴ If there is no such common significance there is an obvious absolute dualism ; continuity and homogeneity at once disappear.

⁵ Metaphorical expansion gives "object of knowledge". Cf., Prof. Stout, p. 394, "knowing sense apparitions, their changes and variations".

⁶ Again metaphorically, we have "I perceive your meaning" = I understand.

and all knowledge. For knowledge, essentially, is of universals; "the world as known consists of universals exhibited in differences,"¹ as is, of course, implied in Prof. Stout's own principle of "noetic synthesis."² But human experience, at least, cannot begin with universals, though it quickly attains them. It must begin with particulars; and these are never "known," but are sensed. The nature of perception here is a difficult question; its content is intermediate between particular and universal,³ and is, I suppose, best regarded as a low or imperfect form of the individual—as a particular attaining to universality, just as perception itself is implicit judgment. But however this may be, we can become conscious of universals only by first becoming aware of particulars;⁴ which means that *all* experience cannot, speaking with due literalness, be knowledge (as Dr. Alexander maintains); nor, on the other hand, can primary sense *knowledge* explain its own origin and development.

Finally, since all criticism should claim some positive basis, I may express my belief that true realism must regard sensed content (with Dr. Alexander) as "identical with perceived features of physical existence"; it "is already an external existence". But it also appears to me possible to establish this principle from a direct survey and analysis of ordinary experience, and to show that it is the logical result of the very conditions of naïve experience itself, without resorting to "intuition" of any kind, or to the metaphysics of Time and Space. No "doctrine of intuition," in other words, is necessary in order to explain "how we advance from the sensum to the notion of a thing;" sensed content need not imply "an intuition which is a lower experience than sensation".⁵ I do not question the truth of these important principles in themselves; only they are not, so far as I can see at present, in any way essential as a basis for realism. But that is a subject altogether too wide to enter upon at this stage.

J. E. TURNER.

¹ Dr. Bosanquet, *Logic*, vol. ii., p. 2.

² Cf. also Dr. Alexander, *ante*, p. 2.

³ Which must not be confused with the general.

⁴ The advance is a matter for psychology and epistemology, not (in the first instance at least) for metaphysics.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 5.

VII.—CRITICAL NOTICE.

The Principles of Logic. By F. H. BRADLEY, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Second edition, revised with commentary and terminal essays. In two volumes. London: Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford, 1922. Pp. xxviii, 739.

AFTER almost forty years from its first publication Mr. Bradley now presents us with the long demanded second edition of his *Logic*. The republication of a work which has already become a classic by one whose thought has undergone continuous development during a period of this length, and has in some important respects moved away from its previous positions, presented a difficult problem, which Mr. Bradley has solved in his own way. He has reissued the original text, with what now seem to him to have been "its faults both of manner and matter—faults which recall to me those days when I was young," but which, in so far as they cover the vivacity and brilliant daring of youth, we would not willingly miss from his pages. To each chapter, however, he has appended a detailed commentary upon its contents, and he has supplemented the whole with a series of twelve essays, in which he expresses his mature view upon some of the more important issues raised in the book. These essays, which vary considerably in length, deal with the following subjects: inference; judgment; the extensional reading of judgments; uniqueness; the "this"; the negative judgment; the impossible, the unreal, the self-contradictory and the unmeaning; absolute truth and probability; analysis; implication; the possible and the actual; theoretical and practical activity.

In the notice of the first edition of this work which appeared in *MIND* the late Prof. Adamson commented upon the unsatisfactory position of logical studies in England at the time. "Province and method of the science, auxiliary principles with which to make the approach to logical doctrines, theory of the doctrines themselves—in no one of these points is there anything like an established view, a common basis. . . . The state of *Logic* is like that of Israel under the Judges; every man doeth that which is right in his own eyes."¹ Since this was written much has happened in the field of *Logic* in England. The last vestige of the claims of the once so proud Philosophy of Experience to represent a coherent doctrine of thought disappeared in face of Mr. Bradley's impetuous assault,

¹ *MIND*, 1884, pp. 122-123.

while the views of those who had till then seemed the chief opponents of its Logic have at least an equally strange and remote appearance. The intervening years have seen the movement initiated by Mr. Bradley greatly strengthened by the support and criticism of Mr. Bosanquet, but they have also seen remarkable developments in Formal Logic, notwithstanding the frequency and fervour with which its decease has been celebrated, and this quite apart from the relations into which it has entered with mathematics. They have heard the loud but unfulfilled prophecies by the Pragmatists of a new Logic, in which the various functions of thought were to be shown as merely instrumental to the working out of practical activities, while now it is more than whispered that Logic is in no sense a mental science, and indeed is not concerned with thought at all. If, in the resulting situation, the words of Adamson seem equally applicable to-day, it can at least be claimed that the exponents of our different Logics are more thorough in their methods and more alive to ultimate issues than was the case forty years ago. That for this result we are largely indebted to the higher standard first set and always maintained by Mr. Bradley all will admit, including those who are in least sympathy with his general position. And if it is coming to be recognised that the problems raised by Logic need to be approached from more than one point of view, there are indications in his present work that Mr. Bradley would himself give a fuller assent to this proposition than at one time seemed probable.

In his Preface Mr. Bradley warns his readers that he has not attempted in this new edition to bring his doctrine into relation with the more recent work in Logic. In the fresh material there will accordingly be found little in the way of criticism of the views of others or of defence against their criticisms. In his notes he has rather taken as his aim to explain and correct the original text of his work in the light of the new positions which he has since been led to adopt. As these positions, at least in the main, have already been set forth in his later publications, there are frequent references to these works, while the reader is on many points advised to consult the logical writings of Mr. Bosanquet, to which Mr. Bradley repeatedly expresses his own indebtedness. We may say, in fact, speaking generally, that what we are now given is a revision of Mr. Bradley's former views from the point of view of his mature metaphysics and under the influence of Mr. Bosanquet's criticisms and constructive work. His Logic has been brought more definitely into line with the philosophical tenets of Absolutism, without losing the special features due to the position assigned by him to feeling and to the closely connected interest which he has always taken in questions of Psychology.

Of the positive sources of error which Mr. Bradley now finds in his earlier work, perhaps the most frequently noticed is the assumption of the existence of "mere" ideas, or of ideas apart from the reference to reality which constitutes judgment. The change of

view upon this point and the way in which Mr. Bradley deals with many of the consequential questions which it raises are already known to his readers. The necessity of finding a home for the imaginary within the real leads to the definite recognition of other regions or spheres of reality than the perceived world. The differences between affirmation, doubt and supposal become differences of content. It is no longer possible to represent negation as in the last resort the rejection of an ideal content by the real which appears in perception, since the rejected content must fall within and qualify reality elsewhere; while the only sense in which it can now be called "subjective" is that "*mere* negation, *mere* denial is an abstraction and is by itself really nothing at all" (p. 127). Finally, with the disappearance of mere ideas there must go all dalliance with the theory of truth as copying. Mr. Bradley, it should be noticed, points out that there were already indications in his First Edition that he was not satisfied with the identification of reality with the "real world" of common sense, "which is copied in truth," a view which he only assumed at times "for convenience" and to avoid the raising of ultimate questions with which he was not then prepared to deal.

Nor is Mr. Bradley willing to admit that in his original treatment of the judgment he made the mistake of taking the reality referred to by it as "Reality merely at large and without distinction," from which it would follow that "the whole ideal content affirmed tends to fall outside the Reality, which on its side tends in consequence to fade into an empty abstraction" (p. 628). He admits, however, that he did not sufficiently warn his readers against such an error. Now, at least, such an interpretation of his position is rendered impossible by the prominence which he gives to what he calls "the twofold nature of Reality as the subject of judgment" (p. 39). The judgment, that is to say, always refers to a special subject, a selected and distinguished content, which nevertheless "remains also inseparably in one with the whole universe and qualifies that immediately" (p. 629). For Mr. Bradley's metaphysics, indeed, the existence of such objects, like that of finite "centres" of experience, is an inexplicable, which can only be described in metaphorical terms. Thus Reality "slides away from itself into our distinction, so as there to become a predicate" (p. 629); while we are said to "loosen" and "relate" qualities which nevertheless remain tight set in a super-relational unity. But Logic, working on a lower plane, may and must rest upon that which falls short of ultimate reality. "In Logic we may and must insist that Reality is to be regarded as a disjunctive totality, as the positive unity of diversities each of which is one and is *not* the others. In our intellectual world we *must* take every element as within a whole, and as qualified by its relations in that whole, and, further, as qualified by them internally. By 'internally' is meant that the element itself, and not merely something else, is qualified. Thus everything will imply its relations both positive and negative" (p. 127).

Such being at once its presupposition and its goal the logical function is in essence the same in all its manifestations. Like the "mere idea," the "simple judgment" is an unreal abstraction, and "something like inference is everywhere the concrete fact" (p. 597). Hence, while recognising that there is something to be said for other and apparently simpler points of departure, Mr. Bradley devotes the first and longest of his terminal essays to an exposition of his present view concerning inference. Discarding as erroneous much in his earlier treatment of the subject, inference is now defined as "the ideal self-development of a given object taken as real" (p. 598). He explains that "The given object is an ideal content before us," and it is "taken to be real as being in one with Reality, the real Universe" (*ibid.*). The possibility of inference thus rests upon the fact that "the object not only is itself, but is also contained as an element in a whole; and *is* itself, we must add, only as being so contained" (p. 600). This double nature of the object furnishes the solution, as far as Logic is concerned, to the puzzle inherent in the very meaning of inference, since it enables the object to advance to a new result without going beyond that which is implied in its own proper being. It is true, once more, that the ideas of system and of self-development within a system must in the end fail us, according to Mr. Bradley's metaphysics, but upon them Logic, which should not attempt to struggle with final difficulties, must take its stand. When it does so, however, it is only to find that it is doomed to inevitable failure in its pursuit of its own end. Inference always does and must fall short of perfect self-development. It is subject to defect which is irremovable, and is always fallible. Illustrating his general theory by reference to different kinds of inference, Mr. Bradley seeks to bring home his charges against each of them, some reservations being made in the case of the method of Dialectic.

The primary defect which Mr. Bradley finds in inference in all its forms depends upon the fact that in Logic we must abstract from the aspect of psychical fact, which inference nevertheless involves. And since the connexion between the logical and the psychological aspects of the process cannot be merely external, it follows, according to Mr. Bradley, that "the ideal truths of Logic cannot in the end hold good merely in their own right." Thus, as I understand it, an inference in arithmetic is defective, because we cannot completely understand the relation of what is inferred to the mental and even bodily (*cf.* p. 625) processes involved in the act of inferring it. It could only be placed beyond the reach of criticism if we had "a view of the world which was wholly intelligible," for which "the logical and psychical side of any truth would not only be necessary each in its own way, but the connexion of both would follow also as a result from necessary premises" (p. 612). Secondly, failing of this complete intelligibility, our different kinds of inference seek to buttress themselves up by means of assumptions which they cannot justify, and which there is good reason to think are in the end contradictory. Thus arith-

metic, to keep to this illustration, is unable to reconcile the changelessness which it attributes to the world of numbers with the change which is involved in all self-development and inference; a change which, Mr. Bradley insists, cannot be regarded as merely taking place in us. In other words, it cannot explain how $2 + 2$ can literally and in itself both *be* and *make* 4. But unless these difficulties can be resolved the inference is pronounced "unsound". Finally, and as the result of these defects, every inference is made subject to unknown conditions. What is really presupposed for the inference can never be completely stated in it. Even in arithmetic, "the steps of its processes are made subject to unknown conditions, and its connexions, no longer intrinsic, appear in truth to be mere conjunctions" (p. 605).

It will readily be seen that Mr. Bradley's whole conception of inference, and in particular the defects in principle which he finds in it, are intimately bound up with his general theory of thought and its relation to reality. To the first duty of the philosopher, *viz.*, that of remorselessly carrying through his own definite point of view, he has always been splendidly loyal. But those who are unable to share his main position are not likely to be convinced that it is impossible for our thought to discover systematic structures, within which relations of logical dependence can be detected without the intrusion of alien elements, and to the constitution of which the psychological and other conditions involved in their apprehension can be definitely seen to be irrelevant. Nor should I, for one, admit that such a position in any way commits us to the view that the relation of mind to its objects is a merely external one. Moreover, in the investigation of the universal nature of such systems and of the relations of logical dependence which they imply there appears to be an ample field for a progressive formal Logic, which will not, however, make the claim, still regarded by Mr. Bradley as its *raison d'être*, to provide all-sufficient prescriptions for the actual conduct of thought.

I have endeavoured to draw attention to Mr. Bradley's latest pronouncements upon the main topics of logical doctrine. There remain, it need hardly be said, many points of interest in the subjects dealt with in the remaining terminal essays, in the treatment of which the reader will find once more the familiar combination of subtlety and directness of thought. The book contains a fairly extensive index, but the proof-reading, particularly in the second volume, has been less careful than the importance of the work demanded.

JAMES GIBSON.

VIII.—NEW BOOKS.

The Measurement of Emotion. By W. WHATELY SMITH, M.A., with an Introduction by WILLIAM BROWN, M.D., D.Sc. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co. Pp. 184. 10s. 6d. net.

THE main part of this book is devoted to a description of experiments in reactions to word stimuli, as measured by the psycho-galvanic reflex, the length of reaction time, and the facility of reproduction, the main point of interest being the first-named. This series of experiments is undoubtedly one of the most extensive and valuable carried out with the psycho-galvanic reflex. For the sake of the uninitiated I may explain that the method of investigation is as follows. The hands of the person on whom the experiment is performed are attached, in a suitable way, to the wires connected with an electric battery, galvanometer and resistance box. The indicator which shows the resistance due to the body of the individual shows that this resistance varies with the individual and from time to time with the same individual, and, what is of particular interest, with the nature of the stimulus to which the subject is submitted. Thus in the experiment before us, certain of the words included in Jung's word-association test gave on the average (with 50 subjects) far greater "deflexions" than the majority of words. Thus while the average deflexion of the words "glass," "give," "flower," "pond," "pencil," "swim," may be indicated by about 16 mm., the average of the words "kiss," "love," "marry," "divorce," "name," "woman" was about 55 mm.

The reaction time for each word was also measured.

Subsequently the subjects were also made to learn by heart lists of words used in the experiments and were tested in their ability to reproduce these words at intervals of 5, 9, 14, 21 and 31 days. When appropriate mathematical corrections were made a remarkably regular curve was given by plotting the mean galvanometer deflexions for the words according to their memory scores. Those which gave the greatest deflexion of the galvanometer were best remembered, but the words that were worst remembered also gave greater deflexions than those that were in the intermediate position as regards memory scores, though the difference is certainly not great (words scoring 10 giving highest mean deflexion, 37; lowest deflexion (22.5) given by words scoring 3; words scoring 0 deflexion 25.8).

At first sight a similar thing seems to be revealed by the reaction time measurement, that is those words with longest reaction times are among those best, or worst, remembered. The variations, however, are certainly very slight, and on the whole the author concludes that the "prolongation of reaction time is mainly an indication of the kind of affective tone which tends to impede memory". This point certainly does not seem to be so well established as the former. The reproduction test reveals more clearly a tendency for the impeding of the recall of the words which (as indicated by the reproduction test) were of strongly marked affective tone.

The author uses the term "positive tone" for that variety of affective tone

which facilitates remembering, "negative tone" being that which hinders remembering. He emphasises the fact that the negative tone does not consist merely in the absence of positive tone.

Finally Mr. Whately Smith concludes that the prolongation of reaction time alone is not a reliable indicator of a complex; that disturbance in reproduction is by far the best complex-indicator—or, at least, the more reliable indication of negative tone; and that the galvanometer detects positive tone as well as negative and in many cases does so when the reaction time test does not.

In examining the forms of associations a general correspondence was found between "inner" personal associations and negatively-toned reactions. Alcohol was found to increase the proportion of highly-toned reactions at the expense of the moderately toned—the proportion of un-toned remaining about the same—suggesting a regression to a more primitive, all-or-none, protopathic reaction under the influence of alcohol.

In his discussion of the theory of affective tone, Mr. Whately Smith elaborates a view that negative tone is dependent upon a conflict in which the systems of ideas concerned tend towards opposing or incompatible organic adjustments or reactions; or, to express this differently, that affective tones result from the conflict or harmony of simultaneously evoked wishes or "wish-tendencies". Yet this negative tone is not identical with displeasure. "Pleasant and unpleasant," he writes, "is the original and fundamental distinction from which the other is genetically derived." "At first, pleasant tone is synonymous with positive, and unpleasant with negative, but so soon as experience begins to operate through association, the reactions and mental processes of the organism begin to be oriented not only by immediate but also by ultimate gratification."

Mr. Smith does not make clear in any part of his book, so far as I can see, the actual nature of the negative and positive feeling tone *as* feeling tone. Nearly all that he says of them would read intelligibly, and to my mind more intelligibly, if we interpreted them as negative and positive *impulses*, either being accompanied by very varying complexes of feelings or emotions. Indeed some passages imply that there is no exact difference of the negative and positive feeling tone; one or the other is used as though comprising a given emotion just referred to. What exactly negative or positive feeling tone are when introspectively observed it is difficult to discover, and the best interpretation of Mr. Whately Smith's views would seem to be that a group of feelings or emotions may, on the whole, lead to a conative impulse towards a given object or end, or away from it, and that in the former case it is positively, and in the latter case, negatively toned. The author, indeed, makes (on page 165) the curious admission that this "something" revealed by the psycho-galvanic reflex and which he calls "affective tone," "could equally well be referred to by any other symbol". If Mr. Smith wants a symbol for something unknown it is surely misleading to give it a term with a recognised meaning like affective tone. "Positive and negative attitude" would seem to fit his facts and to be less committal as to the nature of the feeling tone accompaniments.

On the theory of the emotions Mr. Whately Smith seems to me not to be quite consistent. First he accepts the James theory completely, arguing that if there were no bodily changes there could be no emotion: as the change in consciousness produced by visual sensation is perception so the change in consciousness produced by a visceral sensation is an emotion.

But this is not what is stated by the James-Lange theory, namely, that the sensations *are* the emotions, not that they cause it. Mr. Whately Smith is willing to accept this modification, that is to regard an emotion

as being *caused* by the bodily changes following the prompting of the exciting fact, instead of regarding the emotion as *consisting* of these felt bodily changes.

Now Mr. Smith turns to the criticism of Prideaux, namely that the emotion is experienced some time before the endosomatic changes occur. From this Prideaux argues that the physiological disturbance which is observed cannot be the cause of the emotion which precedes it. This is obviously true so far as it goes, but, it is argued, unless we adopt an absurdly rigid interpretation of the James-Lange theory, the latter is not invalidated. The full effects by way of bodily changes, argues Mr. Smith, no doubt take time, but it does not follow that no impulse of endosomatic origin passes up afferent paths to the cortex before the particular effect observed is demonstrable.

This may be admitted, but can it be shown that such impulses are the immediate causes of those sensations which introspection is supposed to show *are* the emotion, and also are dependent on bodily changes largely localised? In the end Mr. Whately Smith seems to come very close to the more predominant view opposed to the James-Lange theory, which regards the emotion as having an element not traceable to the accompanying bodily sensations.

The main value of the book seems to be in the account of the experimental research, which will undoubtedly do much to stimulate further enquiry on the interesting problems with which Mr. Whately Smith deals.

C. W. VALENTINE.

L'année psychologique. Vingt-deuxième année (1920-1921), publiée par HENRI PIÉRON. Pp. 608.

This is a double number. Needless to say, it maintains the high character of its predecessors, not only as regards important original papers, but also as regards its valuable analysis of current psychological literature. The analysis alone extends to some 370 pages. Original papers are contributed by Mm. M. Foucault, T. Rabaud, H. Piéron, H. Wallon, J. Philippe, and Mlle. J. Abramson.

Prof. Foucault, in the initial paper on "Les sensations visuelles élémentaires autour de la tache aveugle," describes phenomena of colour vision, hitherto, we believe, unrecorded. He finds in the vicinity of the blind spot a zone where the same colour phenomena are manifested as at the marginal boundary of the colour fields. These phenomena are: intermittent sensations with negative and positive phase, diminution of colour saturation with each succeeding positive phase, the field of normal colour vision bounded by a zone of partial colour blindness, and that by a zone of total colour blindness. He finds in fact that there is a 'critical region' bordering the blind spot, in which the phenomena are identical with those of the analogous 'critical region' at the margin of the colour field. The author does not discuss the theoretical significance of these phenomena, but merely records the facts.

In an interesting paper on "Recherches expérimentales sur le comportement de diverses araignées" Prof. E. Rabaud describes careful observations of the behaviour of various spiders in relation to their prey. His general aim is to examine the validity of certain psychological views of instinctive behaviour, as, for example, those of Fabre with respect to the 'paralysing instinct' of *Ammophila* and other Hymenoptera. A similar instinct is attributed by Fabre to the spider *Thomisus onustus*. Like the Peckhams in the case of *Ammophila*, Prof. Rabaud finds that there is no foundation for attributing to spiders an innate knowledge of

the anatomy of their victims, and also that the designation 'paralysing instinct' is a *suggestio falsi*, in that paralysing rather than killing does not in any way describe the aim of the hunter. From start to finish the entire process is determined by external conditions, not by an inner clairvoyant intuition. On the basis of his observations Prof. Rabaud would interpret mechanically the whole chain of reflexes "ce qu'il est commun d'appeler l'instinct des Araignées". The opposition between instinct and intelligence is a mere matter of words. In standpoint as in method the paper is behaviourist throughout.

The longest and most important paper in the volume is that of Piéron on "Nouvelles recherches sur l'analyse du temps de latence sensorielle et sur la loi qui relie ce temps à l'intensité d'excitation". In an article in the XXth. *Année* Piéron found that the law connecting the latent time of the sensorial reaction with the intensity of the stimulus could be expressed by the formula:—

$$t = \frac{a}{i^n} + k$$

but this formula gave only an approximation, and required considerable modification for auditory stimuli. The object of the present investigation is partly to confirm the previous results, and partly to find a more general expression which will cover all cases. The formula he now gets is:—

$$t = \frac{a}{i \pm b} + k$$

(t = latent time, i = intensity of stimulus, and a , b , and k are constants.) Piéron finds that this formula meets all cases satisfactorily, and he has now determined the constants for gustatory, auditory, visual (brightness) sensations under different conditions, and cutaneous sensations with electrical stimulation. Olfactory sensations are not included, but the difficulty of extending the enquiry to such stimuli is fairly obvious, though not necessarily insurmountable. As we have indicated, the whole investigation is of the first importance.

H. Wallon contributes an article on "Les réactions motrices dans les crises dues à l'émotion". He describes several 'war shock' cases of a type, which, as he points out, throws considerable light on the nature of emotional states and on their relation to various pathological conditions.

The paper "À la recherche d'une sensation tactile pure" by Dr. Jean Philippe describes an investigation which throws considerable doubt on the value of aesthesiometric experiments as usually conducted. He maintains that the visual factor enters so largely into the determination of the spatial threshold by the aesthesiometer in the usual way, that the results can hardly fail to be extremely unreliable. The experience of most experimentalists will bear him out. The influence of the visual factor Dr. Philippe would eliminate by keeping the subject in ignorance of the appearance of the apparatus by which he is being touched, and asking him to sketch what he feels. The method is ingenious. How far it would succeed in entirely eliminating the visual factor is still doubtful, but it would at least give more reliable results than can be obtained with the ordinary aesthesiometer and the standard method of procedure. This is in effect the conclusion at which Dr. Philippe arrives.

The final original paper is that of Mlle. Jadwiga Abramson on "Recherches sur les fonctions mentales de l'enfant à l'âge scolaire. Des services que peuvent rendre les examens psychologiques pour la connaissance d'une classe". The primary aim of the investigations described was practical and educational, but the conclusions reached have no inconsiderable theoretical and psychological interest. The subjects were boys

in a secondary school in Poland, whose progress was so unsatisfactory as to call for special investigation. Mdlle. Abramson applied a number of standard mental tests—Binet-Simon, Ebbinghaus, Meumann, etc. She then graded her subjects on the total results, plotted individual 'psychographs,' and calculated correlation coefficients for each individual test with the general ranking. The results indicate that the tests for abstraction and for the critical sense are the tests which correlate most highly with total rank, and those which stand out most clearly as differentiating the psychographs of the superior boys from those of the average. Mdlle. Abramson makes one slight slip in attributing to Spearman the formula she uses for calculating the correlation coefficient. It is really the standard ranks formula, not Spearman's 'foot-rule'.

Following upon the original papers, there is a short section devoted to new psychological apparatus in which a new rotation apparatus, with regulation of the rate of rotation, a photometer, and a filament aesthesiometer are described. That is succeeded by the very valuable analysis of current psychological literature to which we have already referred.

JAMES DREVER.

Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. Edited by EDMUND HUSSERL. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1922. Pp. 628.

The volume is composed of four articles, three of them each long enough to make a small book by itself. The first, by Edith Stein (Breslau), falls into two quite distinct sections; the earlier is entitled "Psychical Causality," and as a treatise on psychology contains much that is of value, although in the form of its expression it sometimes recalls the old "faculty psychology". As an attempt to pick out the distinguishing characteristics of psychical, as opposed to physical, causality it seems far less successful. The only type of "psychical causality" the authoress recognises is change¹ of tone in the "life-force" (i.e., the general store of energy on which all the separate activities of the self depend for the force necessary for their prosecution). A valuable service is no doubt done in emphasising this often neglected type of causation, but it seems distinctly arbitrary to limit the term "psychical causality" to this, as the authoress does. With "causality" is sharply contrasted "motivation" (p. 36 ff.); this term is meant to cover all action in which intelligence plays a conscious or sub-conscious part, including even association of ideas. "Motivation" is declared to be separated from causality by a gulf which nothing can bridge (p. 41)—but why? If by causality is meant necessity or uniformity only, even the indeterminist can hardly deny the presence of some necessity and uniformity in such intelligent action (even if only as a very limited factor); if by causality is meant "activity" or some intrinsic connection, there is at least as much (or rather more) justification for applying the conception here as for applying it in the physical sphere. This "motivation" is regarded by the authoress as, at any rate partly, under the control of an indeterminate will which can choose between different equally possible alternatives: but she expressly recognises "laws" of motivation (and so some limited necessity in that sphere): also surely the will, whether indeterminate or not itself, must *cause* the action which it chooses. It also seems a pity that no attempt is made to develop the conception of causality by a whole not reducible to a mere aggregate of isolable parts, a conception which

¹ E.g., especially the change from freshness to weariness or *vice versa*, which affects all faculties at once.

should provide a clue to determine the difference between psychical and physical causation, if anything can.

The second section, "Individual and Community," by the same authoress, comprises a remarkably able discussion of the problem of the group-mind—what constitutes its existence and how far it is parallel to the individual mind. The group-mind is treated neither as a personality over and above the individual members of the group nor as a sum of all its members in their whole individuality, but as the sum of those moments only in their experience, those aspects only of their life which are concerned with the group as such, and which, of course, may make up but a small fraction of their total activity. A state as an entity thus exists only in so far as its members direct their thought or activity towards the affairs of the community as a whole, and is nothing but this state-regarding thought and activity of its members. Its character is not the average character of its members but only that side of their character which concerns public affairs directly. This view, of course, makes the state essentially an abstraction in the narrower sense, though certainly without depreciating its value and importance on that account, and this being so the authoress perhaps goes beyond the limits of consistency in her emphasis on the parallelism between the individual and the group-mind. The antithesis between "Gesellschaft" where we regard other individuals only as objects not as subjects, and "Gemeinschaft" where we regard them as subjects, not as objects, plays an important part in the thought of the authoress. She tries to show that the "Gemeinschaft" aspect may occur without the "Gesellschaft" aspect but not *vice versa*, since even a man who uses others merely for his own ends must study them as subjects, not only as objects, in order to know how to use them. The society which approaches the "Gesellschaft" type is more of a mechanical, the society which approaches the "Gemeinschaft" type more of an organic nature. In an appendix the distinction between psychology and "Geisteswissenschaften" is discussed; the latter are said to differ from the former: (1) in studying not the individual in himself but his social contributions; (2) in studying these not as types to be connected by universal laws but as in the fullest sense unique and individual.

The next article, by Roman Ingarden (Warsaw), is an account and criticism of Bergson's views on "Intuition and Intellect". While evidently sympathising with very much in Bergson, the author applies with great thoroughness and from many different points of view the argument that all knowledge, including even the knowledge provided by Bergson's intuition, presupposes the existence of definite qualities in reality and the legitimacy of abstraction. The corollary is that Bergson's own philosophy is only another philosophy of the "intellect," and could, on Bergson's own principles, only be relative, and that abstraction does not distort reality in such a way as to falsify all judgments based on it; but the questions whether this argument from the possibility of knowledge proves the absolute or only the approximate validity of abstraction, and, again, whether truth is a matter of degrees, are not disposed of, though an answer to these seems needed really to settle the issue. What is in principle the same argument is applied to Bergson's theory of perception, *i.e.*, it is contended that all the arguments used to establish this theory are themselves based on the discoveries of the "intellect".

The third article, "Morality and Knowledge of Ethical Values," by Dietrich von Hildebrand (Munich), deals with the old problem of the relation between knowledge and virtue. The article teems with subtle distinctions, of which the distinction between the intuitive feeling (Wert-fühlen), and the intuitive knowledge (Werterkennen) of ethical values, the analysis of what is meant by the "depth" of an experience, the dis-

inction between "Grundstellung" (general attitude) and "Grundintention" in regard to moral matters, and the distinction between the conscience and the sense of values are especially useful. The work is very well done, but it is elaborated out of proportion to what, according to the author, is the question the article is written to answer, *i.e.*, does morality presuppose knowledge of values or *vice versa*? The reply given is, in brief, that all moral action presupposes a kind of more or less conscious general awareness of values, but that an effective power of exact judgment in moral matters presupposes morality in conduct rather than is presupposed by it (p. 593 ff.). Here the sharp separation between the two kinds of knowledge of values, that which presupposes and that which is presupposed by moral action, seems liable to criticism; surely it is wrong to say, as the author does, that the primary general awareness of values cannot be modified by moral action, especially in view of the perhaps exaggerated stress he lays on the dependence of moral judgment in particular questions on previous moral action.

Lastly, there is a very much shorter article, by Alexander Koyré (Paris), on the paradoxes of Zeno about motion. The author argues that these difficulties are not peculiar to motion but are reducible to the much wider problems of infinity and continuity, especially the latter, since he believes the difficulty of infinity to have been solved, but not that of continuity. So it will be seen that this book deals with very different problems of philosophy, and on each of them there is said something of real value.

A. C. EWING.

Modern French Philosophy: A Study of the Development since Comte.

By J. ALEXANDER GUNN, M.A., Ph.D. London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd. Pp. 358. Price 21s.

Dr. Gunn here discusses the movement of French thought from 1850 on, carefully relating it both to the speculative tendencies of the first half of the nineteenth century, and to actual political events. The book is constructed on a plan which makes for lucidity of exposition and for ease of understanding; and there is a simplicity of phrase which is apt to conceal from the reader the great research that has gone to make up the book. Dr. Gunn supplies an excellent bibliography. There is a useful comparative table of the chief philosophical works published in France, Germany, England, and America during the last seventy years, and a good index.

The plan Dr. Gunn adopts has, as M. Bergson points out in his foreword, disadvantages as well as advantages. Dr. Gunn does not follow strict chronological order, nor does he treat of each thinker as a whole. The book is divided into sections following the problems which formed the centres of discussion: the nature of science, the problem of freedom, the problem of the reality of progress, with two chapters discussing the attitude of the various thinkers to ethics and religion generally. It is clear that this division follows actual problems rather than a logical scheme, and that it is closely in touch with the facts. The chief disadvantage is, as M. Bergson notes, that "elle morcelle la doctrine d'un auteur en fragments dont chacun, pris à part, perd un peu de sa vitalité et de son individualité. Elle risque ainsi de présenter comme trop semblable à d'autres la solution que tel philosophe a donnée de tel problème, solution qui, replacée dans l'ensemble de la doctrine, apparaîtrait comme propre à ce penseur, originale et plus forte."

M. Bergson goes on to say, "cet inconvénient était inévitable et

l'envers de l'avantage que je signalais plus haut, celui de l'ordre, de la continuité et de la clarté". For ourselves, we regret "cet inconvénient" greatly; and feel that it is due, not only to Dr. Gunn's having divided his book according to problems, but to his mode of exposition as well. He sometimes offers us rather a catalogue of the views of a particular thinker on a problem, than an intimate study of a thinker actively at grips with a problem. It is true that the book improves in this respect steadily, as it passes from science to the more concrete problems of ethics and religion. It is, of course, no disparagement to say that we are never made to feel excited by flashes of insight, throwing unexpected light on a thinker or his problem: Dr. Gunn moves in a more sober, work-a-day world, and the wisdom which searches to the heart of things is the result, for ordinary mortals, only of long and mature study.

French thought was never impregnated, as English thought in the first sixty years of the nineteenth century was, with the thought that all we know is phenomena in the sense of mental states; and as a consequence there was no imperative need in France, as there was in England, for a doctrine of Objective Idealism to avoid an impasse. The mind was not regarded in France, as it was in England, as somehow mixed inseparably with the only world with which it is in touch: there was always available the notion that the mind is an instrument by which man is to get into touch with reality. And hence the problem of knowledge took a different line. Reason was endowed with demands of its own, endeavouring to re-interpret the intimations about reality received through the senses; and man was given a source of insight through the demands of his own spiritual life, distinct from both sense and reason. The problem was not to unify sense, reason, and spiritual insight, but to distinguish them in respect of adequacy as instruments for getting into touch with reality. It was not felt difficult to see how reason could criticise itself and inquire into its own adequacy; for the whole man was considered to be able to stand at a distance from his intellect, coldly survey its demands and principles, and compare them with the nature of the reality which man was in touch with in other ways. Reason did not expand so as to take in the whole of human life, as it did for Absolute Idealism. The criticism of reason was not felt to be necessarily immanent to reason itself. And so the claims of the moral life, the demand for freedom, could be set over against the claims of the scientific intelligence, to the disadvantage of the latter. The variety and contingency of the world of nature, presented through the senses, and called for by the active living being, could be opposed to the demand for identity and necessity made by intellect: life could be appealed to as testifying to the real nature of existence, and as operating as a check on the abstract demands of science. All this gives the French thought of the period under consideration a richness of point of view, a suppleness and a freedom from ulterior considerations in the handling of detailed problems, an ease and attractiveness, a lucidity and suggestiveness, which it is hard to match anywhere else; and Dr. Gunn is to be congratulated on his effort to widen its sphere of influence.

LEONARD RUSSELL.

Das Problem der Gültigkeit in der Philosophie David Humes. By HEINRICH HASSE. München: E. Reinhardt, 1920. Pp. 192.

The habit of dealing with philosophers chiefly from the point of view of their historical sequence often does less than justice to a given philosopher's importance and his significance for modern problems. This has been especially the case with Hume, who is far too often treated as having merely provided the conclusion to the premisses supplied by Locke

and Berkeley. Yet few philosophers are more worth studying on their own account than Hume, for he stated with exceptional clearness one of the most important problems at present being discussed, namely, the problem as to the validity of inferences about matters of fact which go beyond our immediate experience. It is the especial merit of Hasse's re-examination of Hume's philosophy that he deals with him entirely apart from historical considerations, and restates the problem with which Hume was directly concerned.

The central problem of Hume's philosophy, according to Hasse, is the problem of the *validity* (Gültigkeit) of our knowledge as dependent upon the nature and extent of human understanding, but, Hasse argues, Hume contents himself with giving a merely descriptive account of the development of knowledge, having assumed at the outset that its validity cannot be established. Hence, he asks: "hat Hume überhaupt innerhalb des Bereichs wissenschaftlicher Betrachtungsweise normierende Bestimmungen selbständiger Art gebilligt, welche von "Verbindlichkeit" oder "Gültigkeit" im logisch-systematischen Sinne zu reden gestatten? Ist nicht Hume gerade der Typus eines Skeptikers, dessen Philosophie in die Kassierung derartiger Ansprüche gipfelt?" (p. 13). The rest of the book is an attempt to establish an affirmative answer to these questions. Hasse first states in his own words Hume's account of the contents of human knowledge, and then examines the validity of these contents as referred to their origin in experience. He maintains that Hume confuses throughout the strictly logical problem of validity with the psychological account of our consciousness of it. Thus, he argues, that to a careful reader of the *Treatise* it is clear that "Hume zwischen dem logischen Gültigkeitsverhältnis und dem psychologischen Bewusstsein von dieser Gültigkeit nicht unterscheidet und dem letzteren bei seinen Auseinandersetzungen ein fast ausschliessliches Interesse schenkt" (p. 101). Hence, "Tatsächlich wird denn auch das Gültigkeitsbewusstsein als ein Inbegriff psychischer Tatbestände von seinen psychologischen Erwägungen ausschliesslich getroffen, während er eine Alterierung der logisch gültigen Beziehungen als solcher durch sie glaubhaft zu machen nicht instande ist."

Nevertheless, Hasse thinks, Hume had occasional glimpses of the significance and difficulty of the problem of validity as a purely logical problem, without, however, recognising how fundamental it was. But Hume ought—so Hasse thinks—to be precluded, by his assumptions as to the nature and origin of knowledge, from raising the question of its *validity* at all; his whole orientation suggests that he is confined to "spiritual geography". In spite of himself, however, he was forced, in the course of his inquiry, to plunge deeper and deeper into the logical problem, only to end in a scepticism that he was forced, in practice, to repudiate.

Certainly the problem of the validity of perceptual knowledge forms the chief theme both of the *Treatise* and the *Inquiry*. Hume does not, however, raise the question of validity precisely in the form in which Hasse puts it. He is concerned mainly with the question as to what are the characteristics which justify us in asserting that a proposition concerning *matters of fact* can be asserted beyond the evidence of our immediate observation. To have stated this problem clearly is Hume's chief contribution to philosophy. In comparison with this his "sceptical solution" is unimportant; but Hasse is so much taken up with Hume's failure to solve the problem that he does not, it seems to me, recognise sufficiently the merit of having stated it. Nevertheless, the book is useful as calling attention again to the importance of Hume's investigation of human knowledge, and as a fresh and interesting statement of the problem of validity itself.

L. S. S.

Der Unsterblichkeitsgedanke als Philosophisches Problem. By Prof. HEINRICH SCHOLZ. 2nd edition. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1922. Pp. 111.

This little book is an argument for the philosophic validity of the notion of personal immortality on a strictly defined and limited set of presuppositions. It makes no claim to be a coercive proof or a confutation of positivism and materialism; it rules out any empirical evidence derivable from the observations of vitalists and psychical researchers; it rejects all attempts to transform the idea into something else, like 'eternity in time' or 'immortality of influence'; it denies that its pragmatic value (which it admits) is competent to prove its 'truth'; but it resuscitates the distinction between 'soul' (which is bound up with the body) and 'spirit,' and insists that in virtue of his suprasensible functions man transcends 'nature'. The claim to immortality is based entirely on value-judgments which resent the irrational discrepancy between value and reality, *viz.*, on the recognition of the value of an autonomous moral will, of a pure theoretic intellect, and on the 'unearthly' character of religious experience. The difficulties, however, of pre-existence, and of the need for a material world for the exercise of moral activity can only be avoided by combining the belief in immortality with that in God, and resting it on the absolute value of communion with God. Prof. Scholz concludes that his line of thought exhausts the possibilities of a philosophic justification of the notion of immortality.

This claim is a bold one, and may provoke remonstrance even from those who highly appreciate Prof. Scholz's ingenuity and his condescension as an academic philosopher, especially in Germany, in concerning himself with questions of general human interest. But really he *has* omitted a great deal. By ignoring what James called the 'transmission' theory of the relation of body and soul, he has, quite gratuitously, conceded the impossibility of a self-existent soul, and the shadowy, and psychologically quite untenable, distinction of 'soul' and 'spirit' does nothing to retrieve the damage thereby done to his case. By ruling out empirical evidence (disputable though it be), he has not so much risen above sordid fact as exhibited the fear of scientific knowledge which is so characteristic of *a priori* philosophy. Nor is it easy to see why an appeal to 'spirits' should be degrading, when that to 'spirit' is sublime. By appealing to values and the religious consciousness he has entered a field in which the questions are, in the first place, psychological, and where the philosopher will hardly be able to maintain the truth of values, unless he is prepared systematically to regard them as determinants of all reality. Before dismissing pragmatic value as wholly irrelevant to truth, he should have considered the case of a belief so fatal that it eliminated all who held it 'true,' and was, therefore, universally regarded as 'false'. And finally, like nearly all idealists, he has refrained from drawing a very obvious philosophic inference from idealism and from exploiting the chief advantage it has over realism in this very connexion. For if it is true that 'reality' is always relative to a mind, it no longer follows that a mind which parts company with our present reality parts company with all; and if it is a fact that in our 'dreams' we already invade other worlds—though, mostly, of inferior reality—there is nothing, in principle, to forbid us from cherishing the hope that death may (sometimes) be transition into a 'better' world. Prof. Scholz, therefore, could doubtless have made out a much better case, if his survey had not been narrowed by too rigid a notion of what was philosophically proper.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Nella Intelligenza Dell' Espressione. By LEONE VIVANTE. Rome :
 Maglione & Strini, 1922. Pp. 229.

The followers of Croce and Gentile lose rather than gain by their somewhat wearisome insistence on the absoluteness of the values which it is the business of philosophy to expound. After all, to say of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness that they are eternal, infinite, intrinsic, absolute, necessary, and whatever other predicates express their unlimited reality, is to utter a truism, and however important the truism may be, it is the least and not the most interesting thing which can be said about them. Just as it may seem to raise the dignity of man to declare that he is immortal so unless immortality means that the individual will effectively remember in a future state his actions in the present it has little interest for the ordinary individual. Prof. Vivante is one of those who feel they must never let us forget that values are real in the ultimate sense which defies limitation, but it is because he has done something more than this that his book is extraordinarily interesting. He has put forward an argument of great force on a subject of supreme and fundamental scientific importance, and has challenged a philosophical doctrine which had almost seemed to be unchallengeable—the relation of memory to the brain. Everyone knows Bergson's famous criticism of the theory that memories are impressions made or traces left on the brain substance, stored up and preserved in its cells. The force of Bergson's argument is that such preservation of memories as is supposed by the theory must be mechanical. If we take, for example, a word-memory, since it is clear that no single word is pronounced twice in an exactly identical way, what must be preserved in the case of a word are the innumerable impressions of the pronunciations of the word, all individually distinct, superposed on one another in the order of occurrence. Prof. Vivante accepts this argument but declares that it applies line for line, point for point, to a work of art executed in physical material. Take a picture, for example, its identity as a picture does not consist in the identity of impressions we receive when we behold it, these are all individually distinct with nothing in common. When no mind contemplates the picture there is no picture, there are only the combinations of physical and chemical elements—canvas, pigments, etc., which are the material of the picture. Yet we say that the picture, the purely spiritual existence, is preserved in the material elements, and may we not equally say that memories, the purely spiritual realities, are preserved by intelligence in the brain substance in precisely the same way? He suggests, therefore, that the intellect may use the subtle matter of the brain in an entirely analogous way to that in which the artist uses the gross matter of the physical world to embody and preserve its spiritual creations. On this he formulates the thesis which it is the main purpose of the book to defend:—whatever be the sign by which in external nature thought forms and fixes its notions or visions, it can be no other than a prosecution or rather a renewing of the same work of nature as that by which the mind forms memories in the supposed traces or cerebral modifications. It is a powerful and illuminating argument, dominated throughout by the analogy of the work of art, that as with inspiration and expression, so with noumenon and phenomenon, act and fact, spirit and matter, unity and multiplicity, each is in inseparable relation and apart from the relation neither of the related terms has either being or meaning.

Prof. Vivante shows that he has studied profoundly and been considerably influenced by Bosanquet's logical works. His book is clearly and tersely written.

H. WILDON CARR.

Lola, or The Thought and Speech of Animals. By HENRY KINDERMANN. Translated by AGNES BLAKE, with a chapter on Thinking Animals by Dr. WILLIAM MACKENZIE. London: Methuen & Co., 1922. Pp. ix, 188.

In Germany 'thinking animals' play the same part in the social economy that 'spirits' do in the Anglo-Saxon world. That is, their alleged performances serve as a challenge and intense irritant to scientific orthodoxy. Moreover, in both cases, they make converts in the scientific camp, and as these are sometimes persons of standing or even eminence, they produce some confusion and much further irritation thereby. Lastly, the problems involved are always of great interest for the student of human psychology, whatever they may reveal about the psychology of animals and ghosts. Before the war there was in Germany an active movement for the study of animal psychology, as exhibited by the Thinking Horses of Elberfeld and the Philosophic Dog, 'Rolf' (or 'Lol,' as he called himself), of Mannheim: it had a Society, which published Transactions, a 'Zeitschrift,' *Tierseele*, plentiful polemics, and an abundant literature. But none of this literature had been translated (except Maeterlinck's account of his adventures with the Elberfeld horses in *The Unknown Guest*), and the above book is the first account of the matter from an insider to appear in English. It gives a popular account of 'Lola,' the daughter of 'Rolf,' who, we are assured by her mistress, has inherited much of the intellectual capacity (though not the sense of humour!) of her gifted father. Her account is that of an enthusiastic amateur, devoid of psychological training, and too unsuspicious of the various sources of error and misinterpretation to carry scientific conviction, at all events to those who are familiar with the difficulties of psychical research. Nevertheless it contains (relatively) good evidence of supernormal knowledge, e.g., in Lola's prediction (p. 121) as to the number and sex of her puppies, and raises serious psychological problems. For if the evidence reported is mistaken, it raises the problem how honest observers could deceive themselves so elaborately and continuously; if it is right, it raises the question whether the intelligence shown by the animal really is the animal's own, and if not, whence it comes. Now there is good reason to doubt whether the intelligence shown can be the animal's own. These 'thinking' horses and dogs do not seem to think *spontaneously*, but seem to require the stimulus of human intervention. Nor do they use their newly acquired method of communicating with their masters to make their own views and wishes known. Though certain instances of spontaneity are reported both of the dogs and the horses, they *act* in general much as other dogs and horses, and behave as thoughtlessly as any unlearned ass. Hence the pragmatic test, which here is eminently applicable, seems to pronounce against their claim. It is not quite decisive, because it might be contended that the development of the animal's latent capacity for thought was as yet too recent to determine its conduct, and that the 'thinking' dog behaved like any other dog simply because instinct and impulse, and not reason, continue to determine most of the behaviour of dogs—as of men—even after they have learnt to 'think'. Still the discrepancy between the behaviour and the 'thought' of these animals is so marked that it tempts to other explanations. Accordingly, the book contains two final chapters in which Dr. William Mackenzie of Genoa, who has long studied the question, discusses the possibilities that the intelligence exhibited does *not* come from the animal itself. The discussion is interesting, and arrives at the conclusion that 'telepathy' is *not* sufficient to account for the facts, and that the intelligence shown is probably communicated, 'mediumistically' from a human mind, so that the dog "absolutely does not understand anything or

know anything of almost all the manifestations of thought which it exhibits" (p. 169). In other words, it is 'possessed' by another spirit, and so in the end the problem of 'thinking animals' merges after all into that of 'spiritism'.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Aristote. La Métaphysique, livres II, et III. Traduction et Commentaire par GASTON COLLE. Louvain and Paris, 1922. Pp. 299.

A continuation of the version and commentary of which Book I. has already received notice in *MIND*. M. Colle's version is generally scholarly and elegant, and the English-speaking student of Aristotle will often find it useful for comparison with the translation of the *Metaphysics* by Mr. Ross. The commentary is brief but lucid and sensible, and is particularly recommended by the judicious use it makes of the interpretations of St. Thomas. Like Mr. Ross, M. Colle takes the Greek text of Christ for the foundation of his work, but adheres to it more closely than his English rival. This is perhaps unfortunate, since Christ's undue estimate of the manuscript known as E frequently leads him astray (e.g., at 997a 24, where we should read with Mr. Ross *cū' αἰται*, and at 1002b 5, where *τίως*, not *τινός*, must obviously be read). Fortunately there is little serious divergence of texts in the two books of the *Metaphysics* before us. In one or two places I think M. Colle has made small slips. Thus the *ἐλικες* of 998a 5 should not have been paraphrased by *révolutions*; what is meant is the "spirals" which are the apparent paths of the planets. So at 999a 16 the words *ταύτας ἀρχάς* are misconstrued as though they could mean "these principles" (*ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς*). The *ces principes là* of the version should be *ces choses là comme principes*. In the quotation from Empedocles, 1000b 3, *venue la dernière* gives a wholly false sense and presupposes a false grammatical "construe"; the meaning is "was moving to the boundary". In the rendering of 1002b 8 I think M. Colle's *parce que* should rather be *Ce qui prouve que*. But these are small matters. In the Commentary M. Colle seems to me occasionally to reject the most natural interpretation of a phrase from a desire to make Aristotle's *ἀπορία* more subtle than they are intended to be. To say that the traditional explanation of an *ἀπορία* makes it a trifling one is not a sufficient proof that the interpretation is wrong. Aristotle does not guarantee the solidity of all these "objections," and he certainly did not invent them all. The mere fact that an *ἀπορία* was current would be justification for referring to it. Now and then I fancy M. Colle forgets this. But his interpretations are always worth a study. It is a pity that Aristippus should be described on p. 49 as a "contemporary" of Aristotle. The use of the imperfect tense (*προεσηλάμην*, 996a 33) shows that Aristotle is referring to Socrates' friend, the elder Aristippus, and he belongs definitely to a time half-a-century at least before Aristotle's own.

A. E. T.

La Philosophie au moyen Âge. By É. GILSON. Paris, 1922 (Collection Payot). 2 vols. Pp. 160, 155.

Le Thomisme : Introduction au Système de Saint Thomas d'Aquin. By É. GILSON. (2nd edition, revised and enlarged.) Paris, 1923. Pp. 239.

Medieval Philosophy illustrated from the System of Thomas Aquinas. By M. DE WULF. Harvard University Press. (London : Humphrey Milford), 1922. Pp. 151.

Prof. Gilson's little history of philosophy from the age of Charlemagne to that of the fifteenth century Occamists who prepared the way for the

great modern scientific revival is exactly what a work of this kind ought to be, brief and luminous and yet thoroughly accurate and definite. With such a manual to introduce the subject no student of philosophy who can read French has any longer an excuse for remaining in the old contented ignorance of the steady development of European thought which can be traced pretty continuously from the time of Scotus Erigena to that of Hobbes and Descartes. Where all is so excellent it is hard to find particular points for commendation, but I may be allowed, perhaps, to refer specially to the skill with which the substance of the great work of Erigena has been distilled into a dozen small pages, and, again, to the admirable account of the significance of the Oxford Franciscans of the thirteenth century. It is hardly too much to say that in M. Gilson's narrative Grosseteste and Roger Bacon appear as the men who really saved mathematics and the ideal of a *scientia experimentalis* for the Western world in the period when the genius of St. Thomas was leading philosophical students in general to a rather exclusive pre-occupation with metaphysical divinity. No less excellent is the account of the work of the—mostly Parisian—"scientific Occamists," Buridan, Nicholas Oresme, Albert of Saxony, and the rest. The legend of a sudden deliverance of the human intellect from Aristotelian fetters by Galileo and his contemporaries has never suffered a completer exposure.

M. Gilson's full, luminous, and thoroughly "objective" introduction to the system of St. Thomas was reviewed in *MIND* on its first appearance, and all that need be added, in welcoming its re-issue, is that it has received some valuable additions (notably a brief account of the saint's life in c. i., and an analysis of his doctrine of habits and virtues in c. xiii.), and that the external form of the book is now worthy of it. It would be hard to find a better introduction to the thought of any philosopher in any language.

Mr. de Wulf's volume of lectures also deals almost exclusively with Thomism, which is treated in a very elementary way, presumably in view of the requirements of students who are coming to philosophy for the first time. It is, perhaps, a pity that much of the exposition is taken up with a slightly irrelevant polemic against something which the author calls "idealism". It is not quite clear exactly what doctrines are intended, but they do not appear to be those of any philosopher known to fame; they are certainly neither the doctrines of Descartes nor of Berkeley nor of Hume nor of Kant. One can sympathise with Mr. de Wulf's evident desire not to task the intelligence of his audience too severely, but he has certainly run the risk of reducing St. Thomas's doctrine to a series of platitudes. The style is a trifle heavy, but, since we are warned that what we have before us is an English version of Mr. de Wulf's French, the author is hardly to blame for that. It is unfortunate that in one or two places the translator has made nonsense by writing "differ" where he obviously means "defer".

A. E. T.

Die Psychische Dingwelt. By WILHELM HAAS. Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1921. Pp. viii, 216.

This book is really an introduction to a promised sequel, and it breaks off, tantalisingly, just when the reader becomes impatient for the genuine story. The titles of its four chapters, it is true, are intriguing enough: *The Discovery of the Psychical World, The Psychical Thing, The Law of Psychisierung, The Interlacing of the Physical and the Psychical Body.* In all these chapters, however, the discussion, I venture to think, would

be more effective if the author were less resolute in his determination not to clinch his argument. The first chapter is extremely general, and although it makes a number of dubious statements with the utmost confidence (as, for example, that psychical and physical material have a pure and undisturbed distinction, and that psychical material is spatio-temporal although psychically, not physically, so), it is hard to see how these important matters are supposed to be argued out. The second chapter gives the outline of a psychological tripartite division into *Gehalt*, *haltung*, and *Charakter*, and asserts that the functional togetherness of these is the structure (although not the substance) of psychical thinghood. This outline, however, seems again to be asserted, not argued. In the third chapter the attempt is made to show in the concrete how the perceptible world and the sphere of the group-mind can be incorporated into psychical bodies; but it is hard to see what precisely is supposed to happen. And the fourth chapter, as I have said, leaves one guessing. It has the rare merit of approaching an important aspect of the mind-body problem in a purely psychological fashion, and many of its illustrations are apt as well as interesting. Nevertheless, it is *Hamlet* without the Prince, for the whole theory depends on the function and status of the Ego, and this is described in negations. "The 'I' itself," we are told, "is neither a physical nor a psychical somewhat. Both of these, in essentials, are equally near it and equally far away. The 'I' does not directly inhabit either of them. . . . We do not need to deal with the explication of the 'I' at this stage. . . . Our precise problem is the relation of the psychical to the physical body" (156-157).

It will be easier, perhaps, to assess the value of this argument when the succeeding volume appears.

The author believes firmly in the existence of a mental macrocosm, and includes therein all that English writers are accustomed to call the Group-Mind. The theoretical difficulties, however, which attach to this conception are never so much as mentioned in these pages.

JOHN LAIRD.

Matter, Life, Mind, and God. By R. F. A. HOERNLÉ, M.A., B.Sc.
London: Methuen & Co., 1923. Pp. xiii, 215.

These "five lectures on contemporary tendencies of thought" were delivered by Prof. Hoernlé to a popular audience at Newcastle. Both Armstrong College and its Professor of Philosophy deserve to be congratulated on this proof that they realise, in the words of the author "that a University, placed in a centre of business and industry, owes a duty not only to its enrolled students, but to the whole community of which it forms a part". And these lectures form a worthy attempt to convey to the outside world some idea of the main movements of thought in the special subject of Philosophy. They are written with all that distinction of style and clearness of exposition which we have learnt to expect from Prof. Hoernlé.

The main feature of the book cannot be better expressed than in the author's own words. "The plan or pervading interest which runs through the lectures is to review some of the chief movements of contemporary thought, in order to see whether, in spite of their manifest diversity and even their conflict, they do not exhibit traces, at least, of a coherent pattern; whether they do not hold out the promise and possibility of unity in our spiritual life—a unity no less of thought than of feeling." With this end in view the author considers first "the revolt against 'Matter,' with special reference to the views of Whitehead. Then there is a discussion of the questions at issue between Vitalism and

Mechanism in Biology, with suggestions for a possible way out. Then we have a review of the present unsatisfactory position of Psychology, leading up to the idea of "behaviour" in an extended sense as the true subject matter of this study. And, finally, there is a discussion of some of the main lines of thought which are being pursued at the present time in the Philosophy of Religion.

It is perhaps unfair to criticise a work of popular exposition on the ground of omissions. Otherwise one might regret, for instance, that Prof. Hoernlé has in the main confined his discussion of Matter to the sense of the word in which it is defined as "the imperceptible cause of our sensations". We should have been glad to have some more comment on the revival of what would some years ago have been spoken of as materialism, in a somewhat different sense, in the work of writers like Bosanquet and Alexander. And we may at times feel an uneasy doubt whether Prof. Hoernlé has always avoided the danger, to which popular exposition is especially liable, of arriving at his higher unity by simply leaving out the differences. It is, perhaps, the one criticism that might be made against the book considered as popular exposition, namely, that it might possibly leave the impression on the minds of its readers that these problems are less difficult of solution than is really the case. Interesting though Prof. Hoernlé's suggestions are, it would be a pity for anyone to entertain the delusive hope that agreement on his lines is yet in sight.

G. C. FIELD.

The Founder of Quakerism. By RACHEL KNIGHT, Ph.D. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Pp. 280, 1922. 12s. 6d.

This volume is described in the sub-title as: "A Psychological Study of the Mysticism of George Fox". It would be more accurately called a psychological study of the character of George Fox. Dr. Knight died before submitting the manuscript to final revision, and Mr. Barrett Brown, who saw the work through the press, did not feel justified in removing crudities and extravagances. A close reading leads to a distinct alteration of the good opinion which the first impression of the book suggests. Much of the reasoning and of the evidence is weak: e.g. as evidences of hypersensitivity are given "The mosquitoes were very troublesome to him"; "He loved to wander in the fields"; and so on. The method is largely descriptive. The attempts at analysis show definitely the influence of Dr. Starbuck, to whom the book is dedicated. Thus, by far the longest discussion is that which groups conflicting traits in Fox's character, representing them as separated by a "chasm" between an inner and an outer self, a condition eventually transcended by the attainment of a higher selfhood. The allocation of traits to the inner and the outer self is not always easy to follow and often appears arbitrary: thus "stillness" and "instinctive wisdom" are included in the outer self, while "gravity" and "spiritual sensitiveness" are allocated to the inner self. Such traits were hardly constituents of selves between which there was a "chasm". The prominence given to a conflict of traits as of opposing inner and outer selves is, to judge even by the evidence given for it, an exaggeration, the cause of which we believe readers of Dr. Starbuck's work on *The Psychology of Religion* will not find it difficult to trace. In this discussion, as in the book as a whole, there is much of interest concerning Fox as a man, but little descriptive or explanatory of his mysticism. The little the author says of the mysticism is quite sound and important. It is not a type of experience or power peculiar to Fox and other mystics, but something of which all men are capable. Dr.

Knight ought to have given more attention to the psychological consideration of the "Inner Light," the doctrine of which, she calls Fox's real contribution to the progress of religious thought. The Inner Light, of which all are capable, is not a special power of communion with God, a "special sense," but seems to be a heightening and refining of normal powers and so able to affect all sides of life, making clear and giving conviction where otherwise is darkness and doubt. In a chapter entitled Philosophical Implications the author draws some not very convincing parallels between the supposed underlying principles of Fox's religion and the philosophy of Spinoza. We regret that the volume does little to satisfy the need of a study of the Mysticism of George Fox.

A. G. WIDGERY.

La tradition philosophique et la pensée française. Par R. LENOIR et autrui. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1922.

This volume contains some lectures out of two courses given by various lecturers at l'École des hautes Études sociales in 1919-20, and 1920-21. They are adapted to persons taking a general cultural rather than a technical interest in philosophy, and, though attractive reading, have the inevitable limitations of such expositions. They present nothing new for anyone who has occupied himself at all seriously with French thought; and a student wishing for a recent systematic survey of French philosophy should go rather to M. Parodi's *La philosophie contemporaine en France*, Alcan, 1921. The first four lectures, comprising only seventy pages, are from a series on the philosophical tradition. M. Ruysen, comparing Epicureanism and Stoicism, emphasises their "astonishing modernity," and says that they are nearer to us than Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus are. M. Brehier, in a discussion of the origins and character of Neoplatonism, shows its opposition to a mechanical view of reality. M. Brunschvicg contributes two brief statements of the positions of Descartes and Spinoza. Twelve lectures are devoted to modern French thought. M. Lenoir looks on Ravaisson and Boutroux as advocating a form of combination of Hellenism and Christianity: he does not appear to see the great significance of the latter's discussions of contingency. It is to be regretted that Mme. Prenant's lecture on Renouvier contains no indication of influences which helped to form his thought. It would also have been interesting to investigate how far recent pluralistic, libertarian, and alogical tendencies in French thought have been due to his work. The survey and estimate of the work of A. Comte by M. Lévy Bruhl is excellent. The essay on Espinas draws attention to a social psychologist whose ideas may have inspired Durkheim. The lecture on Durkheim does not bring out clearly his sociological view of the categories of thought. The absence of all reference to the writings and thought of A. Fouillée is remarkable, and constitutes a real defect in the volume. M. Parodi gives a useful account of the thought of O. Hamelin. This thinker, regarded as of great promise, died young. His *Éléments principaux de la Représentation* has for long been out of print. Considering this fact, it is to be regretted that M. Parodi did not give more quotations from it. According to M. Parodi, Hamelin, rather than being a disciple of Renouvier, as he himself and others thought, resembled Hegel. His main task was a discussion and deduction of the fundamental categories in the development of thought. M. Parodi does not seem to me successful in defending his author from the charge made by M. Brunschvicg that Hamelin assumes the air of deducing or constructing *a priori* what is suggested to him at each step by experience. The volume ends with a lucid description of the chief features of Bergson's psychology and philosophy by M. Gillouin.

A. G. WIDGERY.

Theoria Philosophiæ Naturalis. By R. J. BOSCOVICH, S.J. (Latin-English Edition.) Open Court Company. Pp. xix, 463.

This gigantic tome (it is of about the same size as a volume of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* in the ordinary edition) contains Boscovich's chief work in Latin with an English translation on the opposite pages. The text is that of the Venetian edition of 1763, the translation has been made by Mr. J. M. Child. Dr. Branislav Petronievic of the University of Belgrade provides a short life of Boscovich and Mr. Child writes an introduction in which he states and explains the main outlines of Boscovich's theory of nature.

The expenses of publication have been partly met by the government of the new kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. So far as I am aware, this is the only instance on record in which one of the succession states of the late Austrian empire has done anything which can be counted to its credit. It is a little pathetic that patriotic Jugo-Slavs should have had to take Boscovich as their leading representative in science, for it is admitted that he left his native land as a boy and only returned to it once for a few months. He is said to have been acquainted with the Serbo-Croatian tongue, but he had the good sense to write nothing whatever in it. M. Petronievic makes the best of a bad job by saying that, 'although Boscovich had studied in Italy and passed the greater part of his life there, he had never penetrated to the spirit of the language'. We may, perhaps, conclude that the Serbo-Croatian genius has not blossomed very freely in science when such a very indirect representative has had to be chosen for the purpose of patriotic 'boosting'.

Setting these nationalist absurdities aside, we may say that Boscovich was undoubtedly a great man, and that it was well worth while to produce an edition of his works for the use of English readers. It seems a pity that the volume should be so extremely unhandy; it is better adapted to form part of a bomb-proof shelter than of a library. But the binding and printing are excellent. So far as I (who can make no claim to be an accurate Latin scholar) can judge, the translation is quite satisfactory. Mr. Child's introduction is both interesting and helpful; and I am afraid that many readers will be tempted to read it and leave Boscovich's own exposition to take care of itself.

C. D. BROAD.

Received also :—

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IX.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. xix. (1922), 23. **F. H. Giddings.** 'The Grounds of Presumption.' [A Review of the new edition of Lord Balfour's *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, which has been much misapprehended as an attack on inductive science and an apology for the Thirty-nine Articles. For the first misapprehension "incompetent reviewing and inattentive reading were to blame". For the second, the author himself, because he used throughout the words 'belief' and 'faith' with their religious connotation, instead of 'assumption,' 'certitude,' and 'presumption'. Unfortunately Prof. Giddings does not explain what precisely he means by the latter terms, and leaves his readers to gather that for him 'assumption' means self-evident truth and that "the grounds of presumption are the conditions present and attaching to assumption". But both his appreciation and his criticism of Lord Balfour's work are interesting.] **J. R. Kantor.** 'Memory: A Triphase Objective Action.' [Attempts "to make an objective analysis of memorial behaviour without transforming such activity into simple processes easily described but not actually constituting a part of human behaviour equipment".] xix., 24. **Bertrand Russell.** 'Dr. Schiller's Analysis of *The Analysis of Mind*.' [In xix., 11. Thinks it is a case of "philosophies which differ radically" and "necessarily involve different logics," and that therefore his reply must be "of the nature of rhetoric rather than logic". 'Pleads guilty' to the charge of a 'return to Hume,' dislikes "the heart as an inspirer of beliefs" and "much prefers the spleen," and regards it as the source of "the antirational philosophy that begins with Kant and leads up to the will to believe". Knows "nothing of 'activity,'" would like "to reach the absolutely simple" but does "not believe that that is within human capacity". Denies that he tries to analyse the mind into sensations and images "without suitable relations"; which however are not "a priori principles of synthesis in the Kantian sense". Thinks "there will be no beginning of a genuine science of psychology so long as people are obsessed by such complex facts as growth and progress".] **S. P. Lamprecht.** 'Critical Realism and the External World.' [Points out, with full documentation, that the premisses of the Critical Realists debar them from getting from the mind to the external world. Truth for them is correspondence, but there is no test for it, as they will not accept the pragmatic 'working' of their hypothesis as such a test. Their interpolated 'essences' are useless, because they do not enable us "to know when we have the truth and when we are in error," and there is no possibility of "distinguishing between hallucination and veridical perception at all". "The essence is present to the mind in case of error just as clearly as in the case of true opinion," and its "affirmation does not constitute proof". So Santayana is quite right to reduce the passage from the essence in thought to the existing object to a "leap of faith and action".] **J. E. Turner.** 'Relativity, Old and New.' [Reply to Wadman in xix., 8.] xix., 25. **H. Nichols.** 'The Cosmology of William James.' [Criticises James, without exact references, as insufficiently empirical, but concludes that he "did more for solving the future problems of mankind than his

school, let alone his generation, yet appreciates. The only adequate memorial to his genius can be to complete his marvellously prophetic vision." **J. L. Mursell.** 'The Concept of Sensation.' [A behaviouristic study of sensation as a 'receptor response'.] **R. W. Sellars.** 'Is Consciousness Physical?' [An (obscure) reply to Pratt's charge, in xix., 13, that he is a materialist, with a counter-charge that his fellow 'critical realist' has not seen the implications of 'critical realism'.] xix., 26. **G. T. W. Patrick.** 'The Emergent Theory of Mind.' [Regards mind as "something which the body achieves," a "new reality," and "in Aristotelian phrase, the form of the body". This conception antiquates and supersedes the old theories of the mind and the mind-body puzzle, and is common to Neo-Realists, Pragmatists, Freudians and Behaviourists, all of whom "agree in regarding mind as adaptive behaviour, as specific response, as selective control". Adaptive selective behaviour 'emerges' from the body, and is new; therefore it is "no longer neural or bodily, but psychical". Mind, however, is more than consciousness, and "the mind-body problem is a kind of pseudo-problem and the traditional solutions are all quite beside the mark".] **C. E. Whitmore.** 'Two Notes on Aesthetics.' [On (1) the connexion between goodness and beauty, which emphasises the intellectual element in beauty and appeals to Aquinas; and (2) on the dictum that aesthetic values are 'independent of all practical considerations'. Because the notion of utility is "complex and highly relative" the phrase is "too vague to be helpful unless interpreted," and if interpreted as "making the æsthetic attitude the polar antithesis of the practical" it sets up "an unnecessary and untenable dualism". What is needed is "a scale of values in which utility and beauty are gradually distinguished".] xx. (1923) 1. **M. W. Calkins.** 'The Foundations of Psychology.' [A review of J. S. Moore's book with this title.] **A. A. Merrill.** 'Duration and Relativity.' [Argues that experience is five-dimensional, *duration* being a fifth dimension additional to space-time. "But it is quality not quantity. It makes us what we are; the east calls it Karma; and it is this fifth dimension that has brought into existence, love, sympathy, and understanding between men."] xx. 2. **D. S. Robinson.** 'The Chief Types of Motivation to Philosophic Reflexion.' [(1) *The hedonic* for the fun of it, (2) *the theological*, (3) *the sociological* (in pragmatism), (4) *the scientific*.] **W. T. Bush.** 'Another Note on Prof. Carpenter's "The Aesthetic Basis of Greek Art."' ["Protests a little against Mr. Carpenter's tendency to isolate art into a pure and self-contained category."] **R. Carpenter.** 'Comment' on the preceding. **H. B. Smith.** 'Certain Conceptions which have Confused a Modernist.' [Reply to a review of his book in xix., 26.] Report by **G. Murphy** on the 31st Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association. xx., 3. **J. R. Geiger.** 'Concerning Instincts.' [Defends them against Knight Dunlap's attempt to identify them with habits.] **H. L. Friess** reports on the 22nd Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. xx., 4. **F. C. Sharp.** 'Some Problems in the Psychology of Egoism and Altruism.' [Defining altruism as desire for the good of another and egoism as desire for one's own (future) good, "egoism and altruism are simply two different directions of the same force," which may be called 'benevolence'. Altruism is to be distinguished from sympathy and love, which "is but one of a series of emotional stimulants" tending to arouse it, like "admiration, approbation, gratitude, joy," while others, like hatred, disapprobation, sorrow, tend to depress it. It requires "a broader range of experience and a more highly developed power of imagining than does egoism". "Thoughtlessness makes a large part of our indifference to others," and "the conditions of social existence reinforce" it, and keep the level of altruism down to, as well as up to, the level which prevails in the

community. Thus the least altruistic are also the least egoistic, *i.e.*, care least for their own future, while "long-range egoism" is best correlated with altruism. 'Benevolence' is "the ultimate source of moral distinctions," and has supreme control over desires.] **W. M. Salter.** 'Nietzsche's Attitude towards Religion.' [A brief protest against calling him essentially irreligious.] xx., 5. **B. J. Gilman.** 'Reading the "Kritik" Afresh.' [Is very appreciative of Kant, but thinks it strange that he "should have sought that which exists beyond all possible experience in no-experience".] **D. W. Pratt.** 'In Defence of a "Worthless" Theory of Value.' [Replies to an article by Picard in xix., 18 and by Dewey in *Phil. Rev.* xxxi., 4.] xx., 6. **C. I. Lewis.** 'Facts, Systems and the Unity of the World.' [An interesting attempt to lay down the formal logical conditions of asserting the metaphysical unity of the world. It takes 'fact' as "the unit of knowledge," meaning thereby the *asserted* fact or *claim* to fact, which is asserted in 'propositions,' and 'system' as "a set of mutually consistent facts such that whatever system contains a given fact will contain also all the consequences of that fact." Further all 'worlds' are 'systems,' "but not every system is a world". "The law of contradiction holds of a system, but the law of excluded middle does not. A world however must satisfy both these laws." Consequently "a given system may be contained in more than one possible world," and as "we never reach the point of discovering *which* of various equally-possible completions of our system of known facts the actual world is," "the real world is always merely one of many which must be viewed as equally possible". It cannot be true therefore that "every fact of our world is somehow determined by every other—that reality has no independent parts". On the contrary "every world which is logically conceivable has something in common with every other; every world, including the actual one, contains mutually independent parts". Moreover "there are an *infinite* number of such mutually incompatible systems," as Riemann proved of the geometrics. Hence "reality contains an infinite number of independent parts". Still this is not a complete proof of pluralism: for the actual world may nevertheless be "a very tight system of interlaced facts". Neither is 'coherence' "a very vague term," any guarantee of truth, whether it is taken to mean "logical consequence" or "consistency without dependence". "A monism which identifies the necessary with the actual, the actual with the all-possible, is incompatible with conceptions which are logically fundamental." **J. E. Turner.** 'Change and the Unchanging Whole: a New Scientific Analogy.' [Between Einsteinian physics with its unchanging ethereal stress and the philosophic Whole of modern Idealism.] Contains also a full review by Prof. M. R. Cohen of Pound's *Spirit of the Common Law*. xx., 7. **C. I. Lewis.** 'A Pragmatic Conception of the *A Priori*.' [Brings out the *a priori* aspect of postulation strikingly. "What is *a priori* is necessary truth, not because it compels the mind's acceptance, but precisely because it does not. It is given experience, brute fact, the *a posteriori* element which the mind must accept willy-nilly. The *a priori* represents an attribute freely taken, a stipulation of the mind itself . . . legislative, because addressed to ourselves . . . which could neither be proved nor disproved by any experience." Hence the laws of logic are "principles of procedure, the parliamentary rules of intelligent thought and speech," and arithmetic is *a priori* because "its laws prevent *nothing*; they are compatible with anything which could conceivably happen in nature. . . . The dividing line between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* is that between principles . . . which *can* be maintained in the face of all experience and those genuinely empirical generalisations which *might* be proven flatly false." If however such conceptions "reveal their infelicity as intellectual

instruments," they can be altered "on pragmatic grounds".] **R. M. Ealin** 'What is the Problem of Knowledge.' [Wishes "to maintain that one can examine knowledge . . . without attaching oneself to any system of metaphysics, and that such a positive analysis of knowledge is necessary," while "the theory of knowledge as it often comes to us, confusedly mingled with metaphysics, bears the same relation to the positive analysis of knowledge as alchemy to chemistry".] **J. Dewey.** 'Tradition, Metaphysics, and Morals.' [Protests against a criticism of himself by D. S. Robinson in xx., 2 as based on extensive misquotation.] xx., 8. **M. Ten Hoor.** 'George Santayana's Theory of Knowledge.' [In the light of *Essays in Critical Realism*, S. has an 'epistemological trinity' of which the three persons are the external object, the datum, and the appreciation thereof. This means "the interposition of a transitive medium between the idea and its object," and two 'leaps,' viz. "the leap of intuition from the state of the living organism to the consciousness of some essence, and the leap of faith or action, from the symbol actually given in sense or in thought to some ulterior existing object". But the first 'leap' is subjective and the realism of the second is groundless. Similarly the attempt to account for relevance and truth by using 'intent' "to bridge the chasm between symbol and object" fails; here too "external existences are gratuitous".] **D. Drake.** 'Critical Realism and Scepticism.' [Replies to a 'naïve realist' criticism in xix., 24, that the charge of scepticism does not affect "the most important sort of knowledge" that which is "open to verification, but only what is "for practical purposes an unimportant sort of knowledge," though crucial for epistemological theory, viz., that of "an independently real world". And that all realists must assume, anyhow. As for the use of pragmatic reasoning by critical realists, they "accept workability as a criterion of truth, but not as the meaning of the term 'truth'".] xx., 9. **A. B. Wolfe.** 'The Role of Sympathy and Ethical Motivation in Scientific Social Research.' [From the nature of his data the social scientist needs sympathy, which is essential to obtain confidence and to secure live evidence, and also to understand the experience of others. But it should be objective. In practice also "ethical interest is a prime motive in the initiation of scientific inquiry;" but it should not disturb its actual course.] **F. C. S. Schiller.** 'Analysis and Self Analysis.' [Comment on Russell, xix., 24. Russell does not allow for the possibility of a plurality of analyses and the consequent necessity of choosing the 'best'. Hence analysis is "no panacea for our philosophic woes". The analysis of the self also has hitherto proved a failure, alike in Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Fichte. Russell's Humism fails similarly: "he cannot take the self as an activity, because from his standpoint no activities are visible—not even his own in taking up his standpoint," and his use of 'relations' as the 'mortar' to bind together 'images' and 'sensations' makes them into objects. But "a genuine personal self must be both subject and object with no insuperable gulf between them".] **S. C. Pepper.** 'Misconceptions regarding Behaviourism.' [Against Pratt, xix., 22, disclaims 'materialism'.]

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. xxxiii., 1. October, 1922. **S. Radhakrishnan.** 'The Hindu Dharma.' [Explains dharma as the "tradition sustained by the conviction of countless generations of men which helps to build the soul of truth in us," controlling desires and leading men to freedom; describes original idea of caste, states that caste rules only became rigid with the advent of Mohammedans into India, shows the danger of continued rigidity, and concludes that caste has a future only if confined to intimate social matters.] **R. Kingsdown Pemberton.** 'The Commensurability of Values.' [Analyses critically

the theoretical problem involved in Dr. Rashdall's position that we can form a judgment as to which of various heterogeneous goods, of which the chief are Virtue, Culture, and Pleasure, is best, a large amount of this or a small amount of that; distinguishes between hierarchy of intrinsic values and attempt to weigh intrinsic values against one another, and maintains that only if there is a single standard are values commensurable.] **Rupert C. Lodge.** 'The Genesis of the Moral Judgment in Plato.' [Analyses the Dialogues to discover the elements involved in moral judgment, concludes that Plato held that the elements were the instincts, habits, and intelligence so trained and ripened by social and educational influences as to have taken the form of the ideal world, and that the judgment of the well-trained man (philosopher-king) is not a chance reaction to a chance stimulus but the rich experience of the whole race, sublimated till it represents as far as humanly possible the complete experience which we call the Absolute.] **C. F. Tausch.** 'Sanctioning International Peace.' [Discusses the present international situation in the light of "the critical period of American history," when the Constitution gave the federal government the capacity to operate directly on individuals, including the power of direct taxation, a mode in which sovereignty is displayed; maintains that if national harmony is paramount to all other considerations then power of taxation affords one of the most tangible means by which the league or association can obtain it, and shows that this involves transition from absolute to relative national sovereignty.] **O. Fred. Boucke.** 'The Relation of Ethics to Social Science.' [Maintains that ultimate source of ethical norms is a personal interest or striving for satisfaction of wants, that social science may help men to realise norms as submitted, but that science cannot establish these ends as moral.] **Claude C. H. Williamson.** 'Hamlet.' [Discusses the play and criticisms on it, concludes that it is a masterpiece because of "the truth to life of its perplexed and perplexing characterisation".] xxxiii., 2. January, 1923. **A. P. Brogan.** 'A Study in Statistical Ethics.' [Gives an account of investigations into "worse practices" as estimated by university students, and states that similar investigations would yield accurate knowledge of public opinion.] **R. F. A. Hoernlé.** 'Recent Philosophy of Religion.' [Contrasts theology as the study of the tradition and doctrines of a particular religion with philosophy of religion as an attempt to understand the place and function of religion in human life, and to justify it as a reasonable attitude; shows that religion is central in normal human life and cannot be ignored by philosophy which must accept religion on its own valuation; characterises revival of theism as most striking movement in philosophy of religion, and summarises critically three modern tendencies—philosophical defence of belief in a personal God, the tendency to emphasise the value of the universe, and Alexander's doctrine of "deity".] **Louis Arnaud Reid.** 'The Nature of the Knowledge that Conditions Goodness.' [Restates the position that living morality must be inspired by knowledge and feeling of the reality of the value of the Universe.] **H. J. W. Hetherington.** 'Sir Henry Jones.' [An appreciation of the contributions to philosophy by the late Sir Henry Jones.] **Gilbert Reid.** 'Revolution as Taught by Confucianism.' [Supports by extracts from the works of Confucius and Mencius the view that revolution is justified when it is directed against wickedness in the ruler or the government.] **Norman Boardman.** 'The Rôle of the Fundamental.' [Declines to accept the view that the overthrow of absolutism in ethics involves that of fundamentals; redefines fundamental as relative to the end sought which is relative to desire, and holds that the abstraction of fundamentals from concrete situations as entities led to the denial of fundamentals.]

SCIENTIA. September, 1922. **E. C. C. Baly.** 'Une théorie de la réaction et de la réactivité chimiques.' **A. Herlitzka.** 'La contribution des divers pays au développement de la physiologie. Première partie: Les bases de la physiologie moderne.' **J. A. Ryan.** 'The Social Question: A suggested Limitation of Capitalist Property.' Reviews. Review of Reviews. October, 1922. **H. Guilleminot.** 'Vitalisme ou physico-chimisme. Première partie: Dégénération de l'énergie et évolution cosmique.' [The problem of Vitalism *versus* physico-chemical theories appears to the author to be too complicated and difficult to be solved in the immediate future. He gives an account of the relevant data of science to account for which these mutually inconsistent sets of theories have been elaborated, and outlines their respective positions. This article is posthumous and gives a sketch of the point of view more fully expressed in the two books of the author written shortly before his death, 'Les nouveaux horizons de la science' and 'La matière et la Vie'.] **A. Herlitzka.** 'La contribution des divers pays au développement de la physiologie. Deuxième partie: Le développement de la physiologie moderne.' **H. Cahn.** 'The World Crisis.' Reviews. Review of Reviews. November, 1922. **H. Guilleminot.** 'Vitalisme ou physico-chimisme. Deuxième partie: La loi d'option de la vie.' [This article continues the discussion by the same author in the previous issue. Two groups of Vitalists are distinguished: 'les animistes purs,' on the one hand, and, on the other hand, those who admit the existence of something specific at the base of all vital movements. According to the physico-chemical theories only the material elements of the world occur in living matter. The forms of organised matter are explicable by means of the properties of inert matter. Living beings are such that, if all the laws of combination were known, it would be possible to create artificially a living thing. General conclusions are drawn from the detailed consideration of the following questions. A. The question of the material constituents of life and of the possibility of artificial reproduction. B. The question of the complexity of structure in living beings. C. The question of the permanence of form and of the chemical state, etc.]. **A. Loria.** 'La contribution des différents peuples aux progrès de la science économique.' **G. D. H. Cole.** 'La question sociale. L'abolition du salariat.' Reviews. Review of Reviews. December, 1922. **O. Lodge.** 'The Philosophy of Science or the Principles of Scientific Procedure.' **G. H. Livens.** 'La théorie électrique et son Éther.' **E. Lugaro.** 'Contre le Vitalisme.' Reviews. Review of Reviews. January, 1923. **H. Bouasse.** 'La question préalable contre la théorie d'Einstein.' **J. A. Thomson.** 'Vitalisme méthodologique.' Reviews. Review of Reviews. February, 1923. **J. Burnet.** 'L'expérimentation et l'observation dans la science grecque.' Reviews. Review of Reviews. March, 1923. **G. Castelnuovo.** 'L'espace-temps des relativistes a-t-il contenu réel?' **E. Rabaud.** 'Le vitalisme et la science.' Reviews. Review of Reviews. April, 1923. **A. C. Crehore.** 'The present outlook in Science.' **E. Lugaro.** 'Les humeurs et le caractère.' Reviews. Review of Reviews. May, 1923. **A. S. Eddington.** 'Can Gravitation be explained?' [In Einstein's theory the phenomenon of gravitation is shown to be a necessary consequence of the 'curvature' of the space and time around heavy masses. This fact is not in any sense an explanation of the phenomenon of gravitation but rather a description of it. A region where there are gravitational effects is different in some way from one which is free from gravitational effects. Einstein's theory puts this difference into mathematical form, and although it offers no explanation it shows clearly what it is that requires explanation. Einstein has discovered the equations satisfied in empty space, and has explained them in terms of four-

dimensional geometry as follows : The radius of spherical curvature of a three-dimensional section of the world taken at any point and in any direction is always the same constant length. It is not possible to visualise the curvature referred to in this statement. The important thing is that with every direction in empty space-time a significant length can be associated.] **A. Dendy.** 'Mécanisme et Vitalisme.' Reviews. Review of Reviews. June, 1923. **E. Bortolotti.** 'Origine e primo inizio del calcolo degli immaginari.' **R. Anthony.** 'Sur le sens et la portée du Vitalisme.' Reviews. Review of Reviews.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. 29^e Année, No. 4, Octobre-Décembre, 1922. This *Numéro Exceptionnel* is wholly devoted to a series of papers on "The General Movement of American Thought," written by nine distinguished American Professors. The selection of the writers, and the general scheme of the Number, are due to Prof. J. H. Woods, of Harvard University, who is, however, not himself a contributor to its contents. The papers, written originally in English, have been carefully and competently translated into French. However, even allowing for the inevitable delay occasioned by the need for translation, the interval of nearly two years and a half between the writing of the papers and their publication is excessive. This has made the contents, in some cases, rather stale and out-of-date, and allowed personal references to stand which have become inaccurate, e.g., H. J. Laski is described as teaching at Harvard which he left in June, 1920; and C. I. Lewis is described as Professor at the University of California which he left in September, 1920. Moreover, the printing and proof-reading fall below even the *Revue's* own mediocre standard. **J. R. Angell.** *La Psychologie aux États-Unis.* [A brief account, by the President of Yale University, of the development of American Psychology since 1890. Genetic, religious, social, animal, and pathological psychology are passed in review in this order, followed by a few remarks on the applications of psychology to education and on the use of intelligence tests for sorting the recruits to the American army during the war. After a short, and somewhat non-committal, discussion of *comportementisme* (= behaviourism), Angell declares himself in favour of the American preference for the study of the practical applications of psychology, on the ground that it saves psychologists from pedantry and intellectual decadence. (This being so, it is curious that he makes no mention whatever of the development of industrial psychology. Münsterberg, too, and his *Psycho-technics* are passed over in silence). America, in Angell's opinion, has contributed a larger number of valuable manuals to psychology than Europe. "Metaphysical psychology" is, with kindly contempt, handed over "to our colleagues, the philosophers".] **J. M. Baldwin.** *L'Aboutissement de la Médiation Logique : L'Intuition.* [Prof. Baldwin, like Prof. W. E. Hocking later on, gives, not so much a survey of American work done in a certain field or by a certain school, as an original paper developing his own theory of logical mediation and its termination in intuition. Mediation has always an *instrumental* function. Its purpose is to lead us to a "fresh experience of reality or value". Baldwin distinguishes three kinds of mediation (1) spontaneous mediation or "conversion"; (2) logical mediation or "inference"; (3) teleological (purposive) mediation or "Research for ends". The first two are discussed in the present paper; the third is reserved for treatment in a further paper to be published by the *Revue*. (1) Conversion consists in the realisation of images and mnemonic ideas in sensory experiences. It secures, or recovers, for our knowledge an "immediate contact with the coefficients of reality or existence". In other words, it is the process in which the

thought of a thing leads to perception of the thing. (2) In logical mediation there is a similar transition to a fulfilling or realising thought, i.e. to a judgment which affirms a fresh reference to existence. Thus, in so-called "immediate inference" we have a judgment of identity in which a concept is applied to a fresh case, the "sphere of existence" to which the concept applies being thereby enlarged. The "control" of the concept is extended over new matter. "Instrumental," or "experimental," logic studies this mediating function of all thought-processes. In "mediate inference," or implication, the same principle holds; only, the situation is more complicated, for the conclusion, reached via the middle term, asserts the control of a whole logical system over the new case or matter. Whether we are dealing with "proof" from abstract, rational principles, or with "verification" by empirical observation and experiment, in either case mediation affects a transition to a fresh contact with reality, analogous to the realisation of a mnemonic idea. This is obvious in verification, but even in rational proof it is true, for here the argument terminates in the "immediacy of rational intuition". Such intuition may have one of two forms: (a) theoretical—the apprehension, as absolutely valid, of a system of principles in their mutual implications; (b) practical—the apprehension of absolute values as determining the realisation of subjective ends, irrespective of the world of actual facts. Baldwin next strives to show that this "immediacy of intuition" is not identical with the "primitive self-evidence" or "auto-demonstration," claimed by some theories for ultimate principles and values, but is always the "product of logical mediation". In the last section of his paper, Baldwin attempts an account of the *genesis* of this immediacy of intuition. In this he emphasises, on the one hand, the importance of social factors for what he calls the "synnomic" character of judgments (i.e. for their validity for a multitude of thinkers), and, on the other, the importance of objective or "essential" necessity—the perception of which he traces to "logical opposition," i.e., to the mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness of *B* and *non-B* in a given universe of discourse.] **John Dewey.** *Le Développement du Pragmatisme Américain.* [Dewey begins with a lucid and careful account of Pragmatism as expounded in the writings of Charles S. Peirce and William James. He shows very clearly how Peirce's Pragmatism took its origin in a remark of Kant's, in the *Metaphysik der Sitten*, about the difference between "pragmatic" and "practical" principles, whereas the roots of James's views are rather in the English Empiricists. To Peirce, Pragmatism meant primarily a method for rendering our ideas clear; to James, a method for verifying our ideas. Peirce was a logician, James a humanist. Peirce was more interested in the general ideas in terms of which we are in the habit of conceiving the universe, James looked more to concrete, particular results in application. Hence, his empiricism differs from that of the English school, in that they tried to trace the antecedents of our beliefs in experience, whereas James threw the emphasis on the consequences which we experience when we act on our beliefs. At this point, James's Pragmatism becomes metaphysical, for the emphasis on the future consequences of action leads to a concept of the universe as still in process of evolution, still "in the making". Here, too, are the roots of Dewey's own "Instrumentalism," which derives, on the one hand, from James's psychology, and, on the other, from reaction against the "neo-Kantian" logic and epistemology of F. H. Bradley and B. Bosanquet. On the psychological side, it is the biological, behaviouristic, strain in James which led Dewey and his school to assign to thought, not the function of contemplative knowledge, but that of forecasting lines of action for remoulding the given situation nearer to the heart's desire. Judgment is

not a purely theoretic act. Its subject is the portion of the environment to be acted on ; its predicate expresses and defines the agent's response to the environment ; its copula stands for the concrete and organic act by which the response takes effect in a modification of the given situation. Thus, Instrumentalism is metaphysically "realistic" in taking for granted an independent, pre-existing world, but it is "idealistic" in looking to thought for actions which make the world more reasonable. In this emphasis on practice, no less than its emphasis on the individual as the bearer of creative thought, Instrumentalism reflects, for better or worse, the spirit of American civilisation.] **W. E. Hocking.** *Les Principes de la Méthode en Philosophie Religieuse.* [This is the most original and philosophically the most important of all the papers in this Number. Hocking starts from the thesis that religion has important functions to fulfil in human life and must be understood in the light of its functions. At the same time, the "scientific" treatment of religion tends to "naturalise" it, but *une religion naturalisée est une religion dénaturée.* He deals, then, first with the "psycho-social" functions of religion. The original, instinctive, and permanent element of religion is the *cult*. But, biologically, the cult looks like an extravagance and a waste ; psychologically, it turns attention and will away from the realities of practical life and evokes mystic, subjective, "useless" states of mind. What, then, is its function ? Religion, whilst being the mother of most of the arts, and, thus, a perpetual "generator and fertiliser," belongs more particularly to the class of *fonctions de délassement*. As such, its function is to check the constant tendency of psychical energy to run down. It has to restore and increase psychical power, to inhibit "unpower". Thus, for example, it opposes the tendency to get set in our secular habits : it is a breaker-up of the determinism of our habits. So, again, it restores our constantly failing capacity to communicate with and understand each other. Peoples, classes, individuals tend to grow out of touch with each other : religion undoes their mutual isolation, for religion in oneself respects the religion in the other and thus facilitates the recovery of contact. Hocking next passes to the conditions required if religion is to exercise its functions. Religion rests on instinct, and "every instinct is profoundly metaphysical". In other words, it is a response to reality, and, therefore, "the only possible justification of the act of adoration is the existence of an *object of adoration*". This object of adoration cannot be a mere ideal in the human mind, nor, again, can it be any actual society or even humanity as a whole. It must be *extra-psychologique* and *extrasocial* ; and, above all, it must deserve to be adored. In short, it must be God, and if there is no God, religion loses even its psychological and social value. What, then, are the obstacles to a belief in God ? Hocking considers two—the existence of evil, and the sceptical despair of the power of the human mind to discover the ultimate nature of reality. As regards evil, Hocking relies on the empirical dialectic of evil, i.e., on the fact that a given evil may lose its character as evil with a change of mood, through the comradeship of others, through mere lapse of time. As regards the mind's capacity for metaphysical knowledge, Hocking points out that the present-day tendency is to treat immediate experience, rather than conceptual thought, as the chief pathway to reality, and that, therefore, a reconsideration of mysticism is in order. Now, a highly "paradoxical equilibrium of affirmation and negation" has always been characteristic of mysticism—an insistence on the unshakable certainty of God's existence together with a denial that our conceptual predicates are adequate to his nature. Clearly, the paradox can be solved only by a fresh study of the relation of conceptual thinking

to intuition. Two logical processes are involved: (a) dialectic; (b) interpretation. The function of dialectic is to carry us from concepts to intuition; the function of interpretation is to carry us from intuition to concepts. Thus, dialectic makes us aware of the *abolute* in our experience, and yields absolute certainty. Interpretation, on the other hand, which tries to render the nature of the *abolute* in conceptual terms is subject to ceaseless revision. In addition to these two elements, every religion must have also a basis of historical fact.] **C. I. Lewis.** *La Logique et la Méthode Mathématique.* [A most interesting comparison between three types of mathematical logic—that of Peano, that of Russell and Whitehead, that of Charles S. Peirce, Royce, and other American logicians. The method of American logic is to develop a type of order of high generality, out of which subordinate types of order can be developed by special selection. Lewis next goes on to summarise his own well-known argument that the principle of “material implication,” employed by most logicians, is wholly superfluous, and that just as sound a calculus can be built on “implication” in its ordinary sense. He closes with a few cautious observations on the influence of mathematical logic on philosophy.] **R. B. Perry.** *La Conscience Américaine.* [This, the longest paper in the Number, suffers considerably from the fact of having to be read three years after it was written. “Americanism,” in the spring of 1920, is interpreted by Perry as the instinctive desire of a people, torn by the war out of its traditional policy of isolation, and finding its belief in democracy threatened by Communism, and its belief in individualistic enterprise and capitalism by Socialism, to recover its stability by a passionate re-assertion of its political and economic faiths. Perry rightly reminds us that, to an American his democratic institutions are the deliberate creation of men who, in the light of the highest ideals, chose for their nation the structure of government they thought best, *as an example of self-governing freedom to the rest of the world.* Hence, American intolerance of all criticism of democracy of the American type—politicians may be bad, but the system is good. The average American, moreover, still preserves the sense of limitless opportunities for individual talent and enterprise, and hence is unwilling to acknowledge the existence of fixed social classes with conflicting economic interests. His ideal is that of the “neighbourhood group” of equals, who are also “good misers”. He looks to the President to be his conscience and to voice his ideals, and to Congress to guard his material interests. He is a believer in “progress,” an “optimist,” whose “moral realism” leads him to regard evil as something which can be done away with, or at least diminished, by resolute action. He does not believe in original sin, or in the innate depravity of human nature, but in its perfectibility by its own efforts, needing no grace of God. “He believes in the family, in the dignity of labour, and in the United States of America.” He is willing to reform abuses, provided the reform does not touch his political system or his economics based on private property and initiative.—As regards ethical thought among the University teachers of philosophy, Perry distinguishes two main currents. One of these is based on “the religious metaphysic of Anglo-German idealism,” the other on “the scientific and positivist spirit of the nineteenth century”. Naturally, Perry claims that the latter represents more truly the essential soul of the typical American. The distinguishing trait of the American is *modérantisme* (= moderation?) and a belief in *fair play* which is the chief moral force in American public life.] **S. P. Sherman.** *Mouvements Contemporains et Tradition Littéraire aux Etats-Unis.* [Perry had just represented the American to us as clinging tenaciously to his traditional ideals. In this article, Sherman shows us that the young poets, novelists, art-critics of America are in re-

volt against these ideals as expressed by the American classics of the nineteenth century—Emerson, Walt Whitman, Henry James, Mark Twain, William Dean Howells. "Free verse" is merely a symptom of a "romantic" and "rousseauist" rebellion, not merely against classical forms and metres but against the whole philosophy of life of the classical writers. The "Young Idea" is chaos in theory and practice. Sherman makes the point that, in this outburst of lawless licence, the younger writers are not genuinely representative of America, but are influenced by foreign models and movements of thought.] **E. G. Spaulding.** *Les Sciences de la Nature en Amérique.* [This is the least satisfactory article in the Number. From the nature of the case, it has suffered most from the delay in publication. Its large "*en Amérique*" is inappropriate for a treatment which deals only with work done in the United States. And the field which Spaulding covers—Mathematics, Astronomy, Chemistry, Biology, Mental Medicine—honours Physics in all its branches by a conspicuous omission. There is a brief account of the National Research Council. The chemical section deals chiefly with Dr. Langmuir's work on the constitution of the atom. The biological section gives a good survey of recent work by Profs. Whitman, Tower, and Morgan on heredity. The section on Mental Medicine deals with intelligence tests and with the treatment of "shell-shock" cases.] **W. M. Urban.** *La Critique Esthétique et la Philosophie en Amérique.* [Here, too, *en Amérique* means in the United States. Otherwise, this article supplements in an interesting way the articles of Perry and Sherman. Urban declares that "the fear of uncontrolled impulses, in thought and action, is the strongest emotion in present-day American life," but then goes on to show how it is the democratic spirit, the existing economic and industrial organisation and the naturalistic outlook of science which combine to produce precisely that rejection of control, as being "repression," which is feared. Romantics and Rousseauists claim "that the *élan vital* was born free, but that everywhere we find it in chains". Urban maintains that this spirit of revolt against control finds expression in contemporary art and æsthetic criticism, and that its philosophical basis is in the philosophical movements which, like Pragmatism, Realism, and Pluralism, best hit off the popular taste. After pointing out the ambiguities of Realism in philosophy and art, he concludes with the demand for a "New Humanism" which must be idealistic and submit human thought and conduct to the control of objective values.] Tables of Authors, Articles, and Reviews for Vol. xxix. *Nécrologie*: Gabriel Séailles; Georges Sorel. Reviews of books.

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. xxv^e Année. No. 97. February, 1923. **E. Gilson.** *Le Platonisme de Bernard de Chartres.* [B. was notoriously a "Platonist" believing in *universalia ante rem*. But he also held that there are *in singular things formæ nativæ*, created along with the matter they inform, and this is why John of Salisbury speaks of him as attempting to conciliate Plato and Aristotle. B. is thus, in virtue of his view that the *formæ nativæ* are images of the true universals, a continuator of Boethius and a precursor of St. Thomas. The conflicting reports about Gilbert de la Porrée, who is called both a Platonic realist and an "Aristotelian" are to be explained by the fact that he was B.'s disciple.] **Dom O. Lottin.** *Les éléments de la moralité des actes chez S. Thomas d'Aquin* (concl.) **J. Maritain.** *La Quantification du prédicat et la logique de l'École.* [The "quantification of the predicate" is considered by St. Thomas in his comment on Aristotle *de Interpretatione* 17b, 12-16, and rightly rejected for the reasons (1) that it arises from a confusion of the matter with the form of a proposition; (2) and gives rise to types of pro-

position which are, in some cases, formally false, in others superfluous. The criticism disposes in advance of Hamilton's "discovery," but whether it invalidates "logistic," as M. Maritain holds, is perhaps a different question. "Logistic" is not really an "equational" logic but a logic of "implication." And perhaps M. confuses the two very different relations of membership of individuals in a class and inclusion of one class in another, which "logistic" is careful to distinguish. When we say "the class *oxen* are included in the class *ruminants*" we are not asserting that "the class *oxen* is a ruminant" though we are implying that the individual members of the class *oxen* are ruminants. The symbols of "logistic" are called by M. "an algorithm to be used without thinking". But does any mathematician really use an "algorithm" without thinking? **P. Charles.** *Le Plotinisme.* [A scholarly, though appreciative, criticism of a recent exposition of the *Enneads*. The author rightly rejects the description of Plotinus as a "pantheist," and says, truly, that the only but real difference between Plotinus and the Christian mystics is the difference between nature and grace. But is he equally right in holding that *voûs* and *ψυχή* are "outside the One"?] **E. Vlietinck.** *La Philosophie de l'Histoire.* **N. Balthasar.** *La Valeur philosophique de la Relation de Raison.* [In God there is no real distinction between essence and attribute. Hence the distinctions we make in reasoning about God have been called mere fictions. This view leads to complete Agnosticism. The author holds that between the two "transcendentals" *ens, res*, and the remaining four, *unum, verum, bonum, pulchrum* there is an "incomplete virtual distinction" which, without being a real relation, is not a fiction. Hence it is possible to make the statements that God exists, is good, etc., with significance and truth.] Book Reviews, etc.

LOGOS. RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA. Anno vi., Fasc. 1. January-March, 1923. **G. della Valle.** *Valore e Fine.* [Values may be regarded as transcendent realities or as ends of spiritual activity. All values are not ends, for some remain, for various reasons, unrealised; some ends, those which are merely empirical, are not values. A value is "what ought to be an end". Finality belongs not to nature, but exclusively to spiritual activity. All facts, even psychical facts, when studied empirically, demand rigidly causal explanation. Axiology, the study of abstract values, should be distinguished from Teleology, the determination of the particular values we ought to choose as ends. By the recognition of the absolute reality of all values, both positivism and idealism are transcended.] **D. Fawcett.** *Hegelian Dialectic or the Imaginal Dynamic?* [Hegel vainly attempts to construct reality out of pure thought. There can be no divine or "cosmic" thought because thought is necessarily of or about something other than itself. The real is, in the last resort, a creation of a divine "imagining". The point that the genuinely novel is continually being created is well illustrated. But is Mr. Fawcett justified in opposing "imagination" to "thinking," and does not actual imagination work under the control of an "other" as much as "thought"?] **M. Maresca.** *Filippo Masci.* [A sympathetic character-sketch of the recently deceased philosopher by an old pupil.] **G. Ciccio.** *Filosofia Scettica.* [A brief comment on Rensi's article in the preceding issue of *Logos* entitled *The Volatilisation of God*. If Rensi were rigidly consistent, he would see that his reasoning, supposing it to be valid, would "volatilise" everything, including himself. But all that he really urges is that our knowledge about God is expressed in negations. This does not prove that the knowledge is illusory or unimportant.] **P. Carabellese.** *Religione e Filosofia.* [The author's inaugural discourse before the University of Palermo. Subject and object are the two constituents of con-

crete reality, which is their synthesis. Philosophy attempts to transcend the synthesis by grasping the object, religion by concentrating itself on the subject. Neither attempt can ever finally succeed, but both are natural and legitimate. Philosophy is forced to end by becoming the personal conviction of the individual philosopher; religion, in spite of itself, becomes the common faith and culture of a community. The author's rather rhetorical style makes the precise line of argumentation unusually hard to follow.] **P. Serini.** *Bergson e lo Spiritualismo Francese del Secolo xix.* (cont.). [A careful study of the influence of the Positivism of Taine and Renan. The anti-intellectualist prejudice of Bergson is largely to be accounted for by the consideration that the "intellect" he denounces is *l'intelligence* as misconceived by Taine.] Book-Reviews, etc. (containing one by N. Abbagnano of Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity*).

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. Anno xiv., Fasc. vi. November-December, 1922. **L. Necchi.** *Le supreme esigenze del pensiero.* [A sound philosophy will never attempt to suppress either term of the three great dualities, subject-object, mind-body, Creator-creature. Hence in principle monisms, whether of the type of Haeckel, or of Croce and Gentile, are false. Monism is possible and necessary as a methodological postulate but false as a metaphysical doctrine; the future of philosophy lies on the lines marked out by Aristotle and St. Thomas.] **B. Dutkiewicz.** *Note sul problema della realtà.* ["Truth is an attribute of interpretations of experience depending on the correspondence of their contents with the real state of things." "The internal coherence of an interpretation does not of itself indicate its truth." "Two or more interpretations referring to the same data of experience cannot at once be true and contradict each other." "But it is possible that two or more interpretations referring to the same body of experience may be constructed which all possess the value of truth and are different but not contradictory" (e.g., a causal and a teleological interpretation of organic evolution)]. **Scrifioriano da Mons.** *Il positivismo di Carlo Maurras.* [Comte's treatment of the principle of authority is thoroughly opportunist. He insists on "free examination" to get rid of theology, but invokes authority to construct an altruistic morality and religion. Hence his system is radically incoherent and arbitrary. He, e.g., rejects the supernatural, not from logical necessity but because he pleases to do so. The Comtist determinism, which is due to the Cartesian prejudice in favour of mathematics, and is false to morality, is a *petitio principii*. But where did the author get his unhistorical theory that "Protestantism" is founded on belief in the infallibility of the individual and that "Protestants" have none but negative doctrines?] Notes and Discussions, Reviews etc. Anno xv., Fasc. i. January-February, 1923. **P. Rotta.** *Il problema dell' origine del malo in Platone e in Kant.* [There is agreement between Plato and Kant in their refusal to accept the easy identification of evil with mere negation. In this respect both are in sympathy with the doctrine of original sin. The author makes Plato approximate closely to Kant's theory of the extra-temporal free choice of evil by appealing to the *Timaeus*, from which he extracts the sense that all souls were originally created good, but some of them "sinned" before their conjunction with a body. The two philosophers agree, as against Christian theology and against Leibniz, in recognising only a fall of the individual, not a fall of the race. But in Plato the fall is not extra-temporal but merely antecedent to incarnation in a body. It is unfortunate that no notice is taken of the Platonic passage, *Laws* 897e, which is fundamental for Plato's views. And will not a careful study show that *Timaeus* means that the earliest sins are committed during the

first life in the body? Not to say that we are not entitled to assume that Plato means to adopt all the theories of his Pythagorean spokesman! The passing statement that the question of the origin of evil is raised, though not solved, in *Ep. ii.*, 313a is an oversight. Nothing is said there on the point.] **M. Cordovani.** *La Teologia secondo il pensiero di V. Gioberti e di F. Schleiermacher.* [Some sound reflexions on the weakly sentimental character of S.'s conception of theology, which would be more effective divested of their tone of angry pulpit-rhetoric.] **A. Levasti.** *Enrico Suco.* **A. Copelli.** *La Critica del Giudizio di E. Kant.* [A full analysis of the account of the Beautiful and the Sublime in the third *Critique.* Criticisms are to follow.] Book Reviews, etc.

X.—NOTES.

DASGUPTA'S "HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY".

TO THE EDITOR OF "MIND".

SIR,

Some of Prof. Mackenzie's statements in his review of Prof. Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy* in the January number of *MIND* are likely to give a misleading impression both of the author's views and of the subject-matter, and I should be glad to be allowed to point out some errors of fact.

Prof. Mackenzie finds that there is less continuity in the history of Indian speculation than in that of Greece, but it is not fair to the author to give this as if it were a conclusion drawn from his book, when his own view is quite different. The Indian systems existed side by side, they did not develop from one into another, but the continuity, unbroken for centuries, was within the same system. Some of these developed schools, but to look for a sequence from one system to another is to misapprehend the whole question. All this seems to me merely historical fact, but Prof. Mackenzie does not mention it as the author's view, even to reject it. It is quite disregarded, and another view put in its place.

There was also criticism and conflict between different systems. The sutras themselves show this, and even a small compendium like the *Vedantasara* refutes views of Carvakas, Buddhists, the Mimamsa, and the Nyaya. Prof. Dasgupta emphasises the fact that the travelling disputing scholar was for long an important feature of philosophical study, and that public discussions between various schools were frequent. On the other hand, Prof. Mackenzie states that it seems to have been the practice even up to quite recent times for isolated teachers to communicate their doctrines to a few receptive disciples. How anyone who knows the philosophical sutras can say this, is not clear, but it is not fair to the author to ignore the fact that he takes a quite opposite view. He is being directly and perhaps unconsciously contradicted.

Prof. Mackenzie also finds in Indian thought "the tendency to take refuge in what is formless and inexpressible". For this he gives no evidence. What he does is to refer, not to any philosophical school or doctrine, but to a legend mentioned by Sankara. This tells only of the impossibility which Bāhva (not Bhava) found in expressing in words the nature of the absolute Brahman. Other thinkers have found the same difficulty without having the general charge brought against them of "a constant effort to escape from name and form". The charge is extended to the philosophical schools, and this "underrating of form" is supposed to be partly responsible for logical errors. The reader will judge for himself about the instance given, though not from Prof. Mackenzie's statement of it, but it has nothing to do with the legend that centuries earlier a certain mystic found his experience of the nature of God inexpressible.

Most surprising is Prof. Mackenzie's complaint of inconsistency in the terminology, and he finds this a chief defect in the work. *Manas* is an instance. In one place (p. 25) Prof. Dasgupta translates it 'soul'. Prof. Mackenzie gives no indication that this sense occurs not as a philosophical term at all, but in a prehistoric Vedic hymn. Then nearly 300 pages further on he finds it translated 'mind'. Why should it be disconcerting if the Nyaya-Vaisesika some two thousand years later distinguished soul and mind? The distinctions are never confused by the author or his authorities. The case of the word *guna* is worse, but is too complicated to discuss, as it has changed its meaning more than once.

It is one of the merits of Prof. Dasgupta's work that he has gone to the sources, and his results are often entirely different from some dissolute expositions of Indian philosophy that might be mentioned. Prof. Mackenzie does not seem to have perceived this, and he thinks it worth while to quote against the author a writer who admits that he does "not know a word of Pali or any other Eastern language," and this on a point which entirely depends on knowing the sources. It is not my wish to defend the author against Mr. Holmes, but only to make it clear that his views have not been fairly stated, and in some cases not stated at all, but replaced by others. Even the scope of the book is misapprehended. It extends not to the ninth century A.D., but to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

E. J. THOMAS.

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INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY AT NAPLES.

An International Congress of Philosophy will be held at Naples in April, 1924, on the occasion of the Seventh Centenary of the foundation of the University of Naples. The *Società Filosofica Italiana* have sent an invitation to the MIND ASSOCIATION to be present at the Congress. Members of the Association who wish to accept this invitation are requested to communicate with Prof. A. Aliotta, Università, Napoli.

OBITUARY NOTICE OF DR. BOSANQUET.

The Obituary Notice of Dr. Bosanquet, promised for this number, has been unavoidably postponed till October.

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